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THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE, PRIVATE WATER
ALLOCATION, AND MONO LAKE: THE HISTORIC SAGA OF

NATIONAL AUDUBON SOCIETY V. SUPERIOR COURT
BY
ERIN RYAN*

This Article tells the epic tale of the fall and rise of Mono Lake—
the strange and beautiful Dead Sea of California—which fostered some
of the most important environmental law developments of the last
century, and which has become a platform for some of the most
potentially important developments in the new century. It shares the
backstory and legacy of the California Supreme Court’s famous
decision in National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709
(Cal. 1983), known more widely as “the Mono Lake case.” Inspired by
innovative legal scholarship and advocacy, the decision spawned a
quiet legal revolution in public trust ideals, which has redounded to
other states and even nations as far distant as India.
The Mono Lake dispute pitted advocates for the local ecosystem
and community against proponents of the continued export of Mono
Basin water to millions of thirsty Californians hundreds of miles to the
south. The controversy itself spanned decades, but the story leading up
to the litigation stretches back more than a hundred years, adding
depth and dimension to the tale that is easily missed on a casual
reading of the Mono Lake decision itself. It is a case study on the
challenges and possibilities for balancing legitimate needs for public
infrastructure and economic development with competing
environmental values, all within systems of law that are still evolving to
manage these conflicts. And at this particular moment in time,
commemorating the hundredth anniversary of the Los Angeles
Aqueduct that would threaten the lake and the twentieth anniversary of

* Professor Erin Ryan, Lewis & Clark Law School; J.D., Harvard Law School; M.A., Wesleyan
University. I am deeply indebted to Mike Blumm, Hap Dunning, Carol Rose, Robin Craig, and
Rick Frank for their generous and insightful comments, to Gabe Hinman and Ashley Garcia for
their outstanding research assistance, and to the editors of Environmental Law for their
exhaustive efforts in helping to prepare this piece for publication. I will always be grateful to
the Mono Lake District of the Inyo National Forest, the Mono Lake Committee, and the
community of Lee Vining, CA for welcoming me home so many years ago, and for inspiring the
professional journey that began with this story. Finally, I dedicate this piece to the memory of
Joseph Sax, whose work changed my life, as it has so many others.
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the State Water Board’s ultimate decision to save it, the Mono Lake
story is especially worth revisiting.
Part II introduces the main cast of characters in the Mono Lake
story, starting with the public trust and prior appropriations doctrines
around which the legal controversy unfolds. Part III introduces the
three places at the center of the drama—Los Angeles, the Owens
Valley, and the Mono Lake Basin—in recounting the history of the
Californian water struggles leading up to the Mono Lake case. Part IV
discusses the Mono Lake litigation itself and its aftermath, reviewing
the court’s conclusion and the subsequent decision by the California
Water Resources Control Board implementing the judicial directive.
After analyzing the most important doctrinal innovations in the opinion,
Part IV discusses subsequent critiques and new developments in public
trust law.
Part V concludes with parting reflections about some important
questions that the Mono Lake story leaves us to ponder, including
whose interests count when we talk about the “public” trust, how they
differ from aggregated private interests, and which to account for when
balancing the economic, cultural, and environmental considerations in
public trust conflicts. It considers the extent to which the doctrine
creates substantive or procedural obligations, and the responsibilities
of different legal actors and institutions in implementing them. The
contested answers to these questions are what make the public trust
doctrine so fascinating, so powerful, and so critical as we continue to
confront the inevitable crises between competing natural resource
values.
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The visitors collect at the parking lot, breathlessly absorbing the
magnificent escarpment of the Yosemite–Inyo Sierra before them, admiring the
defiant cones of the Mono Crater volcanoes behind them, and settling their
gazes over the crystalline edges of the body of water between, a vast inland sea
twice the size of San Francisco—the mythical Mono Lake of newspaper
headline and bumper-sticker fame. As they gradually descend the volcanic ash
trail a few hundred yards out to shore, the ranger explains that the parking lot
had been submerged twice their standing height in lakewater only a few
decades ago, before the lake’s tributaries were first diverted into the Los
Angeles Aqueduct for the 350-mile journey south to the City. . . .
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And then, just a few yards from the foaming water’s edge, the ranger stops
them and explains that thanks to important legal decisions between 1983 and
1994, the water level is now rising again—the salinity falling, the birds
returning, the shrimp safe from extinction, and the people breathing clean air
again—all because of an ancient article of common law, the public trust
doctrine, according to which the California Supreme Court finally decided that
to allow the death of Mono Lake for the benefit of one city [c]ould violate the
State’s duty to protect it as an ecological resource belonging to all. Parents’
eyes grow as wide as their children’s in sudden wonder of the power of ideas,
and in awe of the devastation of near loss and the grace of last-minute
salvation. And as they stand in the midst of such unparalleled natural splendor,
rejoicing in a happy ending so rare in like stories of environmental crisis, the
1
visitors experience . . . genuine gratitude for [law].

I. INTRODUCTION
In this Article, based on an interactive lecture I have given countless
times,2 I have the great pleasure of sharing the epic tale of the fall and rise of
Mono Lake—the strange and beautiful Dead Sea of California—which
fostered some of the most important environmental law developments of the
last century,3 and which has become a platform for some of the most
potentially important developments in the new century.4 The Mono Lake
saga is one of my very favorite stories in the world, and one that I have
enjoyed sharing all over the world in the years since I left the Mono Basin for
academia. It includes the backstory and the legacy of the California Supreme
Court’s famous decision in National Audubon Society v. Superior Court

1 Erin Ryan, Public Trust & Distrust: Theoretical Implications of the Public Trust Doctrine
for Natural Resource Management, 31 ENVTL. L. 477, 493–94 (2001) (describing the standard

United States Forest Service ranger-led tour of the South Tufa trail on the southwest shore of
Mono Lake).
2 This Article is based on an extended lecture about the Mono Lake story, drawing on my
own expertise as both a property and environmental law professor and as a former U.S. Forest
Service ranger at the Mono Basin National Forest Scenic Area, just east of Yosemite National
Park, in northeastern California.
3 See, e.g., Michael Blumm & Thea Schwartz, Mono Lake and the Evolving Public Trust in
Western Water, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 701 (1995) (analyzing impacts of the Mono Lake case on
subsequent cases and the evolving public trust doctrine nationwide); Craig Anthony (Tony)
Arnold, Working out an Environmental Ethic: Anniversary Lessons from Mono Lake, 4 WYO. L.
REV. 1 (2004) (using the Mono Lake case study to suggest that politics and public participation
are as critical as formal law to environmental successes); Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold & Leigh
A. Jewel, Litigation’s Bounded Effectiveness and the Real Public Trust Doctrine: The Aftermath
of the Mono Lake Case, 14 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1177, 1181 (2008) (arguing that
the Mono Lake case laid the foundation for a conception of the public trust that transcends the
courtroom); Sherry A. Enzler, How Law Mattered to the Mono Lake Ecosystem, 35 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 413 (2011) (reviewing the significance of the Mono Lake case for public
trust and environmental law at a systemic level).
4 See, e.g., infra Parts II.A.2, IV.A.4, and IV.C.3 (discussing Robinson Township, the Scott
River case, and atmospheric trust cases).
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(Mono Lake),5 which began a quiet legal revolution in public trust ideals that
has redounded to other states and even nations as far distant as India.6
The Mono Lake dispute pitted advocates for the Mono Basin ecosystem
and its local community against proponents of the continued export of Mono
Basin water to millions of thirsty Californians hundreds of miles to the
south.7 The controversy itself spanned decades, but the story leading up to
the litigation stretches back more than a hundred years, adding depth and
dimension to the tale that is easily missed on a casual reading of the
Audubon Society decision itself. It is a case study on the challenges of, and
possibilities for, balancing legitimate needs for public infrastructure and
economic development with competing environmental values, all within
systems of law that are still evolving to manage these conflicts. And at this
particular moment in time—commemorating the hundredth anniversary of
the Los Angeles Aqueduct that would threaten the lake, and the twentieth
anniversary of the State Water Board’s ultimate decision to save it—the
Mono Lake story is especially worth revisiting.8
It is also a story that is very dear to me personally, because I came to it
mostly through my own experiences living and working at Mono Lake as a
grunt-level ranger with the U.S. Forest Service. Before later becoming a
lawyer and then law professor, I spent a few years working on the Mono
Lake District of the Inyo National Forest, just east of Yosemite National
Park.9 Indeed, my decision to leave the Mono Basin for law, though

5

Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court of Alpine County (Mono Lake), 658 P.2d 709 (Cal.

1983).
6 M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath, (1997) 1 S.C.C. 388 (1996) (India), in I UNITED NATIONS
ENVIRONMENT PROJECT COMPENDIUM OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS IN MATTERS RELATED TO THE
ENVIRONMENT, NATIONAL DECISIONS 259 (1998), available at http://www.asianjudges.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/10/Compendium_Judicial_Decisions_Nat_v1.pdf (discussing the role of
the public trust doctrine in Indian law and quoting the California Supreme Court’s description
of the doctrine in Mono Lake).
7 Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 715.
8 The Los Angeles Aqueduct formally opened in 1913. Id. at 713. The California Water
Resources Control Board issued its decision implementing the state supreme court’s decision in
1994. Mono Lake Basin Water Right Decision 1631, at 1, 6 (State of Calif. Water Res. Control Bd.
Sep. 28, 1994) [hereinafter Decision 1631], available at http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/
publications_forms/publications/general/docs/monolake_wr_dec1631_a.pdf; see also infra Part
III.B and IV.C (reviewing this history).
9 I normally give this lecture as an illustrated photo essay, drawing on my experiences
during the years that I worked at Mono Lake. I lived with U.S. Forest Service rangers, Mono
Lake Committee staff, and other local residents in the tiny mountain hamlet of Lee Vining,
California, nestled at 7,000 feet of elevation between the western edge of the Lake and the
eastern slope of the Yosemite–Inyo Sierra crest, with a population of 315 at the time. Lee Vining
is surrounded by 10,000- to 14,000-foot mountains on three out of four sides, snowed-in beyond
automobile passage for more than half the year. When I lived there in the mid-1990s, before
home satellites were available, there was no television and only one radio station broadcasting
intermittently from Mammoth Lakes, a small ski town 30 miles to the south.
To pass the time, local residents regularly went climbing, hiking, or birding—but my
friends and I invented a wholly new Mono Basin sport: aqueducting. We made it our project to
find all the interesting points along the 400-mile-long Los Angeles Aqueduct, all the way from
the northernmost intake in the Mono Basin down to its symbolic end at Department of Water
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wrenching, was the direct result of my experiences there bearing witness to
the ability of ordinary people to wield the power of ideas to resolve critical
social and environmental crises through legal process. Especially in the
aftermath and implementation of the Mono Lake decision, I was inspired by
efforts of citizens, lawyers, scientists, and governments working together to
make progress in the best possible way, even when no perfect way was
available.10
For that reason, this is an Article that I have been wanting to write for
the better part of the last twenty years. It takes a somewhat unconventional
voice at times, alternating between the academic analysis of a law professor
and the personal narrative of a local storyteller. But throughout, my
objective is to share a classic story of American environmental law that
continues to awe and inspire advocates worldwide. In the telling, I’ll explore
the public trust doctrine, its relationship with competing areas of law,
especially the law of private water allocation, and its potential scope and
limits in application to other public commons that are also subject to private
appropriation.
Part II begins by introducing the main cast of characters in the Mono
Lake story, starting with the public trust and prior appropriations doctrines
around which the legal controversy unfolds. Part III introduces the three
places at the center of the drama—Los Angeles, the Owens Valley, and the
Mono Lake Basin—in recounting the history of the Californian water
struggles leading up to the Mono Lake case. Part IV discusses the Mono Lake
litigation itself and its aftermath, reviewing the arguments that made it to the
California Supreme Court, the court’s disposition of them, and the
subsequent decision by the California Water Resources Control Board
implementing the court’s directive.11 After analyzing the most important
doctrinal developments in the judicial opinion, it reviews the scholarly
criticisms that have followed alongside the praise, as well as important new
developments in public trust law.
I’ll conclude in Part V with parting reflections about some of the open
questions that the Mono Lake story leaves us to ponder. Like all public trust
tales, it prompts us to consider exactly whose interests count when we talk
about the public interest protected by the doctrine, and in what resources.
How does the “public interest” differ from aggregated private interests?
Which interests should we take into account when balancing the economic,
cultural, and environmental considerations in public trust conflicts, and how
should they be balanced? Indeed, we might ask what the Mono Lake story
tells us about the ultimate content of the public trust doctrine itself. Which
resources are subject to its protection? Does it create substantive

and Power’s reflecting pool in Los Angeles. The full lecture makes use of stories and
photographs from these personal journeys, to understand this history up close and personally.
10 Still, I’ll never forget that when I volunteered thoughts about leaving my work as a forest
ranger to become a lawyer, most of the lawyers I spoke with cried aloud that this was crazy—
that they dreamed of leaving their jobs in law to become forest rangers! (Health insurance
aside, there is a lot of wisdom in that reaction.)
11 See Decision 1631, supra note 8.
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obligations to protect trust values, or mere procedural obligations to
consider them? Finally, what are the responsibilities of the operative legal
institutions—including the legislature, the courts, administrative agencies,
and individual citizens—in making these difficult calls? I’ll suggest that the
answers to these questions are what make the public trust doctrine so
fascinating, so powerful, and so critical as we continue to confront the
inevitable crises between competing natural resource values.
II. THE LEGAL BACKDROP: THE PUBLIC TRUST AND PRIOR APPROPRIATIONS
Before delving into the full narrative, we should introduce the cast of
characters. And one unusual aspect of this story is that two of the most
important characters in that cast are legal doctrines: the common law public
trust doctrine, and the prior appropriations doctrine of private water
allocation. This Part introduces the public trust doctrine as a feature of state
common law and constitutional law, and perhaps as an underlying feature of
sovereign authority more generally. It then reviews the broad mechanics of
private water law, focusing on the western doctrines of prior appropriations
and beneficial use.

A. The Public Trust Doctrine
The public trust doctrine is among the oldest doctrines of the common
law, with roots in the Justinian Code of ancient Rome, where it was called
the jus publicum.12 As the Byzantine Emperor Justinian described it: “By the
law of nature, these things are common to mankind—the air, running water,
the sea, and consequently the shores of the sea.”13 Even then, it was
recognized that some resources are so critical that they cannot be owned by
anyone in particular; instead, they must belong to everyone. To prevent
private monopolization of these critical commons resources,14 the
government must manage them on behalf of the public.15
American law received the public trust doctrine through British
common law, where it was applied mostly to the sea and the shores of the
sea.16 Here in the United States, where the shores of the sea are matched by
countless thousands of miles of navigable rivers and lakes, the concept of
12 See, e.g., Ewa M. Davison, Enjoys Long Walks on the Beach: Washington’s Public Trust
Doctrine and the Right of Pedestrian Passage over Private Tidelands, 81 WASH. L. REV 813, 830–
31 (2006); Joseph Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970) (laying the seminal academic foundations for the

public trust doctrine as a modern legal tool to aid in the protection of natural resources).
13 J. INST. PROEMIUM, 2.1.1. (T. Sandars trans., 4th ed. 1867).
14 Davison, supra note 12, at 830–31.
15 See Michael C. Blumm, Public Property and the Democratization of Western Water Law:
A Modern View of the Public Trust Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 573, 580 (1989) (discussing the public
trust doctrine as “a democratizing force by (1) preventing monopolization of trust resources and
(2) promoting natural resource decision making that involves and is accountable to the public”).
16 See Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently
Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 727–30 (1986).
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the trust was expanded to protect the resources associated with navigable
waterways more generally.17 Early American references to the doctrine
include the 1821 New Jersey case of Arnold v. Mundy18 and the U.S. Supreme
Court’s 1842 decision in Martin v. Waddell,19 both affirming state sovereign
ownership of navigable waters and submerged lands.20 The doctrine was
formally ratified by the U.S. Supreme Court in Shively v. Bowlby,21 but the
most classic American statement of the trust comes from the Supreme
Court’s decision in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois (Illinois Central):
“[T]he State holds the title to the lands under the navigable waters . . . in
trust for the people of the State that they may enjoy the navigation of the
waters, carry on commerce over them, and have liberty of fishing therein
freed from the obstruction or interference of private parties.”22
Critically, the doctrine isn’t just about protecting the public nature of
these common resources—it’s also about assigning responsibility for their
protection. Analogous to the private property law construct of the “trust,”
the government (acting as trustee) is responsible for protecting the resource
(or trust res) for the public benefit.23 This means that the government doesn’t
17 See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois (Illinois Central), 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892). The public
trust doctrine has also been held to protect wildlife, groundwater resources, atmospheric
resources, and potentially groundwater tributaries of navigable waters. See, e.g., Betchart v.
Dep’t of Fish & Game, 158 Cal. App. 3d 1104, 1106 (1984) (“California wildlife is publicly owned
and is not held by owners of private land where wildlife is present.”); Owsichek v. State, Guide
and Control Licensing Bd., 763 P.2d 488, 495 (Alaska 1988) (“[C]ommon law principles
incorporated in the common use clause impose upon the state a trust duty to manage the fish,
wildlife and water resources of the state for the benefit of all the people. We have twice
recognized this duty in our prior decisions.” (footnote omitted)); Environmental Protection Act
of 1970, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1202(1) (West 1989) (extending the public trust, via
statute, to authorize legal actions “for the protection of the air” in addition to water and other
natural resources); First Amended Petition for Writ of Mandamus and Complaint for
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2, Envtl. Law Found. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., No.
34-2010-80000583 (Cal. Sup. Ct. July 15, 2014) (seeking to extend the public trust doctrine to
protect groundwater resources in California); Natural Resources and Environmental Protection
Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.1701(1) (1994), available at http://legislature.mi.gov/doc.aspx?mcl324-1701 (extending the public trust to statutorily authorize legal actions “for the protection of
the air” in addition to water and other natural resources).
18 6 N.J.L. 1, 10 (1821) (using the public trust doctrine to prevent individuals from claiming
a property interest in oyster beds in a navigable river).
19 41 U.S. 367, 410 (1842) (“[W]hen the Revolution took place, the people of each state
became themselves sovereign; and in that character hold the absolute right to all their navigable
waters, and the soils under them, for their own common use, subject only to the rights since
surrendered by the Constitution to the general government.”).
20 For a more thorough history of the early American doctrine, see generally Harrison C.
Dunning, The Public Right to Use Water in Place, in WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 28-1 to 33-22
(Amy C. Kelley ed., 2009).
21 152 U.S. 1, 49 (1894) (affirming the substance of the common law doctrine and holding
that, with regard to the territories acquired by Congress, “the title and dominion of the tide
waters and the lands under them are held by the United States for the benefit of the whole
people, and, as this court has often said, in cases above cited, ‘in trust for the future States.’”).
22 Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 452.
23 See, e.g., Richard M. Frank, The Public Trust Doctrine: Assessing Its Recent Past and
Charting Its Future, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 665, 667 (2012) (“Simply stated, however, the doctrine
provides that certain natural resources are held by the government in a special status—in
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own trust resources in the same way that it owns more ordinary public lands
under its jurisdiction. Instead, it holds the resource “in trust” for the real
owner—the public. Some scholars have described the difference as one
between state “sovereign” and “proprietary” ownership, in which resources
held as sovereign property are subject to the trust, while those subject to
proprietary ownership may be alienated by the state on terms more like
ordinary private property.24
The public is the ultimate beneficiary of the trust, and as in
conventional trust relationships, the public can hold the government
accountable for failure to manage trust resources in accordance with its
responsibility as trustee.25 If they feel the government is failing its obligations
as trustee, citizens can usually seek to enforce their rights in court.26 In this
way, the public trust doctrine acts as a limit on sovereign authority with
regard to trust resources, constraining what the government can and cannot
do to ensure against private expropriation and monopolization.27

1. The Common Law Public Trust: Illinois Central
Demonstrating the force of the doctrine are the facts at the center of
the U.S. Supreme Court’s leading public trust decision, the 1892 case of
Illinois Central.28
This colorful nineteenth century lawsuit followed a fraught moment in
Illinois history, when the state legislature granted ownership of the better
part of Chicago Harbor on Lake Michigan to a private railroad company.29
After a series of complicated transactions in which Illinois Central Railroad
Company was granted rights to construct infrastructure along the dry and
wet sides of the lakeshore,30 the legislature overrode a gubernatorial veto to
enact the Lake Front Act of 1869,31 which conveyed ownership rights in
‘trust’—for current and future generations. Government officials may neither alienate those
resources into private ownership nor permit their injury or destruction.”).
24 See DAVID C. SLADE ET AL., PUTTING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO WORK 6–8 (1997)
(describing the distinction between jus privatum, which the state may convey, and jus
publicum, which it may not).
25 See Sax, supra note 12, at 473 (describing how citizens have brought lawsuits to enforce
the trust obligations of the state).
26

Id.
See Amicus Curiae Brief of Law Professors in Support of Granting Writ of Certiorari at 1–
2, 7, Alec L. ex rel. Loorz v. McCarthy, 561 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (No. 14-405), cert. denied,
27

135 S. Ct. 774 (2014) [hereinafter Professor Amicus Brief] (discussing the public trust doctrine
as an attribute of sovereignty).
28 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
29 Id. at 438–39 (making “a grant by the State, in 1869, of its right and title to the submerged
lands, constituting the bed of Lake Michigan”).
30 Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of the American Public Trust
Doctrine: What Really Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 799, 818–23 (2004)
(discussing the railroad’s improvements to the lakeshore); see also Crystal Chase, The Illinois
Central Public Trust Decision and Federal Common Law: An Unconventional View, 16 HASTINGS
W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 113, 126 (2010) (same).
31 See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 30, at 860–77 (discussing the enactment of the Lake Front
Act of 1869); see also 2 Journal of the Senate of the Twenty Sixth General Assembly of the State
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perpetuity to the railroad.32 Whether the legislative grant was a well-intended
plan to spur economic development or the most flagrant variety of political
cronyism,33 the people of Chicago were incensed, and they made their
displeasure known to their leaders in government.34
In 1873, responding to significant public pressure, the Illinois legislature
sought to reestablish public control over the full harbor by repealing the
original conveyance.35 Ten years later, when the railroad continued to
assume a proprietary posture toward the harbor, the state sued for
declaratory relief establishing public ownership of the lakebed.36 But Illinois
Central argued that these submerged lands were now its private property,
conveyed by the Lake Front Act of 1869.37 The railroad maintained that the
state lacked authority to reclaim property that had already passed in a fully
executed conveyance.38 As the railroad argued, the state could not formally
convey property and then just take it back, as if the conveyance had never
happened!39
Of course, even if the legislative grant were sound, the state actually
could have just taken it back—though not as if the conveyance had never
happened. The state’s power of eminent domain would have allowed it to
reclaim the property for public use, so long as it paid just compensation to
the railroad.40 Indeed, other scholars have written about Illinois Central as
though the most important issue in the litigation was the state’s liability for
an uncompensated taking41—a legal issue in which the public trust doctrine
might also play a role42—but that claim was not a subject of the actual
litigation.43 Instead, Illinois Central staked its most important claim on the
power of the original legislative grant and the lack of state authority to undo

of Illinois 922 (1869) (noting the Senate’s passage of the House’s version of the bill, enacting the
Act).
32 See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 30, at 875.
33 Compare Sax, supra note 12, at 490 (arguing that the conveyance could not be justified
by any public benefit), with Kearney & Merrill, supra note 30, at 893 (“[A]lthough the
documentary record from 1869 cannot be said definitely to establish . . . corrupt means . . . it
probably leans in that direction.”).
34 See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 30, at 805–06, 875.
35 Illinois Central, 146 U.S. 387, 449 (1892) (“On the 15th of April, 1873, the legislature of
Illinois repealed the act.”).
36 Id. at 433, 439.
37 Id. at 438–39.
38 Id. at 450–51.
39 Boiling down the legal jargon, the railroad’s claim would have been well understood—by
any five-year-old—under the hallowed doctrine of “No Backsies.”
40 See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
41 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Public Trust Doctrine, 7 CATO J. 411, 422–26 (1987);
Lloyd R. Cohen, The Public Trust Doctrine: An Economic Perspective, 29 CAL. W. L. REV. 239,
246 (1992).
42 See, e.g., Erin Ryan, Palazzolo, The Public Trust, and the Property Owner’s Reasonable
Expectations: Takings and the South Carolina Marsh Island Bridge Debate, 15 SOUTHEASTERN
ENVTL. L.J. 121, 137–40 (2006) (discussing use of the public trust doctrine to defend takings
claims by defusing the reasonableness of claimants’ expectations).
43 See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 30, at 811 n.54 (explaining this popular
misconception).
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it (together with subsidiary claims for rights incident to its ownership of
riparian lands and a later claim that the repeal interfered with rights under
its original charter).44
Nevertheless, the state had a formidable response, and one that hinged
on the subject of our inquiry here. Illinois argued that its power to undo a
fully executed conveyance was immaterial, because—thanks to the public
trust doctrine—there was no actual conveyance to undo.45 It may have
looked like a conveyance in the moment, but in fact, no exchange took place
as a legal matter, because the state never had the power to convey these
submerged lands to begin with.46 The trust obligation prevented the
government from conveying the trust resource away from public ownership,
making the conveyance essentially ultra vires—beyond the power of the
state—and thus of no legal consequence.
Accepting this argument, the Supreme Court concluded that the
operation of the public trust doctrine had prevented the legislature from
ever alienating the harbor in the first place.47 The railroad had never been the
actual owner of the submerged lands, then, and so its legal claims ended
there. In this way, Illinois was able to successfully reestablish public
ownership of Chicago Harbor on the grounds that the public trust doctrine
acted as a limit on the state’s legal ability to casually convey trust lands.48
The premise affirmed in Illinois Central provided critical impetus for
the development of the common law public trust in nearly all of the United
States.49 Today, the common law public trust doctrine offers meaningful
protection of navigable waterways as public commons in nearly every state.50
44 Illinois Central, 146 U.S. 387, 438–39 (1892) (stating the railroad’s claims); Ill. Cent, R.R.
Co. v. Chicago, 176 U.S. 646, 657–67 (1900) (dismissing the railroad’s contract rights claim after
determining that its charter did not convey the disputed lands).
45 Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 439.
46
47

Id.
Id. at 453 (“The trust devolving upon the State for the public, and which can only be

discharged by the management and control of property in which the public has an interest,
cannot be relinquished by a transfer of the property.”). Of note, Justice Field explained that the
trust extended to Chicago Harbor because it was “a subject of public concern to the whole
people,” leaving open the possibility, embraced by later scholars and litigants, that the same
rationale should apply to other commons resources also vulnerable to monopolization. Id. at
455; see also MICHAEL C. BLUMM & MARY CHRISTINA WOOD, THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN
ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 72 (2013) (discussing Illinois Central and various
scholars’ interpretations of the case); infra Part IV.C (discussing the Atmospheric Trust
Project).
48 See Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 453 (“The control of the State for the purposes of the
trust can never be lost . . . .”).
49 See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 30, at 799 (outlining the history of the case in light of
its importance in modern public trust theory).
50 See generally Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust
Doctrines: Classifications of States, Property Rights, and State Summaries, 16 PENN. ST. ENVTL.
L. REV. 1 (2007) (comparing eastern states’ public trust doctrines); Robin Kundis Craig, A

Comparative Guide to the Western States’ Public Trust Doctrines: Public Values, Private Rights,
and the Evolution Toward an Ecological Public Trust, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 53 (2010) (comparing
western states’ public trust doctrines); ALEXANDRA B. KLASS & LING-YEE HUANG, RESTORING THE
TRUST: WATER RESOURCES AND THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE, A MANUAL FOR ADVOCATES 21–24
(2009), available at http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/CPR_Public_Trust_Doctrine
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Following the Mono Lake decision, it has become increasingly associated
not only with the protection of such traditional uses as boating, commerce,
fishing, and swimming, but with environmental protection as well.51

2. Constitutionalization of the Public Trust: Robinson Township
The common law public trust doctrine continues to play an important
role in the regulation of public waterways, but the trust concept has also
developed independently as a matter of state constitutional law.
Many states have constitutionalized versions of the doctrine; some are
similar to the most traditional common law statements, and others are more
encompassing.52 For example, the Florida Constitution includes a version of
the trust that confers very traditional protection for submerged lands
beneath navigable waters: “The title to lands under navigable waters, within
the boundaries of the state . . . is held by the state, by virtue of its
sovereignty, in trust for all the people.”53 This statement recognizes public
ownership of the critical water commons, very much as Illinois Central did.
Constitutionalization in other states has broadened the scope and effect
of the trust, sometimes far beyond the Illinois Central version. For example,
Article XI of the Hawaiian Constitution declares that:
For the benefit of present and future generations, the State and its political
subdivisions shall conserve and protect Hawaii’s natural beauty and all natural
resources, including land, water, air, minerals and energy sources, and shall
promote the development and utilization of these resources in a manner
consistent with their conservation and in furtherance of the self-sufficiency of
the State. All public natural resources are held in trust by the State for the
54
benefit of the people.

Echoing the California doctrine that emerged from the Mono Lake litigation,
the Hawaii Supreme Court has concluded that the law of private water

_Manual.pdf (comparing the sources of various states’ public trust doctrines); MICHAEL C.
BLUMM ET AL., THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN FORTY-FIVE STATES (2014), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2235329 (analyzing the public trust
doctrines of 45 states); CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, RESTORING THE TRUST: AN INDEX OF
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND CASES ON WATER RESOURCES AND THE
PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE (2009), available at http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/Pub
Trust_State_table_2009.pdf.
51 See, e.g., Marks v. Whitney (Marks), 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971) (finding increasing
recognition that one of the most important uses of tidelands protected by the doctrine is “the
preservation of those lands in their natural state, so that they may serve as ecological units for
scientific study, as open space, and as environments which provide food and habitat for birds
and marine life, and which favorably affect the scenery and climate of the area”).
52 See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Environmental Policy and State Constitutions: The
Potential Role of Substantive Guidance, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 863, 866 (1996) (“[T]he ‘public trust’
doctrine . . . plays a constitutional role in most states even though less than a handful of states
refer to the trust in the constitution itself.”).
53 FLA. CONST. art. X, § 11.
54 HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
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allocation does not displace the public trust doctrine.55 However, it has gone
even further than California in holding that all water, and not just navigable
water, is subject to the trust.56
Like Hawaii’s expanded doctrine, the Environmental Rights
Amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitution reveals an expansive modern
conception of the trust:
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the
natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment. Pennsylvania’s
public natural resources are the common property of all the people, including
generations yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth
57
shall conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.

In contrast to the simpler Justinian affirmation of public ownership of
natural resources, the Pennsylvania doctrine explicitly establishes a
substantive commitment to protecting the environmental values associated
with public resources.
Demonstrating the power of this commitment, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court recently invoked the Environmental Rights Amendment to
overturn a state law limiting municipal authority to regulate harms
associated with horizontal shale drilling and hydraulic fracturing
(“fracking”). In the 2014 decision of Robinson Township v. Commonwealth
(Robinson Township),58 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the state
could not preempt local regulation of fracking operations threatening local
water resources, because this conflicted with the state’s obligation to
protect present and future generations’ interests in public natural
resources.59 Notably, the court invoked the doctrine sua sponte to resolve
the case, even though the parties did not argue it.60 The move has drawn
renewed attention to the possibilities for intersections between the public
trust and other forms of state action that threaten public natural resources.61

3. Federalization of the Public Trust?
American case law generally presumes that the public trust doctrine is a
feature of state law—either received as common law or adopted
55 In re Water Use Permit Applications (Waiahole Ditch), 9 P.3d 409, 445 (Haw. 2000)
(holding that the state water code “does not supplant the protections of the public trust
doctrine”).
56 Id. (“[T]he public trust doctrine applies to all water resources without exception or
distinction.”).
57 PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
58 Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 919–20 (Pa. 2013).
59 Id. (noting that “a political subdivision has a substantial, direct, and immediate interest in
protecting the environment and the quality of life within its borders” and that “[t]he protection
of environmental and esthetic interests is an essential aspect of Pennsylvanians’ quality of life
and a key part of local government’s role”).
60 See John C. Dernbach, The Potential Meanings of a Constitutional Public Trust, 45
ENVTL. L. 257, 464–65 (2015).
61

Id.
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constitutionally (or both)62—a view that was recently affirmed by the D.C.
Circuit.63 However, scholars have long argued that the doctrine is better
understood as an inherent limit on sovereign authority in general.64 Pursuing
this intuition, some suggest that relevant federal sovereign authority should
also be subject to public trust limits.65 New litigation follows this line of
argument to assert that as an inherent limit on sovereign authority, the
public trust doctrine may also be an implied feature of federal constitutional
law.66 If so, then it may have application to waters under federal jurisdiction,
and possibly to other natural resources that can be protected only by federal
authority.67
These scholars and litigants argue that there are neither historical nor
logical reasons to differentiate between the state or federal nature of the
sovereign power that the public trust doctrine constrains when the
sovereign acts in a manner contrary to a definable trust obligation.68
Received as part of the English common law that forms the bedrock of all
American legal institutions, the doctrine is neither a creature of state nor
federal law, but a constraint on the sovereign authority delegated to each
level of government within our federal system.69
62 See, e.g., Jeffrey S. Silvyn, Protecting Public Trust Values in California’s Waters: The
Constitutional Alternative, 10 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 355 (1992) (comparing California’s

common law and constitutional public trust rights, and concluding that the latter is more
expansive).
63 Alec L. ex rel. Loorz v. McCarthy, 561 F. App’x 7, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2014). But see Michael
Blumm & Lynn Schaffer, The Federal Public Trust Doctrine: Misinterpreting Justice Kennedy
and Illinois Central Railroad, 45 ENVTL. L. 257, 400–01 (2015) (arguing that the D.C. Circuit is
incorrect on this point).
64 See, e.g., Jan S. Stevens, The Public Trust and In-Stream Uses, 19 ENVTL. L. 605, 609
(1989) (arguing that the public trust is an inalienable attribute of state sovereignty).
65 See, e.g., MARY CHRISTINA WOOD, NATURE’S TRUST: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR A NEW
ECOLOGICAL AGE 133–36 (2014) [hereinafter NATURE’S TRUST]; Mary Christina Wood, Advancing

the Sovereign Trust of Government to Safeguard the Environment for Present and Future
Generations (Part I): Ecological Realism and the Need for a Paradigm Shift, 39 ENVTL. L. 43, 74
(2009) [hereinafter Wood, Part I]; Mary Christina Wood, Advancing the Sovereign Trust of
Government to Safeguard the Environment for Present and Future Generations (Part II):
Instilling a Fiduciary Obligation in Governance, 39 ENVTL. L. 91, 135–36 (2009) [hereinafter
Wood, Part II] (suggesting avenues for Congress to meet its public trust responsibilities);
Blumm & Schaffer, supra note 63, at 399 (arguing that “there is considerable precedent applying
the public trust doctrine to the federal government”); Blumm et al., Renouncing the Public Trust
Doctrine: An Assessment of the Validity of Idaho House Bill 794, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 461, 494
(“[T]he public trust is grounded in the federal constitutional equal footing doctrine . . . .”);
Epstein, supra note 41, at 426 (asserting that the constitutional nature of the trust limits
sovereign authority over public property in the same way the takings clause limits sovereign
authority over private property).
66 See, e.g., Blumm & Schaffer, supra note 63, at 405; see also infra Part IV.C.3 (discussing
possibility of an atmospheric trust theory).
67 See NATURE’S TRUST, supra note 65, at 136 (arguing that federal trust obligations should
apply to protect the atmosphere against private appropriation as a disposal site for greenhouse
gas pollution).
68 Blumm & Schaffer, supra note 63, at 399 (“The trust doctrine, properly understood, is an
inherent limit on all sovereigns, not merely state sovereigns.”); NATURE’S TRUST, supra note 65,
at 133–36.
69 See NATURE’S TRUST, supra note 65, at 133–36.
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The historical argument roughly asserts that the public trust doctrine
must constrain federal authority, because the implicit trust obligations of
most states arose by delegation of federal authority over lands previously
held in federal ownership. Today, the doctrine most often constrains state
authority, because under the equal footing doctrine of the U.S.
Constitution,70 states own the submerged lands beneath navigable
waterways,71 and under the Submerged Lands Act,72 they are the primary
regulators of tidelands within three miles of shore.73 But other than the
original thirteen colonies, all states inherited their trust obligations through
the medium of federal sovereignty that applied before their lands were
carved out of federal holdings.74 The states must have inherited a preexisting trust obligation, goes this reasoning, because there is no clear legal
moment when new trust obligations were expressly conferred. Therefore,
the doctrine must have implicitly inhered at the federal level before it was
delegated to the states, and by this theory, it remains there in application to
all trust resources that were not delegated to the states.75
The analytical argument asserts that, by the logic underlying the
doctrine, there is no persuasive reason to distinguish between state or
federal sovereignty when they govern resources that are appropriately
subject to the public trust.76 The trust simply establishes a constraint on
sovereign authority at whatever is the relevant level to protect public trust
resources from private expropriation or monopolization. For submerged
lands that remain under federal jurisdiction, or for other obligations the
doctrine may be held to create, these scholars and litigants argue that the
federal government should be equally bound as trustee.77
Nevertheless, the argument that the public trust doctrine is an inherent
limit on federal authority must overcome formidable hurdles in previous
Supreme Court dicta stating that the doctrine is a matter of state law, and
not an implied feature of federal constitutional law.78 It remains to be seen
whether this dicta will hold firm over time, or whether it will be dislodged by
more directed Supreme Court litigation in the future.

70

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1.

71

See Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 566 (1911) (interpreting the equal footing clause).

72

43 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1315 (2012).

73

Id. §§ 1311–1312 (discussing state authority over submerged lands and seaward

boundaries).
74 One way of viewing this is that in the equal footing conveyances, the federal government
itself imposed the trust on the states. See Blumm & Schaffer, supra note 63 (discussing Justice
Kennedy’s reference to the equal footing doctrine in Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe and what it
means for the public trust doctrine’s origins).
75 See Blumm et al., supra note 65.
76 Blumm & Schaffer, supra note 63; NATURE’S TRUST, supra note 65, at 133–36.
77 Blumm & Schaffer, supra note 63; NATURE’S TRUST, supra note 65, at 133–36.
78 PPL, Montana, L.L.C. v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1235 (“[T]he public trust doctrine
remains a matter of state law.”); cf. Alec L. v. McCarthy, 135 S. Ct. 774 (2014) (denying certiorari
to address whether there is a federal public trust doctrine). See infra Part IV.C.3, further
discussing these arguments.
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B. The Prior Appropriations Doctrine
The other leading legal doctrine in the Mono Lake story is equally
important to the maintenance of public environmental values, but more
directly associated with private rights and economic development: the prior
appropriations doctrine of private water allocation. Water allocation
doctrines regulate the private benefits that individuals and others can
receive from public waterways. While the public trust regulates the
management of rivers, lakes, and oceans, private water allocation doctrines
regulate the use of the actual water in these waterways (excluding the
nonpotable waters of the ocean). The United States follows two principal
approaches to allocating surface water: the riparian rights doctrine of the
eastern states, in which all users must share, and the prior appropriations
doctrine of the west, in which the first to claim has the superior right.79
Eastern riparianism is essentially a doctrine of correlative rights, in
which users are entitled to appropriate water only to the extent that it does
not compromise the legitimate needs of other qualified users.80
Conceptualizing water as a resource that everyone shares equally, the
doctrine requires a balancing of equities under conditions of shortage.81
Instream uses are protected on par with other uses of a waterway, affording
more historic protection for the environmental values associated with
preserving instream flows.82 Because riparian rights are premised on a theory
of waterways as commons resources, conflicts with the public trust
doctrine—which also presumes that waterways are a public commons—are
relatively modest.
The doctrine of prior appropriations, adopted in arid western states
where water scarcity is the defining feature, works very differently.83
Following the old mining rule of “first-come-first-claimed,” it establishes
first-in-time rights to appropriate water for exclusive private use,
enforceable against later comers.84 Under the traditional common law of
prior appropriations, whenever a user first takes water out of a watercourse
and puts it to “beneficial” (or economically productive) use, that user is
granted a perpetual right to continue taking the same amount for the same

79 See Christine Klein et al., Modernizing Water Law: The Example of Florida, 61 FLA. L.
REV. 403, 406 (2009) (“The wetter eastern states . . . view the right to use water as an attribute of
the ownership of riparian land. This is primarily a torts regime, prohibiting one riparian
landowner from inflicting unreasonable harm upon another. In contrast, the arid western states
historically have followed the prior appropriation doctrine, protecting the right to use water
according to temporal priority of use.”).
80 Id. at 407.
81 In the traditional common law doctrine, water was shared equally by all riparian
landowners. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 858 cmt. a., illus. 1 (1979). In states that
adopt regulated riparianism statutes, most privileges associated with riparian ownership are
eliminated. See Klein et al., supra note 79, at 411–12.
82 See Klein et al., supra note 79, at 410.
83 Id. at 408.
84

Id.
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use, notwithstanding conflicting needs by those who come later—including
the general public.85
The prior appropriations doctrine creates elaborate webs of rights
along a watercourse, in which long-established uses get priority over newer
uses—even upstream or higher value uses.86 Return flows are assiduously
calculated and jealously guarded, and changes in use may require
repermitting to ensure against harm to the rights of other appropriators.87
Traditionally, instream flows and uses receive no protection under the
appropriative rights system, because rights are associated only with
withdrawals.88 Beginning in the 1970s, most western states imposed various
forms of instream protections by statute—but later protections can be of
limited value in a system that continues to be defined by temporal priority.89
To make matters even more complicated, a few states, including California,
incorporate elements of both doctrines in their water laws.90
Unlike the correlative, indeterminate rights associated with riparianism,
the rights associated with the prior appropriations system are theoretically
absolute—allowing senior rights holders to exclude others from the
resource entirely during times of shortage, and in perpetuity. For this
reason, and in contrast to riparianism, the private property orientation of the
prior appropriations doctrine conflicts much more directly with the public
commons theory underlying the public trust doctrine. And indeed, that
conflict erupted most famously in eastern California, at Mono Lake. Both of
the operative legal doctrines have deep roots in state common and statutory
law, and the different values they protect are each legitimate and
independently important. But reconciling them is difficult; they are
theoretically orthogonal, each operating from a premise that excludes the

85
86

Id. at 408–09.
See, e.g., Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140, 147 (1855) (involving the overlapping nature of

appropriative rights).
87 See Steven E. Clyde, Marketplace Reallocation in the Colorado River Basin: Better
Utilization of the West’s Scarce Water Resources, 28 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 49, 57
(2008) (explaining the importance of the historic right to return flows); BARTON H. THOMPSON,
JR. ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES: CASES AND MATERIALS 224–27 (5th ed. 2013)
(discussing the requirements for maintaining a permit).
88 Id. at 215–18.
89 Id. at 215–16.
90 In California, the owners of land abutting watercourses hold some traditional riparian
rights, which coexist with the more abundant appropriative rights that are unconnected to
riparian land ownership but subject to similar requirements of reasonable and beneficial use.
See THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 87, at 200 (discussing California’s hybrid system of water law);
see also CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2 (confirming the protection of riparian rights and discussing the
requirement of beneficial use). However, in California, conflicts between riparian and
appropriative rights are still governed by priority in time (in that riparian rights can be trumped
by appropriations that came first), and prior appropriations remains the defining doctrinal
approach in the state. See THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 87, at 208 (explaining how the doctrines
interact with one another in California); see also John Franklin Smith, The Public Trust
Doctrine and National Audubon Society v. Superior Court: A Hard Case Makes Bad Law or the
Consistent Evolution of California Water Rights, 6 GLENDALE L. REV. 201, 207–09 (1984)
(outlining the history of California’s dual water rights system).
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other’s central premise. How do these independent systems of legal rules fit
together in actual environmental governance?91
What follows is the story of that conflict—between the public trust
doctrine’s affirmation of public rights in waterways and the prior
appropriations doctrine’s affirmation of private rights to use of the water in
those waterways.92 Writ large, it is also a conflict between environmental
protection and economic development.93 And perhaps also a conflict
between in-basin values and utilitarian allocation for use by the more
numerous public in more distant urban centers—and doubtlessly others.94
The Mono Lake story shows that the two doctrines create legal friction in
California, and in other western states with similar laws, although perhaps
necessary friction. With all that in mind, we now turn to what actually
happened there, starting at the beginning.
III. THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE LOS ANGELES AQUEDUCT
This Part explores the California water struggles that led to the
construction of the Los Angeles Aqueduct and ultimately to the Mono Lake
litigation. It reviews the history of water exports from the Owens Valley in
the early 1900s, and the resulting effects on the local community and
ecology. It recounts the story of the St. Francis Dam disaster of 1928, the
extension of the aqueduct to the Mono Basin in 1940, and the acceleration of
exports from the Mono Basin after the Second Barrel in 1970. After
introducing the unique features of the Mono Lake ecosystem and
surrounding community, it explores the human and environmental
consequences of water diversions to the aqueduct, setting the stage for the
legal controversy that would follow.

A. Water as Wet Gold in Los Angeles
The Mono Lake story begins in the early city of Los Angeles, where
water has long been more valuable than gold. Why? A good aerial map of
California makes that immediately clear. Los Angeles is located near the

91 See, e.g., Norman K. Johnson & Charles T. DuMars, A Survey of the Evolution of Western
Water Law in Response to Changing Economic and Public Interest Demands, 29 NAT.

RESOURCES J. 347, 367–71 (1989) (considering ramifications of the public trust doctrine for the
future of western, prior appropriations-based water law).
92 See Jan S. Stevens, supra note 64, at 612–14 (discussing the relationship between the
public trust and prior appropriations doctrines); Timothy J. Conway, National Audubon Society
v. Superior Court: The Expanding Public Trust Doctrine, 14 ENVTL. L. 617, 630–33 (1984)
(analyzing the state court’s reconciliation of the public trust and prior appropriations doctrines
in Mono Lake); Arnold & Jewel, supra note 3, at 1181 (same).
93 See Brian E. Gray, Ensuring the Public Trust, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 973, 974 (2012)
(discussing Mono Lake’s establishment of an environmental baseline in the management of
public resources, and how economic pressures limit further expansion).
94 Cynthia L. Koehler, Water Rights and the Public Trust Doctrine: Resolution of the Mono
Lake Controversy, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 541, 577–82 (1995) (discussing competing interests in the
Water Board’s reallocation decision-making process).
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southwest corner of the state, where the climate is arid and surface water is
scarce.95 Today, some ten million people live in Los Angeles County.96 But the
Los Angeles River—the major local water source, which today is almost
entirely channelized underground—has, at best, enough water annually to
support a population of only a few hundred thousand.97
Los Angeles is California’s largest metropolis, attracting its vast
population with the promise of oil and agricultural resources, mild weather,
and a deep water harbor enabling ready commercial access to other Pacific
ports.98 At first, the growing city was able to slake its thirst by pumping
available groundwater resources.99 By the end of the nineteenth century,
however, when both surface and groundwater reserves had been exhausted,
state and city leaders realized that they were going to have to find water
elsewhere to sustain the growing metropolis.100 Moving water to the city of
Los Angeles became one of California’s highest priorities, but the geography
of the state made this no small task.
The map of California readily shows where the water is available, and
where it isn’t.101 Vibrant blue rivers crisscrossing the north reveal where the
naturally occurring streams are, mostly draining snowmelt and runoff from
the Cascades and Sierra Nevada mountain ranges.102 Further south, toward
Los Angeles, these large, natural drainages mostly disappear.103 That said,
you will find three snaking blue lines converging at Los Angeles—three
enormous aqueducts all designed over the last century to import water to
95 HILDA BLANCO ET AL., U.S.C. CENTER FOR SUSTAINABLE CITIES, WATER SUPPLY SCARCITY IN
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA: ASSESSING WATER DISTRICT LEVEL STRATEGIES vii, xiv (2012), available at
http://sustainablecities.usc.edu/quicklinks/H%20Blanco%20WSSC%20Exec%20Summary%2012%2
02012.pdf.
96 U.S. Census Bureau, State & County QuickFacts: Los Angeles County, California, http://
quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06/06037.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2015).
97 See Kai Ryssdal, The Aqueduct That Gave Rise to Los Angeles, MARKETPLACE (AMERICAN
PUBLIC MEDIA), Mar. 31, 3015, http://www.marketplace.org/topics/sustainability/big-book/
aqueduct-gave-rise-los-angeles (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (“As early as 1894, the city faced
severe water shortages. Engineers estimated that natural sources serving the Los Angeles basin
could support a population of 200,000 or so, in typical years.”); MARC REISNER, CADILLAC
DESERT: THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING WATER 53, 61–62 (1993) (describing the Los
Angeles River as the first local source of water and how reliance on it became untenable as the
population grew).
98 See DAVID KIPEN, CALIFORNIA IN THE 1930S: THE WPA GUIDE TO THE GOLDEN STATE 59
(2013) (describing successful efforts to increase immigration to the City of Los Angeles in the
late 19th century).
99 See REISNER, supra note 97, at 53, 60 (describing Los Angeles’s water sources in the late
19th century).
100 Id. at 62 (“By 1900, Los Angeles’ population had gone over 100,000; it doubled again
within four years. During the same period, the city experienced its first severe drought. . . . In
late 1904, the newly created Los Angeles Department of Water and Power issued its first public
report. ‘The time has come,’ it said, ‘when we shall have to supplement the supply from some
other source.’”).
101 See California: Physical Features, http://www.csun.edu/~cfe/maps/CA_Physical.pdf (last
visited Apr. 17, 2015).
102
103

Id.
See Cal. Nev. River Forecast Ctr., CNRFC Interactive Map Interface: Rivers, http://www.

cnrfc.noaa.gov (last visited Apr. 17, 2015).
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the city from very distant lands.104 It is an especially impressive feat, given
that the Los Angeles Basin is surrounded by the ocean on one side and
mountains on all others.105
Water now arrives in Los Angeles from the Rocky Mountains to the east
via the Colorado River Aqueduct.106 It arrives from the western Sierra and
Central Valley to the north—the agricultural heart of the state where water
is more plentiful—via the California Aqueduct.107 Yet the aqueduct that came
before all others is the Los Angeles aqueduct, which delivers water
improbably from the far eastern midsection of the state, almost to the bend
at the Nevada state line.108 Today, it extends all the way up to the Mono
Basin, which is located about 400 miles northeast of Los Angeles and 250
miles due east of San Francisco, along the Eastern Sierra Nevada range, just
east of Yosemite National Park.109 Still, it started out a little more locally.

B. The Early 1900s: Tapping the Owens River Valley
When consumption began to exceed the locally available water sources
in Los Angeles, state and city leaders struggled with the challenge of finding
water elsewhere. Three in particular—former Mayor Fred Eaton, William
Mulholland, of the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (DWP), and
Joseph Lippincott, a regional engineer of the federal Reclamation Service—
helped execute an unlikely plan to import water from another part of the
state that was, ironically, itself a desert.110 Their target was the distant and
sparsely populated Owens Valley, some 200 miles to the northeast.111
The arid but enchanting Owens Valley is a large, long, and narrow
canyon in eastern California that lies between two mountain ranges—the
Sierra Nevada to the west and the White Mountains to the east, extending
north and south of Bishop, California.112 Although the climate is very arid, the
104 See Sierra Club, Los Angeles Depends on Imported Water, https://angeles2.sierra
club.org/los_angeles_depends_imported_water (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (explaining that
aqueduct construction continued through the twentieth century and currently sources from the
Colorado River and two Northern California locations).
105 Univ. of Houston: Earth and Atmospheric Sciences, Current Research Projects: Neogene
Tectonics of Southern California, fig. 1, http://www.geosc.uh.edu/people/faculty/tom-bjorklund
/current-research/index.php (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (showing the Los Angeles Basin
bordered by the Santa Monica Mountains, San Gabriel Mountains, Santa Ana Mountains, and the
Pacific Ocean).
106 See Sierra Club, supra note 104 (noting that the Colorado River Aqueduct supplies water
to L.A.).
107 See Ctr. for Land Use Interpretation, California Aqueduct East Branch, http://clui.org/
ludb/site/california-aqueduct-east-branch (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (explaining that the
California Aqueduct brings water south to the agricultural industry of the Central Valley and Los
Angeles).
108 Sierra Club, supra note 104.
109 See Louis Sahagun, “There It Is—Take It”: A Story of Marvel and Controversy, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 28, 2013, http://graphics.latimes.com/me-aqueduct/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (describing
the path and history of the Los Angeles Aqueduct).
110 REISNER, supra note 97, at 62–63, 91.
111 Id. at 61–63.
112 Id. at 59.
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valley is a catchment for snowmelt from the high mountain ranges on either
side.113 Rain and snow intercepted at elevations between 10,000 and 14,000
feet drain into the improbably robust Owens River that runs the length
between them.114 At least, it was robust at the beginning of the story—an
extraordinarily life-productive river running through the desert, supporting
the wildlife that thronged to its waters and a thriving agricultural community
in an otherwise punishing environment.115 (The Owens remains a robust river
above the diversion dam.116)
The Owens River drains into a large salt lake at its terminus—the lake
formerly known as Owens. Owens Lake was a terminal lake, meaning that
water flowed into it from the river but nowhere flowed out, collecting at the
base of an upslope in the land to the south.117 In a terminal lake, water
departs the system only through surface evaporation, but that process leaves
behind the trace minerals dissolved in the incoming river water, leached out
of the surrounding rocks and soils.118 Over thousands of years, the
accumulated minerals left behind as water evaporated from the lake’s
surface made Owens Lake a saltwater body, by essentially the same process
that made the oceans saline.119
The Owens River and its delta at Owens Lake were a critical part of the
regional ecosystem, because they combined fresh and saltwater resources in
a high desert environment where water was otherwise scarce.120 Countless
birds journeying along the Pacific Flyway would congregate at Owens Lake
to feed and water themselves at this oasis, after traversing countless miles of
barren land.121 Residents recalling Owens Valley life before the aqueduct said

113 See id. at 58–59 (explaining that the few rivers draining from the arid East Slope of the
Sierra Nevada range are generally small; however, the Owens River, flanked by two mountain
ranges, is the exception).
114 See Cal. Water Sci. Ctr., Evaluation of the Hydrologic System and Selected WaterManagement Alternatives in the Owens Valley, California, http://ca.water.usgs.gov/owens/
report/hydro_system_2surface.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (explaining that precipitation
runoff from the Sierra Nevada feeds into the Owens River).
115 REISNER, supra note 97, at 59.
116 And one where I still fondly remember getting hypothermia while attempting to inner
tube it one sunny day in July! Some years later, beginning in the 2000s, restoration efforts have
apparently resurrected some of the Owens River below the dam. See Louis Sahagun, Tule
Vegetation Infests Lower Owens River, L.A. TIMES, July 7, 2006, http://articles.latimes.com
/2011/jul/25/local/la-me-tules-20110725 (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (reporting that restoration
efforts, which began in 2006, have brought water and wildlife back to the Owens River).
117 REISNER, supra note 97, at 61.
118 CAL. DEP’T OF WATER RESOURCES, THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SALTON SEA AND OTHER
TERMINAL LAKES IN SUPPORTING BIRDS OF THE PACIFIC FLYWAY 1, available at http://www.water.
ca.gov/saltonsea/historicalcalendar/docs/TerminalLakes.pdf (describing the geologic processes
that intensify salinity in terminal lakes with freshwater tributaries).
119

See id.

120

Owens Valley Comm., Owens Lake Birds, http://www.ovcweb.org/owensvalley/owens
lake.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2015).
121

Id.
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that the sky would become so black with birds during migration season that
it was sometimes hard to see sky between them.122
The Owens River thus provided Los Angeles the possibility of muchneeded water, but the Owens Valley is hundreds of miles from the city, and
there are two mountain ranges in between. There was closer and easier
water to be had, including untapped groundwater resources from aquifers
and artesian springs.123 Exploiting these sources would have been faster,
easier, and cheaper—at least in the short term. Why bother seeking water
two hundred miles north to the Owens Valley when there was more
accessible water closer to home?

1. A Self-Powering Design
City leaders considered seven potential sources for water imports,
many of them closer and more easily accessible with a lower initial outlay.124
However, regional planners were concerned that exploiting groundwater
resources closer to the city would curtail desired development of the
surrounding metropolitan areas.125 Yet there was another reason Los Angeles
was especially drawn to the water in the Owens Valley—one that had to do
with gravity.
Over time, the other potential sources would have required the use of
substantial energy to continuously pump water toward Los Angeles. Even
artesian wells that produce without assistance in the present would
eventually require expensive pumps, after withdrawals reduced pressure in
the aquifer.126 Moreover, the city had already learned—the hard way—that
groundwater resources are not infinite, and civic planners worried that these
sources would ultimately tap out.
By contrast, the Owens Valley would provide a renewable flow, and
while it lies hundreds of miles away, it rests at an altitude of 4,000 feet above
sea level.127 Those 4,000 feet of elevation gain would make all the difference
to the engineering project: The elevation gain provided enough potential
energy to pipe water downhill toward Los Angeles—even over the two
intervening mountain ranges—without any additional power source,
enabling a completely gravity-powered design.128

122 See, e.g., id. (quoting Joseph Grinnell, who visited the lake in 1917: “‘Great numbers of
water birds are in sight along the lake shore—avocets, phalaropes, ducks. Large flocks of
shorebirds in flight over the water in the distance, wheeling about show in mass, now silvery
now dark, against the gray-blue of the water. There must be literally thousands of birds within
sight of this one spot.’”).
123 Biographical
Information:
Joseph
Barlow
Lippincott,
available
at
http://www.owensvalleyhistory.com/stories3/lippincott_biography.pdf (extracted from the
“Memoir” on Lippincott prepared by Kenneth Q. Volk and Edgar Alan Rowe that appeared in the
108 TRANSACTIONS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CIVIL ENGINEERS 1543–50 (1943)).
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Sahagun, supra note 109.
128 Id.
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2. Prospecting in the San Fernando Valley
There was one further reason the Owens Valley plan was so attractive
to city leadership, this one having less to do with civil engineering and more
to do with conventional pocket-lining. As chronicled more fully in Cadillac
Desert129 and the classic movie Chinatown,130 the additional value was in
what lies between the Owens Valley and the City of Los Angeles: the San
Fernando Valley.
Today, the San Fernando Valley is pricey southern California real
estate, with prime access to both Los Angeles and the Pacific coast.131
However, when Eaton, Mulholland, and Lipincott were masterminding the
plan—before the aqueduct was constructed and the lands surrounding Los
Angeles were even drier than the city—the San Fernando Valley was open,
empty, economically worthless land.132 There was nothing there, because
there was no water.
Some proponents of the new aqueduct realized that moving water from
the Owens Valley down to Los Angeles meant that they would be piping
water through this worthless, forsaken land—and that it would not be
worthless for long.133 In fact, many city leaders privy to the plan quietly
bought land in the San Fernando Valley on the cheap before plans went
public, trading on their inside knowledge of what was to come, and became
overnight real estate moguls when the water rolled through.134

3. The Miracle of Modern Engineering
When construction began on the aqueduct in 1905, the gravity-propelled
design spanning hundreds of miles and two mountain ranges was considered
a miracle of modern engineering, on par with the Panama Canal.135 The early
project included more than fifty miles of open canals, close to one hundred
miles of covered conduits, nearly another fifty miles of tunnels, and some
twelve miles of steel tubes perilously escorting the flow across plunging
mountain canyons.136

129 REISNER, supra note 97 at 73–74; CADILLAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS
DISAPPEARING WATER AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF NATURE (Columbia TriStar Television 1997).
130 CHINATOWN (Paramount Pictures 1974).
131 JOEL KOTKIN & ERIKA OZUNA, THE CHANGING FACE OF THE SAN FERNANDO VALLEY 8 (2002),
available at http://publicpolicy.pepperdine.edu/davenport-institute/content/reports/changingface.pdf.
132 REISNER, supra note 97, at 72.
133 Id. at 73–74.
134 Id. at 75 (describing the syndicate of investors that purchased an option on the Porter
Land and Water Company, which owned the greater part of the San Fernando Valley).
135 Eric Malnic, The Aqueduct: DWP Smoothes Out Rough Edges on the 74-Year Old
Engineering Marvel, LA TIMES, Oct. 18, 1987, http://articles.latimes.com/1987-10-18/local/me15046_1_los-angeles-river (last visited Apr. 17, 2015).
136 BD. OF PUB. SERV. COMM’RS OF THE CITY OF L.A., CONSTRUCTION OF THE LOS ANGELES
AQUEDUCT FINAL REPORT 271 (1916).
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To begin the long journey to Los Angeles, engineers had to move the
Owens River entirely out of its bed.137 This they accomplished by use of a
full-length diversion dam constructed at Aberdeen, a tiny hamlet just north
of the town of Independence in Inyo County, California.138
In the mid-1990s, if you stood at the diversion point and looked
upstream, you would see the Owens river flowing toward you—down its
naturally arching alluvial channel, lined by point bars, willows, and other
riparian vegetation that slows the water and creates cozy pockets of fish and
wildlife habitat. Then the river would reach the diversion dam, where the
entire flow was shunted to the side into a narrow concrete channel where it
gathers speed along its journey to Los Angeles. And if you looked
downstream from the diversion dam, you would look out over an empty
riverbed, where water stopped flowing almost a hundred years earlier. By
then, it was filled with tangled brush and overgrowth, but it was still a
gaping, ancient riverbed—with no river in it.
New efforts to restore dewatered portions of the Lower Owens have
been underway since 2006,139 but the old Aberdeen diversion dam still marks
the beginning of the original Los Angeles Aqueduct. For many miles below
that point, the aqueduct snakes across the desert, crosses mountain and
valley, and finally rolls down the California Coast Range into the Los Angeles
Basin, by this point in a giant concrete tube.140 Symbolically completing its
journey, some of that water finally flows into the reflecting pool in front of
DWP headquarters, where Chief Mulholland was once king.141

4. Acquiring the Owens Valley Water Rights
The aqueduct may have been a miracle of modern engineering, but that
wasn’t the only puzzle city leaders had to resolve—there was also the legal
puzzle. Our earlier discussion of private water law alludes to the other
hurdle Los Angeles had to overcome before the aqueduct could begin

137 See Henry H. Thomas, Construction—River Diversion, http://community.dur.ac.uk/
~des0www4/cal/dams/cons/conss2.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2015).
138 See Malnic, supra note 135 (discussing the diversion dam 30 miles south of Bishop,
California).
139 Inyo Cnty. Water Dep’t, Lower Owens River Project, http://www.inyowater.org/LORP
/default.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (describing efforts to restore a dewatered 62-mile
stretch of the Lower Owens River below the diversion dam). For more information on Owens
Valley restoration projects, see the Memorandum of Understanding Between L.A. Dep’t of Water
and Power, the Cnty. of Inyo, Cal. Dep’t of Fish and Wildlife, Cal. State Lands Cmm’n, the Sierra
Club, and the Owens Valley Comm., available at http://www.inyowater.org/LORP/DOCUMENTS
/1997MOU.pdf.
140 See Malnic, supra note 135.
141 See Andrea Ford, Recycling Water : Environment: Bicyclists Are Carrying L.A. Water to

Mono Lake in a Symbolic Effort to 'Rehydrate' It. They Also Call Attention to DWP Vote that
May Reward Conservationists, L.A. TIMES, Sep. 1, 1992, http://articles.latimes.com/1992-0901/local/me-6794_1_mono-lake (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (describing an event in which ninety
cyclists carried bottles of water from DWP’s reflecting pool 350 miles north to symbolically
repatriate it to Mono Lake).
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delivering water from afar. And though it seemed more easily handled at
first, it became the thornier problem over time.
The problem was how to deal with the existing water users who were
already putting Owens River water to beneficial use, mostly for local
agricultural use.142 Under both riparian rights and prior appropriations
doctrine, Los Angeles could not just shunt an entire river out of its bed,
leaving downstream users in the lurch.143 Landowners along the river had
riparian rights, and many more Owens Valley residents had rights to
withdraw from the river that were protected under the doctrine of prior
appropriations.144 Under California water law, Los Angeles couldn’t just start
exporting water south, no matter how many thirsty residents were waiting
for it; the city had to get in line.145
Even more problematic, the agricultural use that Owens Valley farmers
were making would return most of withdrawn water back into the river as
irrigation return flows, or into the underlying aquifer from which
groundwater would then be available. Owens River water was being
recycled through multiple in-basin uses and instream flows within the
watershed, and in relatively stable equilibrium with climatic conditions. But
Los Angeles’s intended use would be very different. Exporting the water
would yield return flows to neither the river nor the underlying aquifer,
interrupting the entire web of uses and appropriations. Los Angeles’s change
in use could also set the city to the back of the line, making it the junior
appropriator within the overall system and further complicating its desired
yield. How the city resolved these issues became one of the seamier aspects
of the aqueduct’s history.
The only solution was for Los Angeles to acquire the appropriative and
riparian rights it needed from the existing Owens Valley farmers—and to
iron out the problems of priority, the city would have to buy up most if not
all of the rights. But imagine the complications of trying to buy an entire
town’s worth of riparian land and water rights. Imagine the likely reaction of
most local farmers—presumably fond of the local community, the neighbors,
and their families—to such a proposal. Perhaps the farmer is even ready to
retire from farming, and the land is already on the market. And suppose the
City of Los Angeles approaches with a generous offer to buy the farm and all
associated water rights, so that it can send that water south and extinguish
the community forever. How many farmers in this position would have
accepted that offer?

142 See REISNER, supra note 97 (discussing how water rights were necessary for the Owens
Valley Project).
143 See supra notes 79–94 and accompanying text (discussing the doctrines of prior
appropriations and riparian rights, and the current doctrine for California water law).
144 See Scott Harrison, Dynamite Attacks on the Los Angeles Aqueduct, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 6,
2013, http://framework.latimes.com/2013/02/06/los-angeles-aqueduct-2/#/0 (last visited Apr. 17,
2015) (discussing how Los Angeles officials had to buy land and water rights in the Owens
Valley).
145 See supra notes 84–90 and accompanying text (discussing the law of prior
appropriations).
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Apparently, the city leaders charged with executing the plan believed
that few of them would. They surmised that most Owens Valley farmers
would be hesitant to extinguish their communities, no matter the payout.146
Accordingly, they concluded that the best approach was simply to keep the
details of their intentions quiet. Essentially, when Los Angeles
representatives came looking to buy, they pretended to be farmers.
Using agents and operating undercover, they posed as regular farmers
acquiring land and water rights to continue farming Owens Valley lands just
as the previous rights-holders had long done.147 They covered up or
conveniently left out that they were buying on behalf of Los Angeles, as well
as any mention of their true intentions for the water.148 At the same time,
other champions of the aqueduct were quietly convincing the U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation to disband pending plans to build a new water project in the
Owens Valley that would have benefited the regional agricultural economy.149
By the time local residents figured out what was happening, it was too late
to stop it.150
In 1913, after acquiring the bulk of all water rights in the valley, the Los
Angeles Aqueduct began operations.151 The Aberdeen diversion dam was
completed and water began moving south. Just over a hundred years ago, as
the first Owens River water reached the end of its journey in Los Angeles,
DWP Chief Engineer William Mulholland famously told the assembled
crowd: “There it is. Take it.”152

5. The Local Consequences of Withdrawals
As demand for water in Los Angeles continued to grow, so did exports
from the Owens Valley. Eventually, the city took not only the surface water
of the Owens River, but also the groundwater from the Owens Valley aquifer,
extracted by pumps on the land that the city had purchased to acquire
associated water rights.153 With the disappearance of the river, and the loss of
agricultural uses that had once returned so much water to the ground
through irrigation, the local aquifer was rapidly depleted.154 Unsurprisingly,
the consequences of removing the entire water supply were severe. Once146 Local rebellions following the onset of water exports from the valley suggest that this
perception was accurate. See Malnic, supra note 135.
147 REISNER, supra note 97, at 91.
148 See Malnic, supra note 135 (discussing how city officials began to quietly buy up water
rights).
149 REISNER, supra note 97, at 79 (discussing how the Bureau of Reclamation project in
Owens Valley complicated the Los Angeles Aqueduct project); see also Malnic, supra note 135
(“[O]thers successfully lobbied Congress and President Theodore Roosevelt to abandon plans
for a federal reclamation and irrigation project there.”).
150 See, e.g., REISNER, supra note 97, at 90 (discussing how farmers who did not originally
sell out were eventually forced to do so).
151 Sahagun, supra note 109.
152 REISNER, supra note 97, at 86.
153 See id. at 100–01 (discussing how DPW “sank wells and began depauperating the aquifer”
and that Los Angeles refused to limit its groundwater pumping).
154 Id. at 100.
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thriving farm communities were devastated, and the irrigated agricultural
economy has never recovered.155
Still, the Owens Valley farmers did not go down quietly. They did not
appreciate the less-than-forthright approach the city had taken in acquiring
land and water rights.156 They felt swindled, and not just out of a few dollars,
acres of land, or gallons of water per day—they felt robbed of their
community, their homes, and their very way of life.157 In several incidents of
open rebellion, angry farmers dynamited the aqueduct and released water
back into the valley.158
Their protests drew attention from around the world, with newspaper
coverage effectively depicting the Owens Valley farmers as tiny Davids
pounding on the toe of the Goliath-like City of Los Angeles.159 Nobody really
expected them to prevail, and they didn’t—but the aqueduct continues under
constant patrol surveillance to this day.160 Especially after additional
bombings in the mid-1970s,161 high fences and locked gates prevent public
access or interference.162 It’s hard to get physically close.
The end result was that water effectively disappeared from the lower
Owens Valley, south of the diversion dam.163 The most obvious local casualty
that disappeared with it was Owens Lake, the large but shallow salt lake at
the bottom of the now-empty river.164 The great waterway simply evaporated
without replenishment, until all that was left were the dusty, dried-up
minerals that had been accumulating over thousands of years.165 As a result,
where there had once been an enormous black-with-birds desert oasis, there
was now just a giant, white, empty salt flat—ugly, foul-smelling, and with

155
156

Sahagun, supra note 109.
See id. (explaining that tensions were high between Los Angeles and the Owens Valley,

and that the aquifer was dynamited over a dozen times in the 1920s in citizen rebellions).
157 See Harrison, supra note 144 (describing incidents at the Alabama Gates and No Name
Canyon, among others).
158 Id.
159 Cf. REISNER, supra note 97, at 95 (discussing public sympathy for Owens Valley farmers).
160 Los Angeles Dep’t of Water and Power, A Legacy of Safe-Keeping, INTAKE, Nov. 2013, at
53–54, available at http://www.laaqueduct100.com/wp-content/uploads/LAA100Issue.pdf.
161 Harrison, supra note 144; see also Louis Sahagun, Los Angeles Aqueduct Bomber Reveals
His Story, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2013, available at http://www.latimes.com/local/la-me-c1aqueduct-bomber-20131030-dto-htmlstory.html#axzz2jDMnv8W0 (describing the 1976 bombing
of an aqueduct gate).
162 See Elson Trinidad, A Self-Guided Tour of the Los Angeles Aqueduct, KCET, Nov. 4,
2013, http://www.kcet.org/news/redefine/revisit/commentary/concrete-and-chaparral/a-self-guid
ed-tour-of-the-los-angeles-aqueduct.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (describing water pumps
surrounded by high chain link fences).
163 See REISNER, supra note 97, at 100.
164 See Sahagun, supra note 109.
165 See Marith C. Reheis, Dust Deposition Downwind of Owens (Dry) Lake, 1991–1994—
Preliminary Findings, 102 J. GEOPHYSICAL RES. (ATMOSPHERES) 25,999–26,008 (1997) (describing
the post-aqueduct deposits of minerals accumulated in Owens Lake over thousands of years).

15_TOJCI.RYAN.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

5/14/2015 2:53 PM

588

[Vol. 45:561

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

nothing to offer the people or the wildlife that once depended on it.166 We
now call it “Owens Dry Lake.”167
Since then, the Owens Dry Lake wasteland has become an urgent
problem for the valley, and not just because it is ugly and barren. The Owens
Valley happens to rest at the base of the tallest mountain in the lower fortyeight states—the Sierra Nevada’s Mount Whitney, looming more than 10,000
feet above the valley floor at 14,500 feet above sea level.168 Ferocious winds
whip off the characteristically steep escarpment of the Eastern Sierra,
picking up dust and salt from the bed of Owens Dry Lake and churning it
into chronic regional dust storms.169
Yet Owens Valley dust storms are more threatening than the average
dust storm. To make matters even worse, this dust happens to be toxic.170
The fine-particle alkali salts that compose the dust are so small that they
pass through the membranes of the human respiratory system and are
associated with asthma, other respiratory ailments, and even cancer.171 In
fact, the Owens Valley has been regularly rated as the most polluted place in
the country on the basis of particulates, continually violating Clean Air Act172
standards for ambient air quality.173
The results of the aqueduct in the lower Owens Valley were truly tragic.
Not only did it destroy the original farming communities, it made people
sick. With no water, limited economic potential, and now elevated health
risks, the Owens Valley stagnated.174 Driving around these parts in the mid1990s (with car windows rolled up) yielded sad sights amidst otherwise
stunning vistas. In the worst hit areas, there were many abandoned
structures, and few children. You might have seen a couple of older people

166 REISNER, supra note 97, at 101; Kirk Siegler, Owens Valley Salty as Los Angeles Water
Battle Flows into Court, NPR, Mar. 11, 2013, http://www.npr.org/2013/03/11/173463688/owens-

valley-salty-as-los-angeles-water-battle-flows-into-court (last visited Apr. 17, 2015).
167 See, e.g., Reheis, supra note 165 (describing Owens Lake in a dust disposition study as
the “Owens (dry) Lake”).
168 See Stewart Green, Mount Whitney: Highest Mountain in California, ABOUT.COM, http://
climbing.about.com/od/mountainclimbing/a/MtWhitneyFacts.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2015).
169 MARITH REHEIS ET AL., POTENTIAL HEALTH HAZARDS OF OWENS LAKE DUST? (2003),
available at http://esp.cr.usgs.gov/projects/sw/swdust/pdfs/toxic_dust_poster.pdf.
170 Id. (“Mineral dusts from the desiccated playa of Owens Lake . . . contain elevated
concentrations of many metals known to have toxic effects . . . .”).
171 Sarah Kittle, Great Basin Unified Air Pollution Control District, Survey of Reported
Health Effects of Owens Lake Particulate Matter, http://www.gbuapcd.org/Information/Owens
LakeParticulateMatterHealthEffects.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (discussing studies that
have found positive associations between particulate matter and lung cancer).
172 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2012).
173 U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Owens Valley, CA Particulate Matter Plan, http://www.epa.gov/
region9/air/owens/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (describing Owens Lake as “the nation’s worst
particulate air pollution problem”).
174 Richard L. Forstall, U.S. Census, California: Population of Counties by Decennial Census:
1900 to 1990 (Mar. 27, 1995) (showing population growth from 11,684 in 1960 to 18,281 in 1990),
http://www.census.gov/population/cencounts/ca190090.txt; U.S. Census Bureau, State and
County QuickFacts: Inyo County, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06/06027.html (last
visited Apr. 17, 2015) (showing current population of 18,410).
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unwilling to leave their abandoned towns, sitting vacantly on the porches of
distressed homes that looked a lot like the empty ones next door.
In the late 1990s, Los Angeles began flooding more than 100 square
miles of dry lake bed with billions of gallons of water to keep the dust from
becoming airborne, responding to deep public concern over adverse health
impacts, environmental litigation, and state and federal laws requiring better
management of the air quality hazard.175 In late 2014, the city reached an
agreement with the Great Basin Unified Air Pollution Control District
enabling it to manage the lakebed hazard with a new method that consumes
far less water.176 Under this agreement, tractors will till the moist lakebed to
create basketball-sized dirt clods that can contain the toxic dust for years
before breaking down, at which point the process will be repeated.177

6. The St. Francis Dam
The devastation of the Owens Valley was not the only tragic chapter in
the saga of the early days of the aqueduct. There was also the story of the St.
Francis Dam.
To enable the aqueduct to deliver a steady flow of water to Los Angeles
year round, engineers constructed a series of reservoirs along the aqueduct
to store additional supply during the wet season, for gradual release during
the dry season or other emergency circumstances.178 When the aqueduct was
first constructed, one such dam was built at San Francisquito Canyon,179 a
promising narrows located near the bottom of the aqueduct system, about
forty miles north of Los Angeles near present day Santa Clarita.180 A photo of
the dam when it was completed in 1926 shows a sturdy, shining component
of the overall miracle of modern engineering.181
Yet a photo of the same dam two years later shows nothing more than a
single spire of concrete between gaping voids on either side, like a single
front tooth in a baby’s mouth.182 It took just a few hours for that transition to

175 See Louis Sahagun, New Dust-Busting Method Ends L.A.’s Longtime Feud with Owens
Valley, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2014, http://www.latimes.com/science/la-me-1115-owens-20141115-

story.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (describing new and former methods of containing lake
bed dust).
176
177

Id.
Id. (noting that the new method saves enough water to supply 150,000 Los Angeles

residents per year).
178 See REISNER, supra note 97, at 61–62.
179 Id. at 98. The St. Francis Dam was constructed in part to ensure supply if seismic activity
along the San Andreas fault disrupted the aqueduct. See Kevin Roderick, Dam Disaster Killed
450, Broke Mulholland, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1999, http://articles.latimes.com/1999/oct/12/
local/me-21385.
180 See Michael E. Martinet, Section 6: Flooding Hazards in the City of Downey, in CITY
OF DOWNEY NATURAL HAZARDS MITIGATION PLAN 11, Section VI (Emergency Planning
Consultants ed. 2004), available at http://www.downeyca.org/_blobcache/0000/0002/2401.pdf
(quoting a contemporaneous report of the disaster).
181 See Scott Harrison, St. Francis Dam Collapse, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2013, available at
http://framework.latimes.com/2013/03/12/st-francis-dam-collapse/#/1.
182

Id.
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take place, in the dead of night. As news reports described this awful
moment in California history, the dam gave way shortly after midnight on
March 12, 1928:
[I]n an instant 38,000 acre feet, totaling 12,000,000,000 gallons, of stored
water was rushing on its mad race to the sea. . . . What little warning there was
of the wall of water that swept the floor of the valley was insufficient to give
any of the inhabitants of the upper part of the canyon time to flee its fury.
Caught in the swirl of the raging flood, the hundreds of ranch houses that once
dotted the canyon were crushed like egg shells and their inhabitants in most
183
instances swept to their doom.

Raging floodwaters swept through the Santa Clara Valley toward the
Pacific for more than fifty miles, devastating some sixty-five miles of valley
before reaching the ocean between Oxnard and Ventura.184 The peak surge
was estimated to be nearly eighty feet high.185 When it reached Santa Paula,
forty-two miles south of the dam, the water was estimated to be twenty-five
feet deep.186 Almost everything in its path was destroyed: ten bridges, twelve
hundred homes, railways, power lines, orchards, and livestock.187 The flood
carried away entire towns, wreaking “unthinkable carnage” along the way.188
By the time it was over, parts of Ventura County lay under seventy feet
of mud and debris. Over 450 people were killed, including half the student
body at a local elementary school, hundreds of Department of Water and
Power workers sleeping in a nearby work camp, and many migrant
farmworkers camping in the valley and swept out to sea.189 Damages topped
$20 million at the time,190 valued at well over $250 million today.191 Even now,
it is considered one of the worst civil engineering failures of American
history.192
The spectacular failure of the St. Francis Dam terrified Californians.
Modern engineering suddenly seemed less miraculous, and more dangerous.
Los Angelenos who had once celebrated William Mulholland turned against
him, and he went from being a local celebrity to a pariah seemingly

183 Special to the New York Times, 274 Perish, 700 Missing in Torrent Loosed by Bursting
California Dam; Flood Engulfs Victims as They Sleep, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1928, at 1. Note that

this article appears to misstate the date of the incident as March 13, 1928, and most other
sources report the date as March 12, 1928. See, e.g., Martinet, supra note 180; Harrison, supra
note 181; Roderick, supra note 179.
184 See Roderick, supra note 179.
185 Id. (describing a wall of water ten stories high).
186 See Martinet, supra note 180 (quoting a contemporaneous report of the disaster).
187 See id; Harrison, supra note 181; Roderick, supra note 179 (describing the devastation).
188 See Roderick, supra note 179.
189

Id.

190

Jan Silver Maguire, Water Triumphs and Tragedies, 77 AQUEDUCT MAG. (2006), available
at http://www.mwdh2o.com/Aqueduct/may_06/article_03_01.html.
191 The actual figure in 2015 U.S. dollars is $273,341,520. See Consumer Price Index Inflation
Calculator, http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl (last visited Apr. 17, 2015).
192 See Roderick, supra note 179.
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overnight.193 The surrounding community rebuilt and eventually removed all
evidence of the dam, as though hoping to erase the memory of the horror
that had unfolded there.194 Today, if you try to seek out where the dam had
been, you can’t really find it; there is only an ordinary canyon, rich with
greenery, and not even a memorial.195
But in the late 1920s, even as public sentiment turned against
Mulholland, Los Angelenos still coveted the water he had brought them.196 In
the 1930s, as the city’s thirst continued to grow, engineers continued to look
to other remote sources. And there in the distance—just another hundred
miles north of the Owens River headwaters and an additional 2,000 feet up—
was the Mono Lake Basin.

C. The 1940s: The Mono Basin Extension
Mono Lake lies in a high desert basin just east of the Sierra crest—the
peaks of the mountains that divide Yosemite National Park on the west from
the Mono Basin and the Inyo National Forest on the east.197 Mono Lake is the
eastern watershed of the Yosemite highlands, draining the eastern flanks of
mountains that rise up to 14,000 feet into the air and then plunge more than
7,000 feet to their eastern base.198 Surrounded by mountains in three of four
directions, it is a staggeringly beautiful and occasionally otherworldly
place—pierced by volcanic islands and geothermal activity, and adorned
with limestone towers of tufa that grow where calcium-rich underground
springs meet the carbonate-rich waters of the lake.199
At around seventy square miles in surface area, Mono Lake itself is
almost twice the size of the County of San Francisco—more of an inland sea
than a lake.200 It averages about fifty feet deep but runs as deep as 159 feet
193 See REISNER, supra note 97, at 99–100 (describing the decline of Mulholland’s
reputation).
194 See Hadley Meares, The Flood: St. Francis Dam Disaster, William Mulholland, and the
Causalities of L.A. Imperialism, KCET, July 26, 2013, http://www.kcet.org/socal/departures/
columns/lost-landmarks/the-flood-st-francis-dam-disaster-william-mulholland-and-thecasualties-of-la-imperialism.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2015).
195 A former student of mine who grew up near the former dam site told me that she was
baffled by the lack of local lore and remembrances about the disaster, noting that there was a
small plaque somewhere in town mentioning what had happened, but nothing at the actual site
of the disaster. See also Meares, supra note 194 ( “We were passing the former site of the St.
Francis Dam, but we couldn't tell where it had been, so effective had nature been in reclaiming
its land.”).
196 See REISNER, supra note 97, at 100–01.
197 U.S. Forest Serv., U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Mono Basin National Forest Scenic Area,
http://www.fs.usda.gov/detail/inyo/specialplaces/?cid=stelprdb5129903 (last visited Apr. 17,
2015).
198 See JOHN HART, STORM OVER MONO: THE MONO LAKE BATTLE AND THE CALIFORNIA WATER
FUTURE 5–7 (1996).
199 See generally Mono Lake Comm., Quick Facts, http://www.monolake.org/about/stats
[hereinafter Mono Lake Facts] (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (listing attributes and statistics about
Mono Lake); see HART, supra note 198, at 20–21 (describing the formation of tufa).
200 Compare Mono Lake Facts, supra note 199 (noting Mono Lake’s surface area is 45,133
acres, or 70.5 square miles), with U.S. Census Bureau, San Francisco County, California,
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where its western shores approach the Sierra.201 Like Owens Lake, Mono is a
saltwater terminal lake, collecting snowmelt from the five freshwater creeks
that flow into the basin, carrying trace elements that are left behind as water
evaporates off the surface. Unlike Owens Lake, whose geological age could
be counted in thousands of years, Mono Lake is estimated to be between one
and three million years old, competing with Lake Tahoe as perhaps the
oldest continuous lake in North America.202
The accumulation of those chlorides, carbonates, and sulfates over
millions of years have made Mono Lake almost three times saltier than the
ocean, and nearly as saline as parts of the Great Salt Lake in Utah.203 The
water is so alkaline that fish cannot survive there.204 Nevertheless, the lake is
home to a thriving ecosystem based on a unique species of brine shrimp and
the alkali fly that breeds at its shores, a dietary staple of the Kutzadika’a
Paiute Indians that still live there.205 Mark Twain didn’t care much for the
place, referring to it disparagingly as the Dead Sea of California.206 But most
who live, work, or visit there consider Mono Lake a very special place,
because of its rugged natural beauty, its unique ecosystem, the unusual
scientific research conducted there, and the local cultures and communities
that have lived beside it over history.

1. The Mono Lake Ecosystem
The basis of the simple Mono Lake ecosystem is the algae in the lake,
which support both the alkali fly and the brine shrimp that, in turn, support
the rest of the food chain.207 The species of brine shrimp in the lake are
unique to Mono Lake, and they are rather small—no bigger than the size of a
clipped fingernail.208 However, there are estimated to be as many as three to
four trillion of them in the lake.209 If I were to scoop a coffee cup of water out
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06/06075.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (noting San
Francisco County’s land area is 46.87 square miles).
201 Mono Lake Facts, supra note 199.
202 See HART, supra note 198, at 8–10 (describing Mono Lake’s geological history over
millions of years); Tahoe Fund, Lake Tahoe Fast Facts, http://www.tahoefund.org/abouttahoe/recreational-paradise/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (“Tahoe is considered an ancient lake
and is counted among the 20 oldest lakes in the world.”).
203 See HART, supra note 198, at 14 (listing Mono Lake as three times saltier than the ocean);
Univ. of Utah, Physical Characteristics of Great Salt Lake, http://learn.genetics.utah.edu/
content/gsl/physical_char/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (describing the Great Salt Lake as 3.5
times saltier than the ocean).
204 See HART, supra note 19798, at 16.
205 Mono Lake, 658 P.2d 709, 711 (Cal. 1983); Mono Lake Comm., Brine Shrimp: Mono Lake’s
Unique Species, http://www.monolake.org/about/ecoshrimp [hereinafter Mono Lake Brine
Shrimp] (last visited Apr. 17, 2015); Mono Lake Facts, supra note 199; Mono Lake Comm.,
Kutzadika’a People: Living in Harmony with the Mono Basin, http://www.monolake.org/about/
kutzadikaa (last visited Apr. 17, 2015).
206 MARK TWAIN, ROUGHING IT 243, 245 (Harriet Elinor Smith & Edgar Marquess Branch eds.,
3d ed. 2011).
207 Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 711; Mono Lake Facts, supra note 199.
208 Mono Lake Brine Shrimp, supra note 205.
209

Id.
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of the lake—as I did every day on countless South Tufa tours as a Mono
Lake ranger with the Forest Service—I could have ten or twenty in my cup.
From the perspective of a hungry bird, Mono Lake is a big bowl of shrimp
soup.
For that reason, Mono Lake holds an even more important position
along the Pacific Flyway than Owens Lake held. Birds arriving from as far
north as the Arctic Circle en route to points as far south as the tip of
Argentina use Mono Lake as a critical resting place to gorge their body
weights back up to full strength before resuming their journeys over the vast
desert.210 Hundreds of species of migratory birds visit the lake regularly,
including flocks of grebes, phalaropes, plovers, and sandpipers that
occasionally constitute substantial percentages of their world populations.211
Mono Lake is also a primary world breeding ground for California gulls,
providing a first home to more than eighty-five percent of the state’s
population.212 Year after year, they return to breed on Negit Island, the small
black cindercone in the middle of the lake, where they are safe from
predation by coyotes and other local predators reluctant to swim in Mono’s
punishingly alkaline waters.213
In fact, Negit and Paoha, the white island beside it, are the newest
members of the youngest volcanic range in North America, the Mono
Craters.214 Reaching as high as 9,000 feet, the Mono Craters extend from the
south shore of the lake, through the islands in the middle, all the way to
Black Point, a long-exposed underwater volcano that bites into the lake’s
northwest shore.215 Paoha heaved above the surface of the lake without
exploding only three hundred years ago, and hot springs and fumaroles
continue to mark its cracked, lakebed surface.216 Mono Lake has been a
destination for scientific research into underwater volcanism because it is
safer and easier to explore than some of the more active underwater
volcanoes in Hawaii.217
More recently, Mono Lake briefly made international scientific news in
2010, when NASA scientists announced that they had discovered the first

210 Kevin Neal, TED Case Studies, The Los Angeles Aqueduct and the Owens and Mono
Lakes (MONO Case), http://www1.american.edu/ted/mono.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2015)

(explaining Mono Lake’s importance to migratory bird routes from the Arctic Circle to South
America); Mono Lake Comm., Birds of the Basin: The Migratory Millions of Mono,
http://www.monolake.org/about/ecobirds [hereinafter Mono Lake Bird Facts] (last visited Apr.
17, 2015).
211 Mono Lake Facts, supra note 199; Mono Lake Bird Facts, supra note 210.
212 Mono Lake Facts, supra note 199.
213 Id.; Mono Lake Bird Facts, supra note 210; see also HART, supra note 198, at 16–17.
214 Renee Murdock, Mono Basin Volcanism, http://www.indiana.edu/~sierra/papers/2004
/murdock.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2015).
215 Mono Lake Comm., Volcanic History: Evidence of Recent Eruptions, http://www.mono
lake.org/about/geovolcanic (last visited Apr. 17, 2015); see also HART, supra note 198, at 13–14.
216 Lucas Hatcher, The Geology and Biology of Mono Lake, http://www.indiana.edu/~
sierra/papers/2013/hatcher.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2015).
217 See, e.g., Mono Basin Clearinghouse, Current Mono Lake Research, http://www.mono
basinresearch.org/research/index.php (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (listing ongoing scientific
studies in the Mono Basin).

15_TOJCI.RYAN.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

5/14/2015 2:53 PM

594

[Vol. 45:561

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

species of life on earth that exchanged arsenic for phosphorous in its
chemical profile.218 These scientists had been studying bacteria from the
bottom of Mono Lake as part of a research effort to imagine how life might
evolve on other planets.219 Their discovery of the Mono Lake GFAJ-1 arsenic
bacteria was an initially exciting development, indicating that life in stressed
environments might make creative use of a normally poisonous element as a
basic chemical building block.220 However, later research failed to replicate
these findings,221 and the scientific implications of Mono Lake’s unique
chemistry remain unresolved.
The five Mono Basin creeks are themselves an important part of the
local ecology, providing rich regional fisheries, critical riparian habitat in an
otherwise high desert environment, and irreplaceable cultural and
sustenance values for the local people.222

2. Cultural History and the Modern Economy
Mono Lake’s fascinating natural history is coupled with its compelling
cultural history. It is the ancestral homeland to a branch of the Paiute Native
American tribe known as the Kutzadika’a.223 It had been a supply station for
the nearby ghost town of Bodie, one of California’s largest boom towns
during the mid-nineteenth century gold rush.224 And it remains an
international tourist destination for nature enthusiasts visiting the lake itself,
Yosemite National Park and the Sierra wilderness areas to the west,
Mammoth Mountain and the Long Valley Caldera to the south, Lake Tahoe
and Reno to the north, and the Great Basin desert to the east.225
Today, most of the people who call the Mono Basin home live in the
tiny town of Lee Vining, nestled at 6,781 feet alongside the western shore of
the lake at the base of the Inyo—Sierra Crest.226 With the three mountain
passes leading into the town from the north, west, and south closed more
218 Nat’l Aeronautics and Space Admin., Discovery of “Arsenic-Bug” Expands Definition of
Life, NASA SCIENCE NEWS, Dec. 2, 2010, http://science.nasa.gov/science-news/science-at-

nasa/2010/02dec_monolake/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2015).
219
220

See id.
Id.

221 Richard A. Lovett, Arsenic-Life Discovery Debunked—But “Alien” Organism Still Odd,
NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC NEWS, July 9, 2012, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2012/07/
120709-arsenic-space-nasa-science-felisa-wolfe-simon/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2015).
222 Mono Basin Clearinghouse, Mono Basin Creeks: Rush, Parker, Walker, Lee Vining, Mill,
http://www.monobasinresearch.org/timelines/streams.php (last visited Apr. 17, 2015).
223 HART, supra note 198, at 22–24 (describing the traditional lifestyle and culture of the
Kutzadika’a).
224 Id. at 24–25.
225 See, e.g., Robert Reid, Top 10 US Travel Destinations for 2013, LONELY PLANET, Dec. 25,
2012, http://www.lonelyplanet.com/north-america/travel-tips-and-articles/77583 (last visited Apr.
17, 2015) (describing points of interest in the Eastern Sierra region of California); see also
Mammoth Facts: Town of Mammoth Lakes Fact Sheet, http://www.visitmammoth.com/groupsmeetings/mammoth-facts/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (noting the nearby town of Mammoth
Lakes receives an average of 2.8 million visitors every year).
226 See Lee Vining, California, http://www.city-data.com/city/Lee-Vining-California.html (last
visited Apr. 17, 2015).
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than half the year, only 315 people made it their year-round home when I
lived there in the mid-1990s. When the local 1950s-style burger stand in the
center of town, the “Mono Cone,” opened for business at the start of the
summer season, it was the equivalent of a local holiday.
There are limited economic opportunities in the Mono Basin; the holy
grail of Lee Vining residence is a year-round job with benefits (rather than,
say, a seasonal job with the June and Mammoth Lake ski resorts in towns
further south), and they were few and far between when I lived there. As in
most towns, Lee Vining residents work for the public schools, the local
electric utility, the state highway department, one or two small stores and
restaurants, and a few gas stations and hotels. Other employment comes
from the three primary sources of local industry, all drawing on the bounty
of unique natural resources in the area.
The first source of industry is the local volcanic range. The Mono
Craters are a rich source of pumice—a commercially valuable lightweight
volcanic rock used in landscaping, gardens, and foot stones—and there is a
productive pumice mine to the south of Mono Lake.227 There is also a brine
shrimp processing plant on the west side of the lake, which harvests Mono
Lake brine shrimp as commercial fish food.228 In the days of the gold rush,
the Jeffrey Pine forests southeast of the Mono Lake were harvested for
timber to build Bodie, and the lake was used to transport building
materials.229 There are still one or two sheep ranches in the area.
Today, however, the largest regional industry is provided by the
national and state public lands in the area, which draw hundreds of
thousands of visitors from all around the world.230 Most of the area has been
designated for protection within the Inyo National Forest as the Mono Basin
National Forest Scenic Area, the first National Forest lands set aside by
Congress with a conservation management directive.231 Since then, several
others have been designated, including the Columbia River Gorge National
Forest Scenic Area in Oregon.232 Parts of the basin have also been set aside
as the Mono Lake Tufa Reserve, a California State Park.233 Mono County
maintains a municipal park on the north shore of the lake, and other basin
227 See
U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt. Map of Mono Basin, available at
http://www.blm.gov/style/medialib/blm/ca/pdf/bakersfield/geology.Par.25066.File.dat/ovm07_ge
ology_maps.pdf.
228 Mono Lake, 658 P.2d 709, 719 (Cal. 1983); High Sierra Brine Shrimp Co., High Sierra
Brine Shrimp, http://www.hsbrineshrimp.com/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (advertising as “the
world’s only supplier of Mono Lake brine shrimp . . . products”).
229 HART, supra note 198, at 24–25 (describing the construction of Bodie).
230 See Peter Fimrite, Mono Lake Efforts May Be Undone by Park Closures, SF GATE, July
24, 2011, http://www.sfgate.com/green/article/Mono-Lake-efforts-may-be-undone-by-park-closu
res-2353453.php (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (describing Lee Vining as a “community that relies
on the 271,000 annual visitors who come to the area solely because of [Mono Lake]”).
231 See 16 U.S.C. § 543 (2012).
232 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NATIONAL FORESTS: SPECIAL RECREATION AREAS NOT
MEETING ESTABLISHED OBJECTIVES 9 (1990), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/150/148579.
pdf.
233 Cal. Dep’t of Parks & Recreation, Mono Lake Tufa State Natural Reserve, http://www.
parks.ca.gov/?page_id=514 (last visited Apr. 17, 2015).
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lands are separately conserved by private parties.234 Visitors to the area hike,
fish, camp, canoe, climb, ski, bird watch, photograph, and otherwise enjoy
the ample natural amenities—and seasonally fill the local restaurants, hotels,
and shops.235
The Mono Basin is well-loved by naturalists, scientists, recreationalists,
local tribes, other local residents, and visitors from around the world. For
these reasons, the Mono Basin was once considered for designation within
the National Park Service as a National Monument or an annex to Yosemite,
but the idea could not survive local opposition because it would have
required the discontinuation of all commercial extraction, including the local
pumice mine and brine shrimp plant.236 Even so, I was unofficially told,
Yosemite Park managers still itch to acquire Lee Vining Canyon—the
beautiful passageway along Highway 120 that dives from the eastern tip of
Yosemite over Tioga Pass at 10,000 feet, and then extends nail-bitingly along
granite cliffs past alpine Saddlebag and Ellery lakes, unfolding into the
rolling meadows and canyons of the upper Mono Basin glacial moraines.237

3. Acquiring the Mono Basin Water Rights
It was into this setting that Los Angeles arrived in the 1930s, looking to
expand supply for the Aqueduct. The freshwater creeks of the Mono Basin
would provide ample supply and, like the Owens Valley, all by gravitypowered conveyance. Indeed, the Mono Basin lies at an even higher
elevation than the Owens Valley, with corresponding advantages. As an
added benefit, it was estimated that diverting the Mono creeks through the
Owens River Gorge would enable the city to generate some 268 million
kilowatt hours of power annually—more than offsetting the 186 million
kilowatt hours it would ultimately take to bring water to the city from the
Colorado River each year.238 With all this in mind, the city concluded that it
should acquire rights to divert from Mono Lake’s feeder creeks, just as it had
done to acquire the waters of Owens River—but this time, Los Angeles took
a different approach.
In many respects, this was an easier project. Most of the flow in the
freshwater Mono Basin creeks had never been privately appropriated,239 so
234 HART, supra note 198, at 7; see also Press Release, Eastern Sierra Land Trust, Permanent
Protection of Mono Lake Scenic Vista Draws Applause (July 26, 2008), available at
http://www.eslt.org/Pages/Newsroom2008.htm (describing the donation of a 480-acre
conservation easement in Mono Basin).
235 Mono Lake Comm., Things to Do: Spending Your Time in the Mono Basin, http://www.
monolake.org/visit/activities (last visited Apr. 17, 2015).
236 See HART, supra note 198, at 92 (discussing efforts to designate the Mono Basin as a
National Monument); see also author communications with U.S. Forest Service supervisors
(1996-1998).
237 Author communications with U.S. Forest Service supervisors (1996–1998).
238 GARY LIBECAP, OWENS VALLEY REVISITED: A REASSESSMENT OF THE WEST’S FIRST GREAT
WATER TRANSFER 133 (2007).
239 See Mono Lake, 658 P.2d 709, 711 (Cal. 1983) (explaining that the five freshwater streams
had historically been Mono Lake’s main source of water prior to being appropriated by the city’s
Department of Water and Power).
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from the perspective of California water allocation law, it was there for Los
Angeles’s taking. The traditional approach assigned no protectable rights to
instream flows, so the fact that this snowmelt had long been preserving the
Mono Lake ecosystem had no legal force under the doctrine of prior
appropriations.240
In addition, the Mono Basin was never as developed as the Owens
Valley had been, so there were fewer prior rights holders to contend with.
Most pre-existing claims were riparian rights associated with adjacent real
property, so the city simply sought to purchase the land.241 The aqueduct had
now been operating for decades, so there was neither mystery nor chicanery
about the process. When Los Angeles came looking for land and water rights
in the Mono Basin, nobody pretended to be a farmer. Instead, the city simply
offered to buy riparian land and water rights, underscored by an open threat
of condemnation if offers were refused.242 In fact, most owners sold willingly,
although a few holdouts had to concede or lower their asking prices after
the city brought consolidated eminent domain proceedings against all Basin
landowners.243
Nevertheless, creating the Mono Basin Extension introduced one new
challenge. California water law had developed over the intervening decades,
so this time, Los Angeles had to do more to secure its rights before it could
begin withdrawals. In 1913, California enacted the Water Commission Act,
which required permits for all newly asserted rights to unappropriated
waters and all transfers of previously acquired water rights.244 All rights
acquired before 1914 were grandfathered into the system, and as Los
Angeles had secured rights to Owens Valley water before the Los Angeles
Aqueduct opened in 1913, it had avoided the formal permitting process.245
However, the law now required Los Angeles to establish its rights to
previously unappropriated Mono Basin waters by permit.246 It also needed
permits to transfer the pre-existing rights it acquired for new, out-of-basin
purposes.247 Under the appropriative system, a user can’t just take existing
water rights and do something wholly different with them—creating new

240 See supra notes 79–86, 90–92 and accompanying text (discussing the law of prior
appropriations).
241 See HART, supra note 198, at 39–40 (describing how Los Angeles acquired land and water
rights); see also City of Los Angeles v. Aitken, 52 P.2d 585 (1935) (litigating just compensation
for the related condemnation of Mono Basin property).
242 HART, supra note 198, at 38–39; see also Andrew H. Sawyer, Changing Landscape and
Evolving Law: Lessons from Mono Lake on Takings and the Public Trust, 50 OKLA. L. REV. 311,
323–24 (1997) (describing methods of water rights acquisition by the Los Angeles Department of
Water and Power).
243 Los Angeles v. Aitken, 52 P.2d at 585 (consolidated condemnation proceedings for Mono
Basin property); see also LIBECAP, supra note 238, at 133–34 (describing the Aitken litigation).
244 See Brian E. Gray, The Modern Era in California Water Law, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 249, 273–75
(1994).
245 Id. at 274–75.
246 See William R. Attwater & James Markle, Overview of California Water Rights and Water
Quality Law, 19 PAC. L.J. 957, 972–73 (1988) (noting that the Water Commission Act required
permits to establish new rights in previously unappropriated water).
247

See id.
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patterns of return flow and other potentially negative impacts on
downstream riparians and appropriators.248 The California Water Resources
Control Board (Water Board) must first verify that the new purpose is an
eligible beneficial use, and then it has to figure out where the appropriation
will lie in the chain of temporal priority.249
When Los Angeles had acquired all the necessary rights from previous
owners and sought permission from the state to begin diverting water to the
aqueduct, the Water Board was openly troubled about the decision.250 Agency
personnel worried aloud about the impacts these exports would have on the
local community and environment.251 They recalled what had happened to
the Owens Valley. They knew what similar diversions would mean for the
Mono Basin, and it clearly alarmed them. They had no desire to be
responsible for turning Mono Lake into another Owen’s Dry Lake. Yet they
determined that their hands were effectively tied by California water law.252
California water policy made clear that the task of the agency was to
ensure that water was put to beneficial use,253 and domestic and municipal
uses by state residents are the highest of all beneficial uses.254 “[T]here is
apparently nothing that this office can do to prevent it,” lamented agency
staff.255 Los Angeles was among the state’s largest and most economically
important cities,256 and it sought this water for the most beneficial possible
uses. “This office therefore has no alternative but to dismiss all protests
based upon the possible lowering of the water level in Mono Lake,” they
reluctantly reasoned.257 In 1940, the permits were granted.258
With that permission, the Los Angeles Aqueduct formally reached the
Mono Basin.259 It intercepted four of Mono’s five feeder creeks and shunted
their water south into the upper Owens River, where it could continue
through the established pathway to Los Angeles.260 A new reservoir, Crowley

248

See supra notes 79–86, 90–92 and accompanying text (discussing the law of prior

appropriations).
249
250

Id.
See Mono Lake, 658 P.2d 709, 713–14 (Cal. 1983) (discussing the 1940 Water Board

decision, which found that “it had to grant the application notwithstanding the harm to public
trust uses of Mono Lake”).
251 Id. at 714.
252 See id. at 713–14 (discussing the Water Board’s findings that it was required to prioritize
domestic use above all others).
253 CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2. (“[T]he general welfare requires that the water resources of the
State be put to beneficial use to the fullest extent of which they are capable . . . .”).
254 See Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 713–14.
255 Id. at 714.
256 See HART, supra note 198, at 31; see also Koehler, supra note 94, at 560–61 (describing
Los Angeles’s potential for growth and success as a prime acquirer of land and water rights of
the Mono Basin).
257 Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 714.
258 Id. at 711.
259 Id. (describing how Mono Lake receives water from its feeder streams, of which four out
of five were appropriated by Los Angeles).
260 Id. at 711, 713.

15_TOJCI.RYAN.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

THE MONO LAKE STORY

5/14/2015 2:53 PM

599

Lake, was built just north of where the Owens River passes through the
elongated canyon of the Owens River Gorge.261
There were additional engineering complications to overcome—most
notably, the Mono Crater volcanic range that extended south from Mono
Lake along the path the water would take to reach Crowley. To complete the
aqueduct, engineers had to tunnel through eleven miles of dormant
volcanoes, and the local lore is that the project had lost a man per mile as
workers encountered steam vents and toxic gases—just another indication
of how valuable this water was considered to be.262 So valuable, in fact, that
thirty years later, they built a second aqueduct.

4. 1970: The Second Barrel
As demand for water in Los Angeles continued to grow, the city realized
that it could export even more water from the Mono Basin, if only the
system could be modified to accommodate additional flow.263 To make that
happen, DWP essentially built a second aqueduct.264 The second barrel
increased the capacity of the original system by roughly fifty percent, laying
an additional, parallel channel where needed to accommodate increased
flow.265 Following the logic of the original 1940 permits, the Water Board
affirmed permission for the additional exports in 1970.266 By this time, Los
Angeles was importing about 100,000 acre-feet per year from the Mono
Basin, or roughly twelve percent of its total water supply—supplemented by
the California and Colorado River aqueducts that were now in place.267
Mono Lake had already been slowly deteriorating during the first
twenty-five years after the Los Angeles Aqueduct arrived.268 In 1962, ten years
before the second barrel was put in, the lake had already lost nearly twentyfive vertical feet.269 A famous set of limestone towers known as the
“Benchmark Tufa” illustrated the decline: they had been fully submerged
before diversions began in the 1940s, but they were several feet above the
new water line in 1962, and they were standing fully exposed in 1968 at the
edge of the lakeshore, some six feet high.270
After the second barrel went in, almost no water reached the lake from
its major tributaries, and Mono Lake’s decline accelerated dramatically. Ten
years after the second barrel, the lake had lost nearly forty-five vertical

261 See HART, supra note 198, at 34, 42, 137 (discussing the creation of Crowley Lake, also
known as the “Long Valley reservoir”).
262 Id. at 43 (discussing the tunnel); TIMOTHY TIERNEY, GEOLOGY OF THE MONO BASIN 51 (2d
ed. 2000) (noting the eleven deaths).
263 HART, supra note 198, at 56.
264 Id. at 56–57.
265 Mono Lake, 658 P.2d 709, 714 (Cal. 1983).
266 Decision 1631, supra note 8, at 86.
267 Id. (“Annual Mono Basin exports increased to an average of 102,000 acre-feet per year
through 1981 . . . .”); Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 714; see also HART, supra note 198, at 76.
268 See HART, supra note 198, at 49.
269 See id at 49, 51.
270 Id. at 50–51.
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feet,271 and half its pre-diversion volume.272 The drop in the lake level exposed
about 18,000 acres of lake bed.273 By 1995, the Benchmark Tufa stood sunbleached and bone dry, more than a mile from the shore.274
The falling water level devastated Mono Lake’s ecology. The lake was
losing volume to unreplenished surface evaporation, but evaporation leaves
the saline mineral content behind. As a result, when the volume of the lake
was halved, its salinity doubled. When the salinity doubled, the simple Mono
Lake ecosystem began to unravel.
There were biological impacts to the shrimp, and their reproduction
rates slowed.275 As the shrimp population declined, there were corresponding
effects on the migratory bird populations that depended on the shrimp for
survival along their thousand-mile journeys.276 In addition, as the water level
fell, Negit island—the small black volcano where the California Gulls came
to breed277—became bridged to the land.278 Gull populations were devastated
as local coyotes gorged on the eggs and chicks that were no longer sheltered
from predation—notwithstanding two failed attempts by the National Guard
to breach the land bridge with dynamite.279 Meanwhile, the freshwater creeks
below the diversion points were completely desiccated, destroying riparian
habitat and devastating local fisheries.280
Moreover, as the lake dramatically shrunk in size, the exposed lakebed
contained the same toxic alkali dust that had poisoned the Owens Valley
when the Owens Dry Lakebed was exposed.281 Satellite photos from 1968
show a pronounced ring of white, exposed alkali flats encircling the lake like
a ring of bathtub soap scum—a ring that appeared to double in size by 1983,
after the second barrel had gone in.282 Like Owens Lake, Mono Lake sits at
the base of a dramatic 10,000-foot escarpment along the Eastern Sierra,
where high winds ricochet off the mountainsides and churn exposed salts
into airborne, cancer-causing dust storms. Pollution hadn’t yet reached the
critical levels recorded in the Owens Valley, but Mono is so much more
saline than Owens that the potential public health implications were

271
272

Id. at 58; Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 714.
See Mono Lake Facts, supra note 199 (listing the volume of Mono Lake at its highest and

lowest levels).
273 Decision 1631, supra note 8, at 5 (“The surface area of the lake declined from 54,924
acres in 1941 to approximately 37,688 acres in 1982.”); see also Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 716.
274 See Andrew Ford, Mono Basin: Tufa, http://public.wsu.edu/~forda/tufa1.html (last visited
Apr. 17, 2015) (showing a photograph of Professor Ford kneeling at the tufa in 1995, with the
shores of Mono Lake visible in the background of the photograph).
275 See HART, supra note 198, at 69 (discussing shrimp reproductive issues).
276 Id. at 70.
277 Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 716.
278
279

Id.
See HART, supra note 198, at 72, 88 (describing attempts to breach the Negit land bridge

in 1978 and 1979).
280 Id. at 54–56 (describing effects on the feeder streams).
281 See id. at 52–54 (describing the alkali band buildup and increase in toxic dust storms).
282 See Maggie’s Notebook, NASA’s Creature at Bottom of Mono Lake: Remnants of
Previous Earth Inhabitants?, http://www.maggiesnotebook.com/2010/12/nasas-creature-atbottom-of-mono-lake-remnants-of-previous-earth-inhabitants/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2015).
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concerning.283 As it was, the Mono Basin National Forest Scenic Area—
established by Congress for its extraordinary scenic, ecological, and
recreational values—was periodically violating Clean Air Act particulate
standards.284

5. The Coalition of Resistance
As environmental devastation in the Mono Basin gathered speed, local
resistance gathered force. Residents feared both for their health and for
their livelihoods, as water exports eroded the lake at the center of their
public lands-based tourist economy. Students and scientists who studied the
unique geologic and biological resources in the area raised the alarm of
impending ecologic collapse.285
In 1976, Stanford biologist David Gaines oversaw a student research
project by David Winkler about the effects of Los Angeles’s diversions on
Mono Lake,286 which galvanized the growing opposition.287 If Los Angeles
continued to export 100,000 acre-feet per year from the Mono Basin creeks,
the lake was predicted to lose another forty-three vertical feet and twenty
square miles of surface area over the next eighty to one hundred years.288
Forecasters predicted that it would eventually reach equilibrium as a lifeless,
hypersaline sump at the center of the vast and toxic salt plains of the
formerly submerged lakebed.289
A coalition of local residents, nature lovers, environmental advocates,
scientists, legal experts, and government agencies coalesced around the idea
that something had to be done.290 In 1978, with help from the Santa Monica
Bay Audubon Society, David Gaines organized the Mono Lake Committee, a
local grassroots organization committed to saving Mono Lake.291 David and
his wife, Sally Gaines, traveled the state raising awareness about the Mono

283 Blumm & Schwartz, supra note 3, at 704–05 (describing Mono Lake’s unique level of
salinity).
284 HART, supra note 198, at 154–55.
285 Id. at 61–63 (describing how scientists of various fields demonstrated concern for Mono
Lake).
286 MONO BASIN RESEARCH GRP., AN ECOLOGICAL STUDY OF MONO LAKE, CALIFORNIA (David W.
Winkler ed., 1977), available at http://www.monobasinresearch.org/onlinereports/1976study/
ecologicalstudyofmonolake.pdf.
287 See Mono Lake Comm., History of the Mono Lake Committee, http://www.mono
lake.org/mlc/history (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) [hereinafter MLC History] (“[The] report drew
attention to the potentially catastrophic ecological impacts of Mono Lake’s falling level . . . .”).
288 Mono Lake, 658 P.2d 709, 715 (Cal. 1983).
289 See id. (noting that forecasters predicted the lake would stabilize at 6,330 feet, with a
surface area of approximately 38 square miles).
290 For the most thorough historical account of scientific, political, and legal advocacy at
Mono Lake, see generally HART, supra note 198. For a discussion of the different advocates on
the eve of litigation, see id. at 61–83. For a description of the legal research produced by
Professor Harrison Dunning’s pivotal public trust doctrine conference in 1980 at U.C. Davis, see
id. at 101.
291 See MLC History, supra note 287.
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Lake situation with “schools, conservation groups, legislators, and anyone
who would listen.”292
An independent study by an Interagency Task Force of state and federal
environmental agencies concluded that diversions would need to be reduced
to 15,000 acre-feet per year to stabilize the lake,293 and state legislation
requiring those reductions was introduced but never enacted.294
Nevertheless, statewide public sentiment began shifting in sympathy with
the lake advocates. Vehicles all over California began sporting “Save Mono
Lake” bumper stickers.295 The National Audubon Society expressed interest
in helping the fledgling Mono Lake Committee bring a lawsuit.296
Meanwhile, in 1970, Professor Joseph Sax published the now classic
law review article entitled The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource
Law: Effective Judicial Intervention.297 In his article—one of those rare
academic works that literally changes the world—he noted:
Private citizens, no longer willing to accede to the efforts of administrative
agencies to protect the public interest, have begun to take the initiative
themselves. One dramatic result is a proliferation of lawsuits in which citizens,
demanding judicial recognition of their rights as members of the public, sue the
very governmental agencies which are supposed to be protecting the public
298
interest.

Sax argued that because legislatures are susceptible to capture by industry
that would monopolize and degrade commonly held natural resources, the
doctrine enables judicial access to “promote equality of political power for a
disorganized and diffuse majority.”299 He further argued that the public trust
doctrine should not be limited in application to navigable waters, but should
be extended to “a wide range of situations in which diffuse public interests
need protection against tightly organized groups with clear and immediate
goals.”300
His inspiration was surely felt in the famous litigation that followed.

292

Id.

293

INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON MONO LAKE, REPORT OF INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON MONO
LAKE 1–2 (1979); see also HART, supra note 198, at 88 (describing the report of the Task Force).
294 HART, supra note 198, at 84, 88–89. Earlier legislation inspired by the Owens Valley
conflict imposed tighter controls on some out-of-basin water exports, but Los Angeles Aqueduct
exports were not subject to these restrictions. See LIBECAP, supra note 238, at 16 (describing
California’s 1943 Area of Origin Law).
295 Jane Kay, It’s Rising and Healthy: Three Decades Ago, a Bunch of College Students

Reported on and Worried About the Fate of Mono Lake. This Month, They Celebrated Its
Recovery., SF GATE, July 29, 2006, http://www.sfgate.com/green/article/it-s-rising-and-healthythree-decades-ago-a-2515840.php (last visited Apr. 17, 2015).
296 See MLC History, supra note 287 (discussing two lawsuits brought by the Mono Lake
Committee and the National Audubon Society).
297 See generally Sax, supra note 12.
298 Id. at 473.
299 Id. at 560.
300 Id. at 556.
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IV. THE MONO LAKE LITIGATION
The emerging coalition marshalled its resources to forestall further
environmental devastation in the Mono Basin, culminating in the California
Supreme Court’s epic Mono Lake decision. This Part reviews the path to
litigation, the arguments that reached the high court, the justices’ landmark
ruling, and the aftermath of its decision—including the Water Board’s
resulting plans for implementation of the court’s decision and Los Angeles’s
embrace of a new strategy for compliance. After exploring the most
important doctrinal features of the court’s decision, it touches on some
important scholarly criticisms of the resulting doctrine, as well as potential
future public trust developments, including the Atmospheric Trust Project.

A. The Audubon Society (Mono Lake) Case
In 1979, the National Audubon Society and Mono Lake Committee filed
a lawsuit in Mono County court, arguing that Los Angeles’s diversions
violated the public trust doctrine, constituted a common law nuisance, and
violated portions of the California constitution protecting navigable
waterways.301 Los Angeles defended the legality of the diversions under
California water law and moved for an adjudication of all water rights in the
Mono Basin—effectively joining all private, state, and federal landholders in
a suit that would ultimately proceed all the way to the California Supreme
Court.302

1. The Parties
The parties to the resulting litigation included local residents, state
landowners, environmental nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) at
various levels of geographical scale, government agencies responsible for
impacted land, water, wildlife, and air resources, and DWP. The Mono Lake
Committee coordinated efforts on behalf of the plaintiffs from Lee Vining,
where they remain a Mono Basin watchdog and advocacy group.303 In
addition to local and national chapters of the Audubon Society, they were
joined by several other environmental NGOs, including Friends of the Earth,
the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, and CalTrout.304
301 See Mono Lake, 658 P.2d 709, 716 (Cal. 1983) (“[P]laintiffs filed suit for injunctive and
declaratory relief in the Superior Court for Mono County on May 21, 1979.”). Mono Lake had
been previously established as a navigable waterway in an earlier takings case, City of Los
Angeles v. Aitken, 52 P.2d 585, 588 (Cal. 1935) (“There can be no doubt that Mono Lake is a
navigable body of water.”).
302 Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 716, 727.
303 Decision 1631, supra note 8, at 7; see also MLC History, supra note 287 (describing the
mission of the organization as “a non-profit citizens’ group dedicated to protecting and restoring
the Mono Basin ecosystem, educating the public about Mono Lake and the impacts on the
environment of excessive water use, and promoting cooperative solutions that protect Mono
Lake and meet . . . real water needs without . . . transferring environmental problems to other
areas”) (quotation marks omitted).
304 Decision 1631, supra note 8, at 7, 19.
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A host of state and federal government agencies were also involved,305
including the U.S. Forest Service (responsible for managing the Mono Basin
National Forest Scenic Area), the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (with
interests in the Mono Basin creeks and fisheries), the California Department
of Fish and Game (concerned with wildlife impacts), the California
Department of Parks and Recreation (responsible for the Mono Lake Tufa
State Reserve), the State Lands Commission (responsible for state land
resources), and the California Great Basin Unified Air Pollution Control
District (charged with managing compliance with the Clean Air Act and
other air quality controls).306 And of course, DWP defended the city’s
exports.307

2. Settlement Negotiations
Extensive negotiations preceded the California Supreme Court’s
disposition of the case, in which lawmakers and others tried and failed to
persuade the disputants to reach a compromise.308 Sizeable state and federal
grants were offered to help Los Angeles adopt water conservation
technologies that might reduce its need for water imports,309 but the city was
loathe to give any ground on its claims for imported water. Los Angeles
commanded one of the largest metropolitan areas in the country, but its
continued existence hinged on access to imported water. City leaders likely
worried that conceding any water in the Mono Basin might redound
negatively to other claims.310 Moreover, under the “use it or lose it” principle
of appropriative water law, any sustained failure by Los Angeles to exercise
those water rights could result in their legal forfeiture forever.311
Meanwhile, the Interagency Task Force had determined that 6,388 feet
above sea level was the minimum water level required in Mono Lake to
forestall ecological collapse and prevent further degradation of air
resources.312 Although they did not insist that Mono Lake be returned to its
305 For the argument that the federal government might also have challenged diversions on
the basis of the riparian rights associated with its ownership of Mono Basin public lands, see
Richard P. Shanahan, The Application of California Riparian Water Rights Doctrine to Federal
Lands in the Mono Lake Basin, 34 HASTING L.J. 1293, 1296 (1983).
306 Decision 1631, supra note 8, at 19–20.
307 See Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 709 (“Plaintiffs filed suit . . . to enjoin DWP diversions . . . .”).
308 HART, supra note 198, at 85, 88.
309 Id. at 88 (“The state and federal governments would pay two-thirds of the cost of
replacement water for the first two years . . . .”).
310 Author email communication with Geoff McQuilken, Executive Director of the Mono
Lake Committee, Apr. 26, 2015 (on file with author); see also HART, supra note 198, at 88–89,
168–70 (discussing the city’s reluctance to engage in any activity that might undermine its
appropriative rights); id. at 83 (describing a failed settlement conference among the parties in
which the DWP representative pledged the city’s resolve to protect its appropriative rights by
warning the Mono Lake advocates that “The last lawsuit we had like this took forty-three years.
. . . Fortunately, we're young.”).
311 See supra Part II.B (discussing the law of prior appropriations).
312 See HART, supra note 198, at 86, 88 (discussing the Mono Lake Committee’s and
Interagency Task Force’s insistence on restoring the lake level to 6,388 feet, depending on how
the lake level would be defined).
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pre-diversion level of 6,417 feet, the Mono Lake advocates refused to
consider any proposal that would not protect the lake at the 6,388-foot
level.313 Indeed, Mono Lake Committee leaders once explained to me that
they had been counseled by negotiation experts to open with a more
extreme demand that would enable them bargaining room to concede
downward during negotiations with the city. However, they rejected the
conventional approach in favor of one they felt was grounded in the
authority of scientific evidence.314 “Why play games?” they explained: “We
weren’t going to bluff; we were just going to start with what the science said
was necessary, and then stay there forever.”315

3. The California Supreme Court Decision
As negotiations failed to resolve the dispute, Mono Lake continued to
decline, and the case proceeded through all levels of the judicial system to
the California Supreme Court.316 In the case before the California high court,
the plaintiffs made a simple claim that threatened to undermine a century’s
worth of seemingly settled California water law. Channeling the insights of
Professor Sax and the U.C. Davis conference scholars, the plaintiffs argued
that allowing the destruction of Mono Lake through continued water
diversions was impermissible, notwithstanding that these diversions were
pursuant to state-approved appropriations, because it violated state
obligations under the public trust doctrine.317 The importance of the public
trust doctrine had been progressively recognized in several prior California
Supreme Court cases,318 and the plaintiffs argued that the state’s obligations
313 See id. at 85 (discussing negotiations between the Mono Lake Committee, the
Interagency Task Force, and the City of Los Angeles).
314 See Decision 1631, supra note 8, at 154–55 (describing the long-term goal of returning the
lake to a level that would protect the various public trust resources at issue).
315 Personal communications with Geoffrey McQuilken, MLC Executive Director (July 1996
& May 2001); see also MLC History, supra note 287 (noting that early Mono Lake Committee
leaders “also decided to ask for exactly what they wanted, instead of asking for more and then
compromising down to the true goal”).
316 Because the litigation included federal agencies, the case was removed to federal district
court, which abstained on the novel issue of state law and remanded back to state court. See
Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Dep’t of Water & Power of Los Angeles, 496 F. Supp. 499 (E.D. Cal.
1980); Mono Lake, 658 P.2d 709, 712 (Cal. 1983) (describing the federal district court’s request
“that the state courts determine the relationship between the public trust doctrine and the
water rights system”); see also Mono Basin Clearinghouse, Political & Legal Chronology,
http://www.monobasinresearch.org/timelines/polchr.php (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (describing
history of the various lawsuits taking place at Mono Lake).
317 See Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 712 (describing plaintiffs’ theory that “the shores, bed and
waters of Mono Lake are protected by a public trust” and that diversions that fail to consider
the public trust “may result in needless destruction of [public trust] values”).
318 See, e.g., State of California v. Superior Court (Fogerty), 29 Cal. 3d 240, 247 (Cal. 1981)
(applying the public trust doctrine to “all the navigable lakes and rivers in California”); State of
California v. Superior Court (Lyon), 29 Cal. 3d 210, 227 (Cal. 1981) (same); City of Berkeley v.
Superior Court, 606 P.2d 362, 364 (1980) (characterizing the public trust right as “illimitable and
unrestrainable and incapable of individual exclusive appropriation”) (internal quotation marks
omitted); Marks, 491 P.2d 374 (1971) (recognizing the public trust doctrine as a matter “of great
public importance”).
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as trustee must accordingly take precedence over its previous decisions to
allow Los Angeles’s diversions.
Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that the state had failed its trust
obligations back in 1940, when the Water Board had first granted Los
Angeles permission to divert water from the Mono Basin creeks.319 The Water
Board had granted these licenses in violation of the public trust doctrine, the
plaintiffs explained, because its decision failed to account for the
foreseeable harms to Mono Lake’s ecologic, scenic, and recreational
values.320 At the time, the agency had openly worried about these very
problems, reflecting on the earlier destruction of Owens Lake.321 The
plaintiffs contended that the Water Board had violated the state’s trust
obligations when it wrongly concluded that it had no alternative but to
permit the exports, notwithstanding these anticipated harms.322
In fact, the plaintiffs argued, the public trust doctrine both empowered
and obligated the Water Board to prevent these exports. Mono Lake was
held by the state in trust for the public, and no organ of the state could give
away its water if that would result in the destruction of the resource.323 The
argument, in essence, was that it was no more permissible for California to
give away Mono Lake’s waters than it was for Illinois to give away Chicago
Harbor in the famous Illinois Central case.324 The plaintiffs also argued that
Los Angeles’s harmful diversions should be considered an unreasonable
use.325
DWP defended Los Angeles’s rights to export Mono Basin water on
grounds that the licenses were fully consistent with the clearly articulated
California water law principles of prior appropriations and beneficial use.326
The California constitution affirms that water should be put to beneficial

319 See Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 728–29 (noting that the rights had been acquired “in 1940
from a water board which believed it lacked both the power and the duty to protect the Mono
Lake environment” and that DWP “continues to exercise those rights in apparent disregard for
the resulting damage to . . . Mono Lake”).
320
321

Id.
Id. at 714 (citing the Water Board’s 1940 decision, which found: “It is indeed unfortunate

that the City’s proposed development will result in decreasing the aesthetic advantages of Mono
Basin but there is apparently nothing that this office can do to prevent it.”) (emphasis in
opinion); see also Decision 1631, supra note 8, at 1 (noting the Water Board’s conclusion that
the Water Code “required issuance of the permits despite anticipated damage to Mono Lake and
other natural resources”).
322 See Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 712–14 (noting plaintiffs’ public trust violation cause of
action and the DWP’s determination not to consider the public trust in its 1940 decision).
323 Id. at 712 (summarizing the state’s public trust duty and synthesizing the doctrine with
the prior appropriations doctrine).
324 See id. at 721 (discussing Illinois Central and applying its rule of law); see also supra Part
II.A.1 (discussing Illinois Central).
325 See Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 718 (discussing defendant’s attempt to require plaintiffs to
exhaust administrative remedies before the Water Board for claims “based on asserted
unreasonable or nonbeneficial use of appropriated water”).
326 Id. at 727 (noting defendant’s argument that the public trust had been subsumed into the
prior appropriation system, giving it “a vested right in perpetuity to take water without concern
for the consequences to the trust”); see also supra Part II.B (reviewing principles of water law).
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use,327 and much of this water was going to the highest recognized form of
beneficial use—domestic use by the citizens of Los Angeles. (This, they
would have argued, was hardly comparable to giving away the bed of
Chicago Harbor.)
DWP also pointed to the vast legal and physical infrastructure by which
water is moved all over the state of California, from watersheds with more
to watersheds with less.328 This elaborate network of water transfers is
formalized by the system of licenses that confer the appropriative rights on
which cities like Los Angeles have long relied.329
Finally, DWP argued that the well-developed body of statutory water
law in California had subsumed and displaced the common law public trust
doctrine.330 After all, this is normally what happens when statutory law
conflicts with the common law—as it has in vast areas of tort, contract, and
criminal law.331 Legislative pronouncements to the contrary abrogate the
precedents of judge-made common law.332 DWP also argued that the
plaintiffs were not entitled to judicial relief because they had not exhausted
administrative remedies.333
The plaintiffs thus argued that the public trust doctrine trumps the prior
appropriations doctrine, while the defendants maintained that the statutorily
codified principles of prior appropriation trump the common law public
trust doctrine.334 Indeed, reviewing the two doctrines in isolation reveals a
set of legal principles that seem hard to reconcile; neither so much as
acknowledges the other. The court openly acknowledged that “the two
systems of legal thought have been on a collision course,” and that it was
time to resolve the issue.335 This, then, was the critical question of first
impression that the Mono Lake case presented to the justices of the
California Supreme Court: What is the relationship between the public trust
327 CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2. (“[I]n this State the general welfare requires that the water
resources of the State be put to beneficial use to the fullest extent of which they are capable,
and that the waste or unreasonable use or unreasonable method of use of water be prevented,
and that the conservation of such waters is to be exercised with a view to the reasonable and
beneficial use thereof in the interest of the people and for the public welfare.”).
328 See Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 727–28 (discussing California’s historical reliance on water
diversions out of stream).
329 Id. at 727 (discussing the Water Board’s power to “grant usufructuary licenses that will
permit an appropriator to take water from flowing streams and use that water in a distant part
of the state”).
330

Id.
See, e.g., William Lindsley, Effects of Statutes on Common Law, in 58 CAL. JUR. 3D
Statutes § 5 (“The legislature is at liberty to change any rule of the common law and thereby
331

prevent it from being the rule of decision in this state.”); Modern Barber Colleges v. Cal. Emp’t
State Comm’n, 192 P.2d 916, 920 (Cal. 1948) (noting that the legislature may “create new rights
or provide that rights which have previously existed shall no longer arise, and it has full power
to regulate and circumscribe the methods and means of enjoying those rights”).
332 See Lowman v. Stafford, 226 Cal. App. 2d 31, 38–39 (1964) (“[T]he law itself, as a rule of
conduct, may be changed at will by the Legislature subject only to constitutional provision.”)
(internal citations omitted).
333 Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 718.
334 Id. at 713–14, 718.
335 Id. at 712, 727.
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doctrine and the law of appropriative water rights? When they point in
opposite directions, which do we follow? Which trumps the other?
In its ultimate decision, the high state court famously declined to
choose. Instead, it affirmed that both doctrines remain bedrock principles
within California law, and that neither displaces the other.336 It is the
obligation of the state, said the court, to navigate the requirements of both.337
The state must act to protect the interests in navigable waters that are
protected by the trust, but it must also have the power to enable
appropriative rights in water for other public purposes, even if diversions
harm public trust values.338
Critically, however, the court stated that “[a]pproval of such diversion
without considering public trust values . . . may result in needless
destruction of those values.”339 The court directed that “before state courts
and agencies approve water diversions they should consider the effect of
such diversions upon interests protected by the public trust, and attempt, so
far as feasible, to avoid or minimize any harm to those interests.”340
On the facts of this case, the court agreed with the plaintiffs that the
public trust doctrine had not been given its due weight in the Water Board’s
permitting calculus.341 The state could not allow the Mono Lake tributaries to
be diverted to the extinguishment of its public trust values without even
considering the possibilities for avoiding this harm.342 But the court also
stressed that the state’s most populous areas have long depended on the
appropriation of water from remote locations, often to the detriment of the
basin of origin.343 Water allocation and permitting laws govern the
established legal relationships in these circumstances in ways that cannot be
casually disrupted. In a decision affirming that instream values are
considered beneficial uses in California,344 the court nevertheless allowed
that there may be times when the public interests in diversions outweigh the
public values protected by the trust.345
The court thus affirmed that Southern California’s legitimate water
needs must remain protected by appropriations law, but also that these
rights are nonvested, and subject to the state’s ongoing duty to supervise the
impact of diversions on the navigational and environmental values
associated with trust resources.346 It concluded that the Water Board had
neglected these obligations in 1940 and 1970, when it issued Los Angeles
permits without even considering its implicated trust responsibilities.347

336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347

Id. at 727.
Id.
Id. at 712.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 728–29.
Id. at 726.
Id. at 712, 727.
Id. at 727.
Id. at 728–29.
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Accordingly, the court invalidated the licenses and remanded them to
the Water Board for reconsideration in light of its decision.348 In the new
decision-making process, the Water Board was directed to balance the
legitimate water needs of Los Angeles with the state’s obligation to protect
the scenic, ecological, and recreational values in the Mono Basin as much as
feasible.349 Finally, the court upheld its concurrent jurisdiction with the
Water Board in administering issues of the public trust and water rights,
affirming the plaintiff’s ability to seek judicial relief without first exhausting
administrative remedies.350

4. Legal Innovations
The central contribution of the Mono Lake case is its affirmation that—
at least in California351—the common law public trust doctrine exerts force
independently from the statutory principles of private water allocation, and
that water planners must accommodate the interests protected by each. As
discussed above, the court pointedly rejected the argument that the trust
had been subsumed or preempted by statutory and constitutional provisions
establishing the prior appropriations doctrine.352 In addition to clarifying the
relationship between the public trust and prior appropriation doctrines,
however, the decision also yields several other important points of law,
including its application to environmental values, non-navigable tributaries,
and over time.

a. Application to Environmental Values.
Among lay audiences worldwide, the Mono Lake case is perhaps most
famous for the proposition that the public trust doctrine protects values
beyond the traditional boating, fishing, and swimming associated with
navigable waters to also include ecological, recreational, and scenic
considerations.353 Indeed, when I would give the South Tufa tour along the
southwest shore as a Mono Lake ranger, we casually extolled the decision
for its extension of public trust principles to include these more modern
environmental values. Only in law school did I learn that this was a bit of a
348
349
350

Id. at 729.
Id. at 728–29.
Id. at 730–32.

351 Although the California Supreme Court’s interpretation is limited to California law, it is
noteworthy that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in the Robinson
Township decision. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 913 (Pa. 2013). For further
discussion of the case, see supra Part II.A.2.
352 Mono Lake, 658 P.2d 709, 712 (Cal. 1983) (conceiving of California water law as “an
integration including both the public trust doctrine and the board-administered appropriative
rights system”); see supra Part IV.A.3 (discussing this holding).
353 See, e.g., Blumm, supra note 15, at 591 (characterizing Mono Lake as among the best
known of the new generation of public trust decisions); Frank, supra note 23, at 670 (referring
to the case as “perhaps the nation’s most important public trust decision in nearly a century”);
Conway, supra note 92, at 631.
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local conceit; while the Mono Lake case made it famous, that expansion was
really established by another case more than ten years earlier.354
In 1971, in Marks v. Whitney (Marks),355 the California Supreme Court
affirmed the flexibility of the public trust doctrine to encompass changing
public needs in trust resources, including ecological, open space, habitat,
scenery, and scientific values.356 However, Marks addressed a comparatively
dry set of facts, adjudicating the conflicting rights of private parties over the
construction of a wharf in trust-protected tidelands.357 By comparison, the
compelling facts of the Mono Lake case, together with the force of the more
photogenic environmental values at risk there, have made it the more
popular standard-bearer for the expansion. The use of the public trust
doctrine to protect the vulnerable water, air, wildlife, scenic, scientific, and
recreational values of the Mono Basin remains the best known feature of the
Mono Lake story.358

b. Application to Non-Navigable Tributaries.
An especially concrete legal innovation of the Mono Lake case is that it
extended the protection of the public trust doctrine from the navigable
waterway itself to the non-navigable tributaries on which it relies
hydrologically.359 After all, Los Angeles wasn’t directly draining the lake
(which would have yielded some awfully nonpotable water!). Instead, the
city was diverting the mostly non-navigable creeks that channeled snowmelt
from the Sierra into the lake, replenishing it against continuous
evaporation.360 At the time, the public trust doctrine had not been applied to
activity interfering with non-navigable creeks. Los Angeles could thus
defend the Mono Lake lawsuit not only by arguing that the doctrine had been
preempted by prior appropriations, but also that there was no interference
with a waterway subject to the trust.

354 Marks, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971) (expanding public trust protections to ecological,
habitat, open space, climatic, and scenic values).
355
356

Id.
Id. (expanding public trust protections to ecological, habitat, open space, climatic, and

scenic values).
357 Id. at 377.
358 The public trust analysis in the Mono Lake case is complemented by several important
but unpublished cases that helped lay political foundation for the role of the doctrine in
California water law, involving the American River and Putah Creek. See, e.g., Stuart L. Somach,

The American River Decision: Balancing Instream Protection with Other Competing Beneficial
Uses, 1 RIVERS 251, 258–60 (1990) (discussing use of the doctrine in an unpublished Alameda
County Court decision that led the state agency to relocate its exercise of rights from the
Folsom South Canal upstream of Sacramento to Freeport downstream in order to preserve
instream flow through the intervening channel); Joseph Sax, Bringing an Ecological Perspective
to Natural Resources Law: Fulfilling the Promise of the Public Trust, in NATURAL RESOURCES
POLICY AND LAW: TRENDS AND DIRECTIONS 152–60 (Lawrence J. MacDonnell & Sarah F. Bates,
eds. 1993) (discussing the same Alameda County case).
359 Mono Lake, 658 P.2d 709, 720–21 (Cal. 1983).
360 Id. at 711.
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Nevertheless, the court accepted the hydrological relationship between
the lake and its essential tributaries to construe them as one for the purpose
of doctrinal protection.361 As the court reasoned, protection of the navigable
waterway of Mono Lake had to include protection of its tributaries, without
which the lake would ultimately disappear.362 This particular aspect of the
court’s reasoning has particular resonance to a contemporary public trust
case unfolding in Northern California, where litigants are currently arguing
that doctrinal protection should be extended to the non-navigable
groundwater tributaries of the navigable Scott River (the Scott River case).363

c. Application over Time
While these are all important new points of law in the Mono Lake
decision, the potentially widest-reaching legal innovation was its recognition
of the state’s trust responsibilities as an ongoing legal duty.364 The court
clarified that the public trust doctrine not only requires the state to protect
trust resources as much as feasible when allocating water, it held that the
state also has a continuing duty of supervision under the doctrine.365 Indeed,
it was this element of the decision—the Mono Lake doctrine of ongoing
oversight—that empowered (and obligated) the state to revisit the
permitting decision it had made approving Los Angeles’s exports nearly fifty
years earlier.
The consequences of this new understanding of the doctrine were
potentially staggering. A state duty to revisit past allocation decisions that
are compromising trust values in the present has ramifications far beyond
the Mono Basin. Subjecting prior appropriations to potential revision for
countervailing public trust values threatened havoc for water managers all
over California, and potentially all over the western United States.
Throughout the West, large volumes of water are transported long
distances in just the way the Los Angeles aqueduct exports it from the Mono
Basin.366 Just as it did in southern California, urban and agricultural
development all over the arid west has depended on the ability to shift water
from wetter to drier parts—and Americans have become quite good at it, at
least from the engineering perspective.367 If the Mono Lake doctrine were
widely applied, all of those water licenses would suddenly become very
361

Id. at 720–21.

362

This argument has particular resonance right now, as another public trust drama unfolds
in northern California around the extension of public trust obligations to protect the
groundwater tributaries of the Scott River (discussed further in Part IV.C). See Order After
Hearing on Cross Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings at 3, Envtl. Law Found. v. State Water
Res. Control Bd., Case No.: 34-2010-80000583 (Cal. Sacramento County Ct. 2014) [hereinafter
Scott River Case].
363 See id. at 3–4. For further discussion of the Scott River Case, see infra Part IV.C.2.
364 Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 728.
365
366

Id.
See generally REISNER, supra note 97, at 12 (noting that water from Colorado River

canyons is moved to meet demand in Phoenix and Palm Springs).
367

See id.
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uncertain. If public trust values were being affected in ways that hadn’t been
anticipated when those licenses were initially granted, then all the
appropriative rights on which remote uses had developed in reliance would
be up for renegotiation. For that reason, the doctrine of continuing oversight
was an extremely controversial element of the decision.368
Perhaps for the same reason, it is also a doctrinal element that has
rarely been adopted outside of California. One exception is Hawaii, where
the state Supreme Court has also held that private allocation decisions do
not displace the trust.369 Indeed, Hawaii’s public trust doctrine is perhaps the
most protective of all American states—but it is distinguishable from that in
most western states because Hawaii’s doctrine is incorporated
constitutionally, and the state does not follow the doctrine of prior
appropriations.370 The closest a prior appropriations state has come to
embracing the Mono Lake doctrine of ongoing oversight is in Nevada, where
two concurring justices suggested an important role for the public trust
doctrine in a water rights case—but this analysis was not part of the
majority opinion.371 Beyond Hawaii, however, no western state has formally
adopted the California requirement of continuing oversight. Several Idaho
cases signaled approval of this feature of the California public trust doctrine
in the years after the Mono Lake case was decided,372 but they were
subsequently (and pointedly) overruled by the state legislature.373
Even within California, where the doctrine remains good law,
obligations of ongoing oversight have had a very limited impact on
previously established water rights outside of the Mono Basin.374 In a
quantitative study of freshwater public trust litigation in California since
Mono Lake, Professor David Owen concludes that outside of the Mono
Basin, the doctrine has exerted almost no force on existing patterns of water

368 See LIBECAP, supra note 238, at 151–53 (critiquing the Mono Lake decision’s impact on
prior appropriations systems by creating uncertainty, undermining property rights, and
compromising economic efficiency); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 VA. L. REV.
1449, 1533 (1990) (noting how Mono Lake “surprised many people and was certainly a deviation
from most water lawyers’ expectations”).
369 Waiahole Ditch, 9 P.3d 409, 445 (Haw. 2000) (holding that the state water code “does not
supplant the protections of the public trust doctrine”).
370 See supra notes 54–56 and accompanying text (discussing Hawaiian water law).
371 Mineral Cnty. v. State Dep’t of Conservation & Natural Res., 20 P.3d 800, 807 (Nev. 2001)
(Rose, J., concurring) (arguing that the Court should affirm the existence and role of Nevada’s
public trust doctrine); see also Lawrence v. Clark Cnty., 254 P.3d 606, 617 (Nev. 2011) (adopting
the public trust doctrine expressly but in a case that did not address water rights).
372 See, e.g., Kootenai Envtl. Alliance v. Panhandle Yacht Club, 671 P.2d 1085, 1094, 1096
(Idaho 1983) (adopting the “California rule” but finding that the land grant at issue did not
violate it).
373 IDAHO CODE tit. 58, ch. 12 § 58-1201 (1996). For further discussion, see generally Blumm
et al., supra note 65 (discussing Idaho’s attempt to legislate away the public trust doctrine).
374 See generally David Owen, The Mono Lake Case, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the
Administrative State, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1099 (2012) (noting that, despite this potential, the
doctrine has not upended many established water rights). Depending on the final outcome of
the Scott River litigation, however, the doctrine may yet be extended to previously asserted
groundwater rights. See generally Scott River Case, supra note 362.
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use, even when serious interference with trust values are manifest.375 He
concludes that effects of the doctrine are inextricably intertwined with the
force of other environmental laws, which are often more responsible for
substantive results, almost exclusively at the administrative level, and most
often with regard to prospective uses of water, rather than existing rights.376

B. The Aftermath of the Court’s Decision
The California Supreme Court’s decision was the seminal step toward
the protection of Mono Lake, but it was only the first step—and an uncertain
one at best. It required the Water Board to consider the public trust values in
the Mono Basin before adjudicating Los Angeles’s permits, but it did not
specify how to balance the competing interests at stake. Additional litigation
over the Mono Basin creeks further complicated the Water Board’s task. Los
Angeles would make important choices in its response to the outcome of the
legal process. And the scholarly community would pass judgment as well.

1. The California Trout Litigation
Before the Water Board could respond to the court’s relicensing
directive, it was charged to consider a further set of statutory concerns after
California Trout—joined by the National Audubon Society and the Mono
Lake Committee—separately sued in California Trout v. State Water
Resource Control Board (California Trout)377 to modify DWP’s diversion
licenses on additional grounds. In the California Trout litigation, the
plaintiffs argued that the DWP diversion dams were harming Mono Basin
creeks in violation of state Fish and Game Code provisions.378
After determining that the plaintiff’s claim had merit, the appeals court
ordered the Water Board to additionally incorporate these concerns into its
reconsideration of Los Angeles’s permits to export from the Mono Basin.379
Indeed, the California Trout litigation was just as critical as the earlier Mono
Lake case in determining the outcome at Mono Lake, and arguably more so
in terms of its ultimate impact on stream restoration requirements.
Consolidating both the Mono Lake and California Trout judicial
commands into a single proceeding, the Water Board accordingly set to
work determining how to assess the appropriate equipoise of so many
conflicting interests. It struggled with the question over ten years of
scientific inquiry, public hearings, and policy research, finally culminating in
its 1994 release of the 200-page directive that would become known as
Decision 1631.380

375
376

Owen, supra note 374, at 1122–23.
Id. at 1135–36.

377

207 Cal. App. 3d 585, 592 (1989).

378

Id. at 592 (commanding the Water Board to reconsider Mono Basin diversion licenses in

light of the California Department of Fish and Game code requirements).
379 Id. at 632–33.
380 See generally Decision 1631, supra note 8.
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2. Implementation by the Water Board: Decision 1631
In the historic Decision 1631 that it released in 1994, the Water Board
re-allocated water rights in the Mono Basin, modifying Los Angeles’s
licenses to export in accordance with the judicial orders of the Mono Lake
case and the California Trout case.381
Following a full decade of research, evidentiary hearings, stakeholder
consultation, and an exhaustive Environmental Impact Report,382 the Water
Board arrived at a compromise not unlike the original proposal by the
Interagency Task Force and Mono Lakeadvocates: that water exports should
be curtailed to the extent needed to enable Mono Lake to rise to the level of
6,392 feet above sea level over the next twenty years.383 Exports were
eliminated until the lake reached an elevation of 6,377 feet (up from the
current low near 6,372 feet) and water exports would then be permitted on a
limited, graduated basis designed to achieve and maintain the ecologically
sound lake management level.384 Once the lake reached the designated level,
Los Angeles could increase diversions to a little more than thirty thousand
acre-feet per year, so long as the lake level remained stable.385 Decision 1631
also included requirements for restoration of the desiccated Mono Basin
creeks and minimum instream flows going forward, and it designated Mono
Lake as an Outstanding National Resource Water.386
The Water Board designated 6,392 feet as the recovery target because
the science confirmed that this level would resolve the most serious threats
to the public trust values in the Mono Basin.387 This target would stabilize the
salinity of Mono Lake at a level that would allow the ecosystem to recover.388
The brine shrimp and alkali fly populations would reproduce successfully
and maintain the base of the food web.389 The breeding grounds of California
Gulls and nesting habitat of migratory birds would be protected.390 It would
cover the most harmful salt flats that were causing air pollution problems.391
It would protect the most scenic and recreational values associated with the
lake, leaving some of the relicted lands’ tufa exposed.392 It would protect the
fisheries and riparian habitat associated with the desiccated Mono Basin

381

Id. at 2.

382

California State Water Resources Board, Final Environmental Impact Report for the
Review of Mono Basin Water Rights and the City of Los Angeles (1994), available at http://www.
monobasinresearch.org/onlinereports/feir1.php.
383 Decision 1631, supra note 8, at 154–55, 158.
384

Id.
Id. at 3.
386 Id. at 2 (requiring Los Angeles to prepare stream restoration plans). See generally
Koehler, supra note 94 (reviewing the historical buildup to Mono Lake and critiquing the
385

positive and negative aspects of the Water Board’s resulting Decision 1631).
387 Decision 1631, supra note 8, at 155.
388 Id. at 77–78, 82.
389 Id. at 82.
390 Id. at 3.
391

Id.
Id. “Relicted lands” refers to the formerly submerged lakebed that has been exposed by
water diversions. Id.
392
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creeks, but some important waterfowl areas would be forsaken. And it
would still allow Los Angeles to divert water—though diversions would be
curtailed as needed to enable the lake to recover to the designated levels.
It was, in every respect, a compromise plan. Indeed, almost poetically,
the plan would raise the lake approximately twenty vertical feet from its
post-diversion low of 6,372 feet, but it would leave it twenty-five feet below
its pre-diversion level of 6,417 feet—roughly in the middle.
When I left Mono Lake in the late 1990s for law school, the results of
Decision 1631 were visible to the naked eye. The land bridge joining Mono
Lake’s north shore to the gull rookery on Negit Island was receding under
water. The rangers had to pull up many legs of the old boardwalk extending
the public trails down to the water’s edge as the lake reclaimed formerly
exposed bed. The toxic dust devils were less intense and less frequent. The
lake level rose about ten feet to 6,382 feet in the first five years after the
decision, raising high hopes all around—and then, sadly and suddenly, it
stopped.393
Climate patterns have shifted in California—as elsewhere—leading to
reduced snowmelt in the creeks.394 The drought that hit California in the
2000s has intensified to epic levels in the 2010s.395 Precipitation has not been
following the modeled average conditions that Decision 1631 relied on, and
so the lake did not reach 6,392 feet last year, as the Water Board had
projected.396 Even though Los Angeles has remained on a curtailed schedule
of diversions, the lake level has hovered around 6,382 feet since 1998,
suspended at halfway to the compromise point—and this year, for the first
time in decades, it has declined below 6,380.397

3. Los Angeles Turns a New Page
Whether Mono Lake will continue to recover will partly depend on
climatic conditions beyond human control, but it will also depend on

393 See Mono Lake Comm., Mono Lake Level and Tributary Stream Flows, http://www.
monolake.org/today/water [hereinafter Mono Lake Level] (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (listing
historic lake levels from 1919 until present).
394 See, e.g., Mono Basin Clearinghouse, Monthly Weather Summaries for Lee Vining, CA,
http://www.monobasinresearch.org/data/weather.php (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (noting
average temperatures in Lee Vining and providing precipitation data).
395 Kyle Kim & Thomas Suh Lauder, 163 Drought Maps Reveal Just How Thirsty California
Has Become, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2015, http://www.latimes.com/science/la-me-g-californiadrought-map-htmlstory.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (showing the severity of the California
drought with map infographic).
396 See Mono Lake Level, supra note 393 (providing recent sub-6,392 foot water levels). In
fact, with the lake level below 6,380 feet as of April 1, 2015, Los Angeles will be required to
dramatically curtail exports again. Geoff McQuilken, Executive Director of the Mono Lake
Committee, April 1 Lake Level Means Reduced Water Exports to LA, More Protection for Mono
Lake, MONOLOGUE, April 1, 2015, http://www.monolake.org/today/2015/04/01/april-1-lake
-level-means-reduced-water-exports-to-la-more-protection-for-mono-lake/ (last visited Apr. 17,
2015) (noting that the lake has declined to a level at which water exports to Los Angeles are
automatically reduced by 70% to 4,500 acre-feet of export annually).
397 See Mono Lake Level, supra note 393.
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decision making in Los Angeles, at levels both political and personal. If the
recent past is any indication, there is reason to be hopeful.
Indeed, one of the favorite chapters of the Mono Lake tale is how the
City of Los Angeles reacted to the various losses it encountered thus far in
the story. While paling in comparison to what the Owens Valley lost—and
what the Mono Basin is still trying to avoid—Los Angeles has also lost a
good deal over this course of events. It lost in court, twice. It lost water
rights it believed were settled decades earlier, and it lost any sense of
security that its current rights are fully vested. It also lost access to a fair
amount of water—twelve percent of its total supply.
To avoid these painful losses, the city fought hard to prevail on the legal
issues, fearful of weakening its access to critical water imports on which it
had come to rely. It declined offers of state and federal funds to experiment
with water recycling and other technology that might enable it to import less
water, fearful of losing any portion of its hard-fought water rights to
forfeiture or abandonment.398 But after investing so much energy in fighting
an ultimately losing battle, the city finally turned a page after the Water
Board’s decision. Just as the citizens of Illinois forced a change in the
direction its legislature took over the conveyance of Chicago Harbor, the
citizens of Los Angeles embraced a new approach to the city’s ongoing
problem of water insecurity: conservation.399
After Decision 1631, Los Angeles made two critical decisions. First, and
perhaps most important, the city decided not to seek judicial review of the
Water Board’s decision. Even though a significant portion of the city’s water
supply was at stake, equally significant support for restoration of Mono Lake
had developed among city residents. A city official would later explain that
the mayor wanted to engage a more forward-thinking environmental policy,
and the decision to accept the Water Board’s new allocation was consistent
with this new ethic.400 In addition, the Mono Lake Committee had worked
hard to generate ideas and funding to help Los Angeles gracefully absorb the
loss of Mono Basin water, and not just replace it with harmful exports from
other vulnerable watersheds.401
Los Angeles’s second critical decision was to fully embrace the
conservation alternative. The city sprung to a new phase of action,
experimenting with infrastructural improvements, new methods of
municipal and highway barrier management, and grassroots campaigning for
household water saving devices.402 The city pushed forward with the use of
recycled water for irrigation and industrial purposes.403 It sponsored
398 See HART, supra note 198, at 88–89 (discussing DWP’s refusal to adopt the Interagency
Task Force plan that offered state and federal money to cover the majority of the cost of
replacement water for the first two years after adoption).
399 See id. at 168–70.
400 David Cobb, National Director of Civic Affairs, HDR Inc., Address at the Berkeley Mono
Lake Symposium (Nov. 17, 2014), available at http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/board_info/
media/nov2014/mono_lake_111714_1.shtml.
401
402

Id.

HART, supra note 198, at 148–49.
403 Id. at 182.
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neighborhood drives to trade in old toilets for low-flush models.404 “Save
Mono Lake” bumper stickers gave way to “I Save Water for Mono Lake”
bumper stickers, which appeared throughout the city, and even the state. In
the end, by effectively deploying these strategies, Los Angeles was able to
recover all twelve percent of the water that it had lost as a result of the
Mono Lake legal decisions—simply by reducing its demand.405 And this
makes the Mono Lake story one of the very rare cases in environmental law
with a happy ending for both sides on the dispute.
Los Angeles remains at the forefront of water conservation efforts and
has become a leader nationwide.406 Although the population has grown
substantially in the past two decades, municipal water use has remained
fairly flat.407 While the city may have earned scorn for its approach to water
management at the beginning of the last century, and there is certainly still
work to be done today, it nevertheless deserves credit for its approach at the
beginning of the 21st century.

4. Public Trust and Distrust: The Critiques
After Mono Lake, the public trust doctrine achieved instant notoriety
among environmental advocates, property rights advocates, and legal
academics. Environmentalists hailed the doctrine as a means of preserving
ecological treasures that might otherwise be lost.408 Some began looking for
other opportunities to apply the public trust concept in other realms of
404

Id. at 149.
Compare id. at 76 (noting that Mono Lake provided 12% of Los Angeles’s water supply),
with Mono Lake Comm., Mono Lake FAQ: Frequently Asked Questions About Mono Lake,
405

http://www.monolake.org/about/faq (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (noting that Los Angeles
conservation efforts have more than replaced water no longer diverted from Mono Lake).
406 See Jacques Leslie, Los Angeles, City of Water, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2014, http://nyti
.ms/1u550yO (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (noting that Los Angeles has become “a leader in
sustainable water management, a pioneer in big-city use of cost-effective, environmentally
beneficial water conservation, collection and reuse technologies”).
407 See Mono Lake Comm., Replacement Water: Helping Los Angeles Find Better Solutions,
http://www.monolake.org/mlc/altwater (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (“[D]espite growth of a
million people between 1975 and 2005, LA’s water usage (of about 600,000 AF/yr) had not
changed.”).
408 See, e.g., Blumm, supra note 15, at 579 (characterizing the public trust doctrine as
“chameleon-like” in its ability to shape itself to different contexts); Stevens, supra note 64, at
621 (concluding that the public trust and prior appropriations doctrines were intertwined long
before Mono Lake and other cases, and arguing that the public trust is an inalienable attribute
of sovereignty); Kevin M. Raymond, Protecting the People’s Waters: The California Supreme
Court Recognizes Two Remedies to Safeguard Public Trust Interests in Water—National
Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 413 (1983), 59 WASH. L. REV. 357, 357–58 (1984) (examining the administrative and
judicial remedies available for public trust violations in California after the case); Gray, supra
note 93, at 975, 979, 997 (describing the author’s work with the San Francisco City Attorney’s
office on an amicus brief for the plaintiffs, and arguing that one especially significant aspect of
the case is the court’s recognition of an environmental baseline in the management of public
resources); see also Arnold, supra note 3, at 2 (celebrating Mono Lake as an environmental
achievement); Enzler, supra note 3, at 456–501 (reviewing the significance of Mono Lake for
public trust and environmental law at the systemic level).
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natural resources management.409 Directly inspired by Mono Lake, India
incorporated the public trust doctrine into its own constitutional order.410 Yet
the ongoing development of the public trust doctrine has also spawned
serious alarm among competing constituencies, and even some
environmental advocates.411 While the doctrine remains generally popular
among the public, this section briefly addresses the distrust that also
emerged around the idea of the public trust, focusing on concerns about
property rights, environmental protection, and legal process.

a. The Property Rights Critique
Perhaps the most immediate concerns were those raised by advocates
for private property rights, alarmed that expansive use of the doctrine would
result in the confiscation of private rights, in tension with public trust
values.412 Conflicts between public and private rights have manifested over
water rights,413 waterfront and wetland development,414 the regulation of
private activity on submerged lands,415 and beach and lakefront access.416 For

409 See infra notes 445–451 and accompanying text (discussing attempts to extend public
trust protection to other realms).
410 M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath, (1997) 1 S.C.C. 388 (1996) (India), in I UNITED NATIONS
ENVIRONMENT PROJECT COMPENDIUM OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS IN MATTERS RELATED TO THE
ENVIRONMENT, NATIONAL DECISIONS 259 (1998), available at http://www.asianjudges.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/10/Compendium_Judicial_Decisions_Nat_v1.pdf (discussing the role of
the public trust doctrine in Indian law and quoting the California Supreme Court’s description
of the doctrine in Mono Lake).
411 See infra notes 370–400 and accompanying text (discussing various critiques of the
public trust doctrine).
412 See, e.g., James L. Huffman, A Fish out of Water: The Public Trust Doctrine in a
Constitutional Democracy, 19 ENVTL. L. 527, 533 (1989) (identifying the doctrine as a creature of
property law that has been distorted by the courts beyond its proper boundaries); Barton H.
Thompson, Jr., The Public Trust Doctrine: A Conservative Reconstruction and Defense, 15
SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 47, 49 (2006) (suggesting reconstruction of the public trust doctrine in
response to libertarian and property rights critiques); Cohen, supra note 41, at 274–76
(criticizing the public trust doctrine’s effects on private property rights); see also Rose, supra
note 16, at 711–13, 774, 777–81 (recognizing the inevitable conflict between the public trust and
private property rights and considering what type of property can, under competing notions of
public trust, be considered inherently public). But see Epstein, supra note 41, at 428–30 (1987)
(analyzing the public trust from a similarly libertarian, property rights perspective, but
supporting it as a natural limitation on government power, comparable to restrictions on
eminent domain).
413 See, e.g., Mono Lake, 658 P.2d 709, 712 (Cal. 1983) (discussing public and private rights
over water).
414 See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 611 (2001) (resolving takings claim
related to waterfront development, in part, on public trust grounds); see also Ryan, supra note
42, at 123–25 (discussing South Carolina’s Marsh Island Bridge debate involving waterfront land
and water development programs).
415 See, e.g., Marks, 491 P.2d 374, 383 (Cal. 1971) (discussing regulation of private activity on
submerged lands).
416 See e.g., Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 355–56 (N.J. 1984)
(discussing private and public activity on beachfront property); Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58
(Mich. 2005) (discussing private and public rights on lakefront property).
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example, in one of the most controversial extensions of the doctrine, the
New Jersey Supreme Court held in Matthews v. Bay Head417 that the doctrine
protected public passage over private beachfront property if needed for
public access to the ocean.418 Like the California Supreme Court in Marks,
the New Jersey Court in Matthews stressed that the doctrine must be
construed flexibly, to respond to changing societal needs.419
When courts administering the trust emphasize its flexibility to adapt to
changing public needs,420 property rights advocates worry.421 Without a clear
limit on how far the public trust doctrine may intrude on seemingly settled
private rights, they worry about its potential as an unlimited tool of legal
opportunism that, caricatured, eats everything in its path.422
The property rights critique asks what, then, is the limiting principle?423
Whenever the public decides it wants something new in a trust resource,
does that mean private interests must yield, no matter how established?424
Especially in California, where the Mono Lake case establishes an ongoing
duty of supervision, the state can theoretically revisit water licenses at any
time (although, as noted above, this hasn’t actually happened).425 For
example, analyzing the doctrine from a law and economics perspective,
Professor Lloyd Cohen criticized the doctrine as “a piece of disingenuous
gimmickry” that would undermine property rights.426

417
418

Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n (Matthews), 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984).
Matthews, 471 A.2d at 363 (“In order to exercise these rights guaranteed by the public

trust doctrine, the public must have access to municipally-owned dry sand areas as well as the
foreshore. The extension of the public trust doctrine to include municipally-owned dry sand
areas was necessitated by our conclusion that enjoyment of rights in the foreshore is
inseparable from use of dry sand beaches.”).
419 Id. at 365.
420 See, e.g., id.; Mono Lake, 658 P.2d 709, 719 (Cal. 1983).
421 See Thompson, supra note 412, at 48–49 (discussing concerns among conservatives
about judicial interpretations of the public trust doctrine); Thompson, supra note 368, at 1478
(discussing concerns among property owners about possible takings under the public trust
doctrine).
422 Thompson, supra note 368, at 1507–08, 1520, 1532–33. But see Michael C. Blumm, The
Public Trust Doctrine and Private Property: The Accommodation Principle, 27 PACE ENVTL. L.
REV. 649, 654 (2010) (arguing that there is no inherent conflict between private property and the
public trust doctrine). See also Thompson, supra note 412, at 48–49; Thompson, supra note 368,
at 1478.
423 See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 368, at 1478 (discussing the belief that property is
determined politically with no objective principle); Kearney & Merrill, supra note 30, at 929–30
(arguing for limited application, and worrying about unclear boundaries). But see Epstein,
supra note 41, at 428–29 (arguing that the sweep of the doctrine, as he construes it, “should be
broad indeed”).
424 Cf. JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 62–63, 65
(2010) (discussing how far the public trust doctrine will go and querying whether it might
require the public to give up public use rights as an incident to public enjoyment of trust
resources).
425 See supra notes 371–374 and accompanying text (discussing the limited impact of the
duty of ongoing oversight).
426 Cohen, supra note 41, at 276. Professor Gary Libecap has critiqued the rule for impeding
economically efficient interbasin transfers and frustrating the development of water markets.
See LIBECAP, supra note 238, at 151–53.
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b. The Environmental Critique
In the immediate wake of the Mono Lake case, a separate critique of the
public trust doctrine emerged from within the circle of environmental
advocacy. Some environmental critics were skeptical that the doctrine, with
its roots in property law, would provide the best legal tools to support the
unfolding environmental law movement.427 The notion of the “public trust”
relies on public ownership and oversight of natural resources to effectuate
environmental protection, but owners can be fickle and shortsighted, and
public participation requirements are content-neutral.428 The trust may
prohibit private monopoly, but if public opinion swings away from
environmental protection at a critical moment, competing concerns may
prevail.429 After all, the same public owners advocating for environmental
protection one day may find themselves longing for cheaper fuels the next.
Recognizing that the doctrine isn’t invariably “green,” these “green
dissenters”430 would have preferred that the legal protection of natural
resources be established according to concepts of stewardship with a more
explicit commitment to environmental protection. Indeed, just as the Mono
Lake case was filed, executive agencies were being given new roles of
responsibility for administering the major federal environmental statutes of
the 1970s.431 Environmental critics of the public trust doctrine hoped that
environmental protection norms would take root in administrative law
responsibilities that were more aligned with the principles of stewardship
than the dominion of ownership.
For example, Professor Richard Lazarus worried that the doctrine
might distract the progress of environmental law toward effectuating
resource protection through more concrete state and federal mandates,
arguing that it was a “romantic step backward toward a bygone era at a time
when we face modern problems that demand candid and honest debate on
the merits.”432 Professor William Araiza argued that a substantive

427 See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in
Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 715–16 (1986);
William D. Araiza, Democracy, Distrust, and the Public Trust: Process-Based Constitutional
Theory, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Search for a Substantive Environmental Value, 45

UCLA L. REV. 385, 387–88 (1997).
428 See, e.g., Lazarus, supra note 427, at 715–16 (discussing public trust and shifts in notions
of private property).
429 See, e.g., Araiza, supra note 427, at 432 (criticizing the doctrine’s reliance on process over
a substantive commitment to environmental protection). But see Arnold, supra note 3, at 39, 41
(using Mono Lake to suggest that politics and public participation are as critical to
environmental protection as formal environmental law).
430 See Ryan, supra note 1, at 493 (discussing the “green dissent” by environmentalists
objecting to use of the doctrine for environmental protection in lieu of conventional
environmental statutory and administrative law.).
431 See Lazarus, supra note 427, at 681 n.308, 684.
432 Id. at 715–16. But see Albert C. Lin, Public Trust and Public Nuisance: Common Law Peas
in a Pod?, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1075, 1097 (2012) (distinguishing the public trust doctrine and
common law nuisance as elements of property and tort law respectively, and answering
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commitment to environmental values would be preferable to the untethered
political process implied by public trust adjudication.433 After all, even the
Mono Lake case did not require the absolute protection of Mono Lake; it
simply required that the Water Board think carefully about it.434

c. The Legal Process Critique
Other critiques took aim at the way that the doctrine empowers judicial
decision making at the expense of political decision making.435 The doctrine
expressly enables the judiciary to countermand legislative and executive
decisions, even though the political branches of government are
conventionally considered to be more democratic.
Public trust supporters argue that the role of judicial review is among
the greatest strengths of the doctrine, enforcing necessary checks and
balances among the three branches of government.436 However, legal process
critics worry that the doctrine provides insufficient guidance to decision
makers,437 and that the judiciary—prone to abstraction and elitism—will not
be as responsive to the public in the same way as regularly elected
legislators.438 For example, Professor James Huffman has argued that the
doctrine had been distorted by the courts beyond its appropriate boundaries,
threatening both liberty and democracy.439
Finally, some worry about the implications of the public trust doctrine
for upending the role of law in protecting settled expectations more
generally.440 Professor Barton (“Buzz”) Thompson summarized generalized
distrust of the public trust doctrine evocatively:
To environmentalists and public-access supporters, the public trust
doctrine appears to provide a relatively malleable legal tool to address a variety
of issues involving the use and protection of waterways, beaches, and perhaps
other important lands and resources. . . . These environmental advantages,

Lazarus’s arguments that the public trust should be superseded by nuisance law with his
conclusion that the two fill distinct roles).
433 Araiza, supra note 427, at 452; see also William D. Araiza, The Public Trust Doctrine as an
Interpretive Canon, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 693, 697 (2012) (suggesting the public trust doctrine be
interpreted as a canon of construction, establishing a background principle against which
legislation and administrative actions are construed, rather than as an independent legal
principle).
434 Mono Lake, 658 P.2d 709, 712, 727 (Cal. 1983).
435 See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 412, at 48–49.
436 See, e.g., Blumm, supra note 353, at 580 (arguing that the public trust doctrine
compensates for defects in the democratic process).
437 See, e.g., Araiza, supra note 427, at 432 (criticizing the process-justified public trust
doctrine as a violation of the democratic political process); Thompson, supra note 368, at 1507–
08, 1532–33.
438 See, e.g., Huffman, supra note 412, at 533; see also Cohen, supra note 41, at 271–72.
439 See Huffman, supra note 412, at 533.
440 See, e.g., Ryan, supra note 42, at 130–31 (2006) (discussing concerns by coastal
landowners that the administration of public trust principles would frustrate their
expectations).
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however, are conservative anathema. To many conservatives, the public trust
doctrine is an anchorless doctrine that is anti-democratic and an easy way to
441
evade critically important property protections.

Concerns about the malleability of the doctrine tap into age-old
anxieties about the evolving nature of the common law—pitting the need for
flexibility to meet changing public interests against the need for certainty to
establish order and expectations.442 For example, the Mono Lake doctrine of
ongoing oversight stands squarely on the side of flexibility at the cost of
certainty443—but popular resistance to that idea may also explain why it has
been seldom used.444

C. Future Doctrinal Developments
The Mono Lake case was followed by a surge of interest in use of the
public trust doctrine for environmental advocacy.445 Following Professor
Sax’s broad vision, litigants and scholars sought to expand its application to
other water resource issues446 and to other critical public commons that are

441
442

See Thompson, supra note 412, at 48–49.
See generally Smith, supra note 90 (defending Mono Lake against critiques during its

immediate aftermath).
443 See, e.g., Mono Lake, 658 P.2d 709, 721 (Cal. 1983) (emphasizing that appropriative rights
are nonvested, and subject to the state’s continuing oversight).
444 THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 87, at 685–87 (noting that the Mono Lake duty of ongoing
oversight generated concern among water planners but never amounted to many changes in
allocations).
445 See, e.g., Rose, supra note 16, at 711 (recognizing the inevitable conflict between the
public trust and private property rights and considering what type of property can be
considered inherently public); Blumm, supra note 353, at 579 (characterizing the public trust
doctrine as “chameleon-like” in its ability to shape itself to different contexts); Frank, supra
note 23, at 671–73 (analyzing the past and future of the public trust and the various resources
subject to the trust); Allison Rieser, Ecological Preservation as a Public Property Right: An
Emerging Doctrine in Search of a Theory, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 393 (1991) (discussing the
significance of the Mono Lake case in recognizing the preservation of ecological function as a
trust value and proposing additional theoretical support for the move).
446 See, e.g., Ralph W. Johnson, Water Pollution and the Public Trust Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L.
485, 486–88 (1989) (suggesting innovative application of the trust to nonpoint pollution sources
left largely unregulated by the Clean Water Act); Danielle Spiegel, Can the Public Trust Doctrine
Save Western Groundwater?, 18 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 412, 414 (2010) (analyzing the public trust’s
extension to groundwater and concluding that western states where depletion is most
problematic are least likely to do so); Carol Necole Brown, Drinking from a Deep Well: The
Public Trust Doctrine and Western Water Law, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2006) (advocating for
expansion of public trust doctrine to preempt prior appropriations in western states where
water scarcity issues loom); Joseph L. Sax, The Constitution, Property Rights and the Future of
Water Law, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 257, 257–59 (1990) (discussing the future of water law and the
takings law ramifications of government-mandated restoration of instream flows from
appropriations right-holders); Sam Brandao, Louisiana’s Mono Lake: The Public Trust Doctrine
and Oil Company Liability for Louisiana’s Vanishing Wetlands, 86 TUL. L. REV. 759, 761–62 (2012)
(comparing Louisiana’s public trust doctrine to that of California following Mono Lake, and
arguing for its expansion to better protect Louisiana’s coastal wetlands).
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also subject to private appropriation.447 Some states, like Pennsylvania, have
constitutionalized broader versions of the trust that extend to additional
resources.448 Some scholars have emphasized the important role of executive
agencies in administering the trust.449 Others have pointed to the doctrine as
a means of resisting takings claims against regulations protecting trust
resources,450 and some courts have agreed.451

447 See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm & Aurora Paulsen, The Public Trust in Wildlife, 2013 UTAH L.
REV. 1437, 1440–41 (2013) (arguing that the public trust should be integrated into state wildlife
protection law); Alexandra B. Klass, Renewable Energy and the Public Trust Doctrine, 45 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1021, 1026 (2012) (considering use of the doctrine within the field of renewable
energy law); Robin Kundis Craig, Adapting to Climate Change: The Potential Role of State
Common-Law Public Trust Doctrines, 34 VT. L. REV. 781, 781 (2010) (arguing that the doctrine
could provide “legal support for adaptive management-based climate change adaptation
regimes”); David D. Caron, Time and the Public Trust Doctrine: Law’s Knowledge of Climate
Change, 35 U. HAW. L. REV. 441, 442–43 (2013) (advocating that the doctrine be used to prevent
sea level rise in the context of climate change); see also Irma S. Russell, A Common Tragedy:
The Breach of Promises to Benefit the Public Commons and the Enforceability Problem, 11
TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 557, 558, 560–61 (2005) (suggesting contract law as a solution to the
difficulty of enforcing legislation designed to protect public commons).
448 See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text (discussing the Pennsylvania
Environmental Rights Amendment); John C. Dernbach, The Potential Meanings of a
Constitutional Public Trust, 45 ENVTL. L. 257, 469–73 (2015); See also CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE
REFORM, supra note 50 (listing state-by-state public trust surveys by Craig, Klass, and Blumm);
Araiza, supra note 427, at 394–95 (noting that many state constitutions have developed a
conception of the public trust that is based on a more substantive commitment to preservation
than most common law analogues); Silvyn, supra note 62, 356–57, 373 (comparing California’s
common law and constitutional public trust rights and concluding that the latter is more
expansive).
449 See, e.g., Ronald B. Robie, Effective Implementation of the Public Trust Doctrine in
California Water Resources Decision-Making: A View from the Bench, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1155, 1157 (2012) (reflecting on the impact of the case 30 years later and concluding that
protection of the public trust should primarily rest with administrative actors); Dave Owen, The
Mono Lake Case, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Administrative State, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1099, 1104–05 (2012) (considering the administrative ramifications of the case and its impacts
on the California water board); Gregory S. Weber, Articulating the Public Trust: Text, Near-Text
and Context, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1155, 1159 (1995) (examining the judicial, legislative, and
administrative development of the public trust doctrine in California after the case).
450 See Ryan, supra note 42, at 123 (analyzing how the public trust doctrine operates as a
background principle of law that can constrain the reasonable expectations of a property owner
alleging a taking); J. Peter Byrne, The Public Trust Doctrine, Legislation, and Green Property: A
Future Convergence?, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 915, 916 (2012) (suggesting that the doctrine be
used as a defense to innovative regulatory takings claims and to “sustain environmental
legislation against judicial hostility”); John D. Echeverria, The Public Trust Doctrine as a
Background Principles Defense in Takings Litigation, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 931, 931–34 (2012)
(analyzing use of the doctrine as a takings defense in light of two California cases that did not
allow it). But see Thompson, supra note 368, at 1532–33 (criticizing use of the doctrine to avoid
just compensation for what otherwise looks like a taking).
451 See, e.g., Palazzolo v. State, No. WM 88-0297, 2005 WL 1645974, at *7 (R.I. Super. Ct. July
5, 2005) (relying on the public trust doctrine in part to conclude in an unpublished opinion that
there had been no taking of privately owned wetlands by a state wetlands regulation); see also
Orion Corp. v. State, 747 P.2d 1062, 1072–73 (Wash. 1987) (determining that the public trust
doctrine foreclosed a regulatory takings claim because the public trust doctrine already applied
to private property owner’s tidelands prior to the adoption of a regulation prohibiting dredging
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Additional noteworthy developments include the public trust doctrine’s
application to oil and gas extraction activities impacting trust resources, its
potential extension to groundwater resources, and its potential role in
managing climate change.

1. Application to Oil and Gas Extraction
As discussed in Part II, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently
invoked its constitutional version of the public trust doctrine to protect local
authority to regulate fracking andperhaps other extraction activities that
pose a threat to local water resources.452 The Robinson Township decision
marked a dramatic debut for Pennsylvania’s constitutional doctrine, which
had not previously been understood as self-executing and had never before
been used to invalidate state law.453
Other municipalities have also attempted to assert local control over
fracking, but they have been less successful—especially in states without
similar public trust protections. For example, when two Colorado
municipalities banned fracking within local limits, two separate state courts
held their ordinances were preempted by contrary state law.454 Notably,
Colorado’s public trust doctrine is far more limited than Pennsylvania’s
expansive trust.455 Because Pennsylvania’s law is so encompassing, its model
may not be easily replicated elsewhere. Nevertheless, Robinson Township
has galvanized interest in applying the doctrine to the regulation of oil and
gas extraction with impacts on water resources in states with a strong public
trust.456

and filling; remanded on factual question of whether private property owner uses land for any
uses consistent with public trust doctrine, which could present a takings claim).
452 See Robinson Township, 83 A.3d 901, 913, 980 (Pa. 2013) (holding unconstitutional parts
of Pennsylvania’s Oil and Gas Act prohibiting local government water and air quality
protections, on the basis of article I section 27 of Pennsylvania’s Constitution, which provides
for the public trust doctrine).
453 Dernbach, supra note 48; see also supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text (discussing
the Pennsylvania Environmental Rights Amendment).
454 See Colorado Oil & Gas Ass’n v. City of Longmont, No. 2013CV63, at 17 (Colo. Dist. Ct.
July 24, 2014) (order granting summary judgment); see also Colorado Oil & Gas Ass’n v. City of
Fort Collins, No. 2013CV031385, at 7, 9 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Aug. 7, 2014) (order granting summary
judgment).
455 Compare Ling-Yee Huang, Restoring the Trust: An Index of State Constitutional and
Statutory Provisions on Water Resources and the Public Trust Doctrine 2, 7 nn.37–41 (Ctr. for
Progressive Reform White Paper No. 908-B, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1478512 (noting that Colorado’s public trust doctrine is limited to
issues pertaining to “waters of every natural stream”), with Robinson Township, 83 A.3d at 913
(recognizing that Pennsylvania’s public trust doctrine applies more broadly to natural resources
affected by oil and gas).
456 See Ellen M. Gilmer, Enviros Push ‘Public Trust’ as Trump Card over Oil and Gas
Influence, E&E ENERGYWIRE, August 15, 2014, http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060004530 (last
visited Apr. 17, 2015) (noting that in Michigan, environmental attorneys assert that “even if the
doctrine is limited to navigable water issues . . . it places a duty on government to consider how
fracking and horizontal drilling could affect the water”).
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2. Potential Extension to Groundwater Resources
One important innovation from the Mono Lake decision may provide
the basis for a historic extension of the doctrine to groundwater resources
that supply surface waters subject to the trust. Just as the Mono Lake
plaintiffs had argued that the doctrine be extended to Mono’s non-navigable
tributaries to protect the trust values of the navigable lake,457 plaintiffs in the
unfolding Scott River case are arguing that it must be extended to protect
the non-navigable tributaries of a river that is demonstrably dependent on
groundwater recharge.458
Located in the Klamath River Basin, the Scott River is famous for
hosting regionally important runs of salmon and steelhead trout. The lower
reach of the river derives the majority of its flow from groundwater, and
along hydrologic pathways that are perhaps unusually well established.459
However, as locally permitted groundwater withdrawals increase, long
portions of the river often run dry in the summer.460 In the Scott River case,
the plaintiffs argued that the state must curtail groundwater pumping to
satisfy its public trust obligations to protect the Scott River—even though
groundwater has never before been considered within reach of the public
trust doctrine.461 However, the lower court followed the Mono Lake
precedent to conclude that diverting essential hydrologically connected
groundwater tributaries is analogous to diverting essential non-navigable
tributaries, opening the possibility that groundwater resources may also be
subject to public trust protection.462

3. The Atmospheric Trust Project
After Mono Lake, litigants attempted to extend the doctrine to other
resources, with little success. A few cases have borrowed the concept of the
public trust as a basis for protecting fugitive wildlife.463 However, most U.S.

457 See supra notes 359–363 and accompanying text (describing Mono Lake’s extension of
the public trust doctrine to non-navigable tributaries).
458 Scott River Case, supra note 362, at 2.
459 Marcus Griswold, Scott River Decision Gives Californians One More Tool to Keep Water
in Streams, NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL (Aug. 25, 2014), http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/
mgriswold/scott_river_decision_gives_cal.html.
460 Scott River Case, supra note 362, at 3.
461 See id. at 2 (characterizing application of public trust doctrine to groundwater as an
“issue of first impression”); see also Frank, supra note 23, at 675–76 (discussing application of
public trust doctrine to groundwater in Hawaii, Vermont, and California).
462 See Scott River Case, supra note 362, at 10.
463 See, e.g., Betchart v. Dep’t of Fish & Game, 158 Cal.App.3d 1104, 1106 (1984) (holding
that “California wildlife is publicly owned and is not held by owners of private land where
wildlife is present”); Owsichek v. State Guide Licensing & Control Bd., 763 P.2d 488, 495 (Alaska
1988) (“[C]ommon law principles incorporated in the common use clause impose upon the state
a trust duty to manage the fish, wildlife and water resources of the state for the benefit of all the
people. We have twice recognized this duty in our prior decisions.” (footnote omitted)); see also
Blumm & Paulsen, supra note 447, at 1440 (discussing application of the public trust to protect
wildlife).
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efforts to expand the common law trust beyond water resources have not
been successful.464
Nevertheless, the principles underlying the doctrine raise legitimate
questions about why the same premise of a public trust should not also
apply to other critical commons resources that are also susceptible to
harmful appropriation or monopoly. By the same rationale that applies
public oversight to waterways, why not other natural resource commons like
coral reefs, forests, or biodiversity, which also confer critical ecosystem
services and represent inherent value? Perhaps these resources do not share
the same common pool features of water, or draw less support from
common law precedent. But if those are the relevant metrics, then what
about the atmosphere?
If the premise of the public trust is that some resources are so critical
that they cannot belong to anyone in particular, and must instead belong to
everyone,465 then why should it not also apply to the great air commons on
which we all depend for life as surely as we depend on water? After all, the
original Roman common law statement of the public trust included not only
the sea and the shores of the sea as the common property of all the people,
but also the air.466 In the United States, we have already expanded the trust
from the sea to the great navigable lakes and rivers that span our country.
Should the atmosphere be next? Has the public trust doctrine anything to
say about the natural resource crisis that would appear to eclipse all
others—the harms associated with impending climate change?
Several scholars have argued that the doctrine could provide legal
support for regulatory responses to climate change. Professor Robin Craig
has argued that it could support adaptive management-based adaptation
regimes.467 Professor David Caron has argued that it could support climate
governance to forestall sea level rise.468 Professor Jeff Thaler and Patrick
Lyons suggest it could be used to promote offshore renewable energy as a
means of combating climate change.469
Most ambitiously, however, Professor Mary Wood has sought to apply
the trust directly to atmospheric resources, reviving the Justinian concept of
the public trust as encompassing not just the running waters and the sea, but
also the air.470 In urging use of the doctrine to protect endangered air
464
465

Ryan, supra note 1, at 490 (listing failed efforts to expand the doctrine).
See supra notes 12–16 and accompanying text (discussing the philosophical

underpinnings of the doctrine).
466 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
467 See Craig, supra note 447, at 781.
468 See David D. Caron, supra note 447, at 455–56.
469 See Jeff Thaler & Patrick William Lyons, The Seas Are Changing: It’s Time to Use Ocean-

Based Renewable Energy, the Public Trust Doctrine and a Green Thumb to Protect Seas from
Our Changing Climate, 19 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 241, 276 (2014).
470 See NATURE’S TRUST, supra note 65; Mary Christina Wood, Atmospheric Trust Litigation,
in CLIMATE CHANGE: A READER 1018, 1021 (W.H. Rodgers, Jr. et al., eds.) (2011); Wood, Part I,
supra note 65, at 80–81 (2013) (criticizing the failure of modern environmental law to protect
natural resources and proposing broader state responsibilities as trustee, especially to combat
greenhouse gas pollution); Wood, Part II, supra note 65, at 91, 93–98, 139 (discussing the
pragmatic duties of governmental trustees, the interaction between the public trust and
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resources, she argues that the state must curtail private appropriation of the
atmosphere as a dumping ground for carbon pollution and other greenhouse
gases.471 She argues that the government’s failure to prevent this
unprecedented private appropriation is enabling short-sighted destruction of
the most important public commons of all, leading to the global threats
associated with rapid climate change.472 As she might describe it, it’s like
giving away Chicago Harbor to self-interested private actors—only worse,
because in this case, countless lives, communities, cultures, places, and
species will be lost if we don’t take it back soon.
As this Article goes to press, grassroots advocates are attempting to
leverage Professor Wood’s theory in a nationwide campaign of
environmental litigation. Individual atmospheric trust lawsuits and
administrative petitions have been filed all around the country in separate
states and the D.C. Circuit, each seeking to establish that the atmosphere is
subject to the public trust, and that the relevant regulators must therefore
act to protect it from private appropriation by air polluters as a carbon
sink.473
When government allows unfettered greenhouse gas emissions, the
advocates argue, it is allowing private parties to despoil the air commons
that belongs to all of us, in derogation of the public trust.474 Arrestingly, the
actual plaintiffs in each of these lawsuits are children.475 Their argument is
that it is their future, and the well being of the children that come after them,
that will be squandered by our failure to protect the air commons today.476
Public trust lawsuits by children on behalf of future generations may be
haunting, but their legal argument faces a number of uphill battles. While the
claim has roots in the original Justinian Code—applying the trust to the air,
the running waters, and the sea and its shores477—the air commons has never
before been recognized as a public trust resource in the United States.
Recognizing one now would mark a substantial extension of the American
doctrine, and an ambitious reach in a legal arena already marked by

statutory law, and the ramifications of the trust for property rights in an effort to “reframe what
is currently government’s discretion to destroy our atmosphere and other resources into an
obligation to defend those resources”) (emphases in original); Mary Christina Wood, Tribal
Trustees in Climate Crisis, 2 AM. INDIAN L.J. 518, 518–19 (2014) (considering the federal trust
obligation as the legal cornerstone of Indian law and suggesting how tribes can use their status
as co-trustees with the federal government to combat climate change).
471 Wood, Part II, supra note 65, at 93–98; see also Blumm & Schaffer, supra note 63.
472 Wood, Part II, supra note 65, at 97–98.
473 See James Conca, Atmospheric Trust Litigation—Can We Sue Ourselves over Climate
Change? FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2014/11/23/atmospheric-trust-litigati
on-can-we-sue-ourselves-over-climate-change/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2015).
474

Id.

475

Sam Bliss, These Teens Are Taking Their Climate Lawsuit All the Way to the Supreme
Court, GRIST, http://grist.org/climate-energy/these-teens-are-taking-their-climate-lawsuit-all-theway-to-the-supreme-court/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2015).
476
477

Id.
See supra notes 12–22 and accompanying text (discussing the jus publicum).
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suspicion among critics about the potentially limitless malleability of the
doctrine.478
Even if a court does newly recognize the atmosphere as a trust
resource, fashioning a meaningful judicial remedy would prove a difficult
challenge. It seems unlikely that any court would order the political
branches to affirmatively regulate greenhouse gases beyond existing
statutory obligations, and existing obligations are weak to nascent at the
moment. Professor Wood argues that courts should impose natural resource
damages for trust violations, and perhaps the threat of substantial enough
damages could motivate changes in the law.479 However, courts imposing
substantial fines on the political branches under a contentious doctrine of
judge-made common law could raise separation-of-powers concerns that
extend beyond the more ordinary judicial invalidation of political decision
making.480
As the California Supreme Court did at Mono Lake, a court reviewing an
atmospheric trust claim could order the defendant agencies to use existing
statutory authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, or else explain
why doing so was beyond their statutory authority or outweighed by
competing public policy concerns.481 This could help facilitate a process of
good climate governance that more meaningfully engages with the question
of sovereign responsibility to protect trust resources in the atmosphere. That
said, it also indicates an additional hurdle for the atmospheric trust
litigation, because the state agencies currently recognized as responsible for
administering the trust arguably lack the authority necessary to manage
atmospheric pollution.
The only government entity with true capacity to effectively regulate
greenhouse gases is Congress, because greenhouse gas emissions are a
collective action problem of the most national scope.482 Although many
states are experimenting laudably with local climate regulation to valuable
ends,483 most concede that it is a second-best solution to the ideal of a
national program that could better control leakage and incentivize
appropriately scaled responses.484 However, the public trust has not yet been
recognized as applying to the federal government. As discussed in Part II,
478 See supra notes 408–444 and accompanying text (discussing critiques of the public trust
doctrine).
479 Wood, Part II, supra note 65, at 97–98.
480 See Jeremy Waldron, Representative Lawmaking, 89 B. U. L. REV. 335, 335–37 (2009).
481 See Professor Amicus Brief, supra note 27.
482 Opponents would doubtlessly argue that even Congress lacks the needed capacity,
because greenhouse gases mix evenly in the atmosphere at the international level—but unlike
the states, at least the federal government can participate in treaty-making and other
international efforts to resolve the problem.
483 See, e.g., Kirsten H. Engel, Whither Subnational Climate Change Initiatives in the Wake of
Federal Climate Legislation?, 39 PUBLIUS 432, 437–39 (2009) (providing an overview of multiple
climate change initiatives advanced by the states; see also ERIN RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG
OF WAR WITHIN 145, 169–73 (2011).
484 See, e.g., RYAN, supra note 42, 169–73 (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of
state climate regulation and noting that state climate regulators still long for a national
solution).
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there is a compelling argument that the trust is an attribute of sovereignty
that should apply to any sovereign with jurisdiction over a trust resource.485
Nevertheless, the U.S. Supreme Court made that argument even more
difficult in its recent PPL Montana486 decision, in dicta suggesting that the
doctrine is a creature of state law alone.487 The D.C. Circuit recently rejected
one of the atmospheric trust cases on these grounds (and the Supreme Court
declined review).488
For all of these reasons and potentially others, most of these lawsuits
will likely fail. Indeed, several have already lost, including those filed in the
state of Kansas,489 and in the D.C. Circuit, which the Supreme Court declined
to review.490 Notably, the case proceeding in Oregon has succeeded, at least
as far as the appellate court level.491 The New Mexico Court of Appeals
recently affirmed the plaintiff’s contention that the state’s public trust
doctrine applies to the atmosphere: “We agree that Article XX, Section 21 of
our state constitution recognizes that a public trust duty exists for the
protection of New Mexico’s natural resources, including the atmosphere, for
the benefit of the people of this state.”492 Nevertheless, it declined the
requested injunctive relief on grounds that the state’s air quality regulatory
process provided sufficient remedy.493 There has also been mixed success in
Arizona.494
The atmospheric trust plaintiffs must further contend with the strategic
criticism that the lawsuits themselves could be harmful, because the losses
may produce unfavorable precedent that could set their ultimate cause back.
485 See supra notes 68–78 and accompanying text (discussing arguments that the public
trust doctrine should also limit federal authority in appropriate cases).
486 PPL Montana, L.L.C. v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215 (2012).
487 Id. at 1235 (2012) (“Unlike the equal-footing doctrine, however, which is the
constitutional foundation for the navigability rule of riverbed title, the public trust doctrine
remains a matter of state law . . . .”).
488 Alec L. ex rel. Loorz v. McCarthy, 561 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2014), cert. denied, No. 14-405,
2014 WL 6860603 (U.S. Dec. 8, 2014).
489 See Press Release, Our Children’s Trust, Kansas Teenager Pledges to Petition

Department of Health and Environment for Climate Change Regulations After Court Tells Her
to Go to Agency (June 13, 2013), available at http://ourchildrenstrust.org/sites/default/files/
2013.06.13-KansasPR.pdf; Petition for Declaratory Judgment, for Writ of Mandamus and
Application for Injunctive Relief, Farb v. Kansas, (No. 12-C-1133), 2012 WL 5974335 (D. Kan.
Oct. 18, 2012).
490 Alec L. ex rel. Loorz v. McCarthy, 561 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2014), cert. denied, No. 14-405,
2014 WL 6860603 (U.S. Dec. 8, 2014).
491 Chernaik v. Kitzhaber, 263 Or. App. 463, 481 (2014) (“[P]laintiffs are entitled to a judicial
declaration of whether, as they allege, the atmosphere ‘is a trust resource’ that ‘the State of
Oregon, as a trustee, has a fiduciary obligation to protect . . . from the impacts of climate
change . . . .’”) (citing the Plaintiffs–Appellant’s Opening Brief at 13, 29, Chernaik v. Kitzhaber,
263 Or. App. 463 (2014) (No. A151856)).
492 Sanders-Reed ex rel. Sanders-Reed v. Martinez, No. 33,110, 2015 WL 1120403 (N.M. Ct.
App. 2015).
493
494

Id.

Butler v. Brewer, No. 1 CA–CV 12–0347, 2013 WL 1091209, at *1, *5–7 (Ariz. Ct. App.
March 14, 2013) (rejecting the argument that determinations of what resources are included in
the public trust doctrine and whether the state has violated the doctrine are non-justiciable, but
ultimately dismissing the case for lack of standing).
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Usually, the plaintiffs in strategic impact litigation make carefully tailored
decisions about when and where to file, professionally counseled to aim for
legal moments at which the chosen jurisdiction appears ready for the new
interpretation the litigants are promoting.495 The scattershot approach of the
atmospheric trust litigation defies this approach, and could create
unwelcome precedent. Bringing cases in every jurisdiction all over the
country all at one time is poetic, but it runs the risk that at least some (and
possibly many) could result in negative judgments that could make it even
more difficult to bring more narrowly tailored public trust claims in the
future.
Nevertheless, the atmospheric trust suits represent an important
doctrinal development, even if most are unsuccessful. These litigants are
relying on one of the most important and powerful features of the doctrine.
For them, it is a legal device for starting a conversation among the three
branches of government, about the sovereign obligations of government. In
this time-honored way, the doctrine enables ordinary citizens to put pressure
on the political branches through the judiciary, when the political branches
seem not to be listening otherwise. Used appropriately, the doctrine protects
the public against legislative or executive abdication, strengthening the
legitimacy of the democratic process with additional checks and balances.496
Even if the public trust lawsuit fails, it provides citizens the political
leverage they may need to start a wider societal conversation about the
management of trust resources—in this case, resources threatened by
climate change. Public trust litigation thus provides an additional fulcrum
into the political process, and into public dialogue. Even if no atmospheric
trust case ever succeeds on the merits, these children will have initiated an
open conversation about climate change in terms that ordinary people can
immediately understand, and to which many have responded with support.497
The strategic critique elides the expressive power of the doctrine to spark
meaningful grassroots change, translating losses in court to political
momentum. After all, most successful legal movements are preceded by
countless failures, before bad precedent eventually gives way to change.
Some brave somebody always has to begin somewhere.
My own view is that while the legal argument may be too ambitious to
succeed in the near term, the central premise is sound. Protecting a public
commons from short-sighted private appropriation—as Professor Sax first
urged in 1970—is the same premise that motivated the Mono Lake decision,
the Illinois Central decision before it, and the Supreme Court of India
thereafter. It makes sense to understand the public trust doctrine as an
attribute of sovereignty at all levels. The air commons was recognized as a

495 James E. Pfander, Forum Shopping and the Infrastructure of Federalism, 17 TEMP. POL. &
CIV. RTS. L. REV. 355, 355 (2007) (discussing the use of forum shopping in deciding whether to
bring impact litigation claims).
496 Gerald Torres, Joe Sax and the Public Trust, 45 ENVTL. L. 257, 393–97 (2015).
497 Bill Moyers, The Children’s Climate Crusade (Public Affairs Television, Inc. Jan. 1, 2015),
transcript available at http://billmoyers.com/episode/full-show-climate-crusade/ (last visited
Apr. 17, 2015).
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public trust resource as early as ancient Rome, it is an equally essential
public commons, and it is equally vulnerable to harmful private
appropriation. Even if the American public trust only protects water
resources, government would still be obligated to manage greenhouse gas
emissions, given the implications for navigable waters of the national megadrought that has been forecast over the next century as a result of climate
change.498 Scientists project that extreme drought will threaten the public
trust resources of virtually all the nation’s navigable waterways—just as
diversions to Los Angeles have threatened Mono Lake.
These are the same arguments that once motivated me to leave the
idyllic life of a Mono Basin forest ranger to pursue the calling of law as a
means of solving critical societal problems. Recognizing this, I became a
signatory on the law professor amicus briefs in the atmospheric trust cases,
notwithstanding concerns about the risky strategy. To be sure, these
lawsuits are not without their own strategic craft; the device of children as
plaintiffs is certainly a strategic move. Yet the connection between these
children and the future generations they represent is not opportunistic—it is
literal. Concerns about precedent aside, there is something that goes beyond
strategy, perhaps even beyond poetry, about children all around the country
making this powerful public trust argument with a single voice, at this
pivotal moment in time, because time appears to be running out. They may
not win, but something about their argument is what the public trust
doctrine was made for.
V. CONCLUSION
One hundred years after the opening of the Los Angeles Aqueduct,
thirty years after the California Supreme Court’s decision, and twenty years
after the Water Board’s Decision 1631 implementing it, this is an especially
good time to revisit the Mono Lake story.
After our great loss of Joe Sax last year, it is also a good time to think
more about the public trust doctrine—and with newly unfolding doctrinal
developments, there is much to consider. The Scott River litigation in
Northern California may extend the Mono Lake doctrine to groundwater
tributaries of navigable waters.499 The Robinson Township decision by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court applied that state’s constitutionalized trust to
affirm local authority to regulate fracking, and possibly other extractive
activities that threaten trust resources.500 The Atmospheric Trust Litigation,
whether or not it is successful in court, is opening a conversation among the

498 Darryl Fears, A “Megadrought” Will Grip U.S. in the Coming Decades, NASA Researchers
Say, WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/todays-

drought-in-the-west-is-nothing-compared-to-what-may-be-coming/2015/02/12/0041646a-b2d911e4-854b-a38d13486ba1_story.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (discussing scientific forecasting
that over the next 100 years, soil moisture levels will reach desert levels throughout the western
and midwestern states, with devastating consequences for waterways).
499 See supra notes 458–462 and accompanying text.
500 See supra notes 58–60 and accompanying text.
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public and its three branches of government about how to respond to the
challenges of climate change.501
The Mono Lake story and these progeny provide a rich reservoir of
context for considering the questions raised in Part I: 1) Who is the public
trust doctrine’s relevant “public”?; 2) What interests does it protect?; 3) Does
the doctrine impose substantive or procedural obligations?; and 4) How does
the doctrine intersect with the separation of powers? Concluding the piece, I
now return to each of these questions, considering the public trust doctrine
as the California Supreme Court articulated it in the Mono Lake decision. I
raise them mostly to provoke further reflection, offering only preliminary
thoughts in response, and recognizing that the trust continues to evolve
independently throughout the United States—and indeed, the world.

A. Who Is the Public Trust Doctrine’s “Public”?
First, as we recount this famous moment of public trust development,
consider what we really mean by “public.” Whose interests count when we
talk about the “public interest” at issue here? On what scale? And what’s the
real difference between public and private interest? Is economic
development a private or public interest? What about environmental
protection? Who, then, was the relevant “public” in the Mono Lake case?
Was it Lee Vining? California? The Audubon Society? The Forest Service?
The scientific community? The international community?
In the Mono Lake case alone, many different publics were operating,
and they appeared to have different interests. Indeed, we often gloss over
this question in the United States, where we seem to have some fragile
working consensus about what the public interests means. But especially in
other countries where I have offered this lecture—for example, in China—
my audiences are often very unsettled by this question. Isn’t all law in the
public interest? What is the difference between public and private interest?
Is the public interest just an aggregation of private interests, or is it
something more?
At least in the United States, most public trust cases suggest that the
relevant public is the population of the relevant sovereign, usually the state.
The New Jersey Supreme Court reached this conclusion most explicitly in
the Matthews beach access case, in which it determined that the interests of
state citizens who lived far away from the beach must be protected, even at
the expense of the contrary interests among the more local beachfront
communities.502 In Mono Lake, the court invoked the interests of the entire
state of California in preserving Mono Lake—even though millions of Los
Angelenos are missing their former access to water that will now remain in a
basin where only a few hundred live.
With that anti-utilitarian calculus in mind, the public interest has to be
more than just the aggregation of private interests—unless we indulge an

501

See supra note 496 and accompanying text.

502

471 A.2d 355, 363–64 (N.J. 1984).
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extravagantly hypothesized cost–benefit analysis of social preferences
favoring environmental intangibles that we may never be able to prove. Even
though the trust sounds in the concept of ownership, it has taken on
undertones of stewardship, at least in California. This makes sense, given
that an important difference between a state’s public trust obligations and its
authority to protect public welfare under the police power more generally is
that the public trust doctrine puts more focus on the welfare of future
generations. In that way, the “public” of the public trust doctrine requires
consideration of intergenerational equity, necessarily infusing the doctrine
with undertones of sustainability.503 Nevertheless, the California high court
also invoked utilitarian reasoning in affirming the need to move water great
distances to the south, even when doing so causes harm to the basin of
origin. Public trust resources may be damaged, but the public interest
requires it.
To that end, it may be that the California Supreme Court hasn’t quite
worked out what the public interest means either—and more to the point,
doesn’t have to. By assigning the task to the Water Board to figure out, the
decision suggests that the public interest is whatever the political process
determines it to be, through conventional measures of consultation and
consensus building. That means that the Audubon Society, the Forest
Service, the scientific community, and perhaps even the international
community are all able to voice their interests as public participants.
So perhaps the public trust “public” isn’t really a discrete collection of
people; perhaps it is defined more as a process of public expression. (Public
choice theorists, cue your violins!) Cynically, one could conclude that the
role of the public in public trust controversies is therefore to be played by
whoever turns out to be most successful at mobilizing the political process.
Less cynically, how else is democracy intended to work?

B. What Interests Does the Public Trust Doctrine Protect?
A key question that continues to bedevil the discourse is the issue of
which resources should receive protection by the doctrine. Why is it that
some resources seem to merit public trust consideration, while others do
not? If the trust protects more than just water resources—for example, if it
protects the atmosphere—then what else does it protect? All resources
subject to private appropriation and monopoly? Only those that reach some
critical threshold of utilitarian or biocentric concern? Should it protect
pollinators, soil microbes, and other natural resources that provide critical
ecosystem services? At what point, if any, is the critics’ fear of doctrinal
limitlessness made manifest?
In the uncontroversial context of navigable waterways, Mono Lake and
Marks assigned novel trust protection to ecological, recreational, and scenic
503 This important distinction also differentiates the public trust doctrine from the police
power that is the sole province of state law, an important distinction for those urging a federal
trust obligation. See supra notes 62–78 (discussing the interpretive possibility of a federal public
trust).
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values, but neither decision provided a definitive theoretical account that
would resolve these issues in other resource contexts. But even when we
agree that a resource warrants public trust protection, what interests should
be taken into account when balancing environmental values against the
competing economic development and private property values that collide in
public trust conflicts? If you were the Water Board tasked with managing the
conflict between prior appropriations and the public trust at Mono Lake,
what would you consider? Gross domestic product? Birds? Human Health?
Wilderness? Jobs? The Water Board had to consider each of these in the
Mono Lake aftermath, but which should have more or less gravity?
In reaching the balance established by Decision 1631, the Water Board
was faithful to the compromise position that the court struck with regard to
the integration of public trust and private appropriation principles in water
allocation. The Board appeared to thoughtfully weigh the interests of birds,
human health, the ecosystem, and the Mono Basin regional economy in
establishing a target lake level that would mitigate the most severe harms to
each of these interests. It also accounted for the municipal interests of Los
Angeles, in allowing the city to divert at a reduced but steady stream once
the most immediate danger to the Mono Basin ecosystem had passed—even
while the system was still under stress. Still, the diversions were so
reduced—by nearly 45,000 acre-feet per year504—that one could reasonably
conclude that birds, human health, and wilderness in the basin had trumped
competing interests in Los Angeles.
Indeed, in the immediate aftermath of the court’s decision, sentiment
toward protecting Mono Lake ran high, even among Los Angelenos. Twenty
years later, however, the lake has missed the designated 2014 lake level
target.505 In fact, it has never moved above the halfway point of designated
recovery.506 And notwithstanding the court’s recognition of an ongoing duty
of supervision, there has been no move to revisit the allocation—although
the dropping lake level will automatically trigger reduced exports in the near
future.507 With worsening reservoir conditions,508 Los Angeles’s legitimate
needs for water have also taken on new urgency. If the public interest is the
political consensus of the moment, then perhaps the public interest has
shifted, and 50% progress may be the new normal. Whether 50% progress
should been seen as half empty or half full remains to be seen.
That the public interest may be the political consensus of the moment
lends credence to the concerns of the green dissent that environmental
504 Paul S. Kibel, The Public Trust Navigates California’s Bay Delta, 51 NAT. RESOURCES J. 35,
51 (2011).
505 See Mono Lake Level, supra note 393 (showing that Mono Lake has not reached the
target level since Decision 1631).
506 See Mono Basin Clearinghouse, Mono Lake Levels 1850—Present, http://www.mono
basinresearch.org/data/levelyearly.php (last visited Apr. 17, 2015).
507 See McQuilken, supra note 396 (explaining that exports will be reduced by 70% as the
lake reaches a threshold of concern).
508 Cal. Dep’t of Water Res., Water Storage in Selected California Reservoirs, http://cdec.
water.ca.gov/cgi-progs/rpts1/STORAGEM (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (showing declines in
storage for several of California’s major reservoirs).
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protection would do better with firmer commitments than mere public
process.509 On the other hand, what if Los Angeles runs out of water? Some
Central Valley agricultural communities without access to the municipal
water grid have already done so this year,510 and it is excruciating to watch.
(Come to think of it, though with joyless irony, it looks a lot like what
happened to the agricultural communities of the Owens Valley.) Is the
indeterminacy of the doctrine its Achilles’ heel, then—impeding certainty for
both property rights and environmental protection? Or is it the genius of the
doctrine—facilitating the ongoing conversation between citizens and
sovereign that balances and rebalances competing interests as
circumstances evolve?

C. Does the Public Trust Doctrine Create Substantive or Procedural
Obligations?
Following this line of thinking, what exactly does the doctrine require
of its administrators? At least as the California Supreme Court interpreted it,
is there genuinely substantive content to the doctrine, in a meaningful
command to protect trust values? Or is there merely a procedural
requirement—similar to the procedural requirement under the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)511—to have considered them before
destroying them? The Mono Lake decision orders the Water Board to protect
trust resources as much as is feasible, but how do we know how much that
is? If we’ve thought it over and decided it’s not feasible, is that enough to
satisfy judicial scrutiny?
The language of the decision is sparse and vague on this point, so it’s
hard to say definitively what substantive force there is to the command. The
Mono Lake doctrine of ongoing oversight makes clear that the state may not
rely on past decisions as determinative without seriously assessing their
current and future consequences. And the Water Board must protect trust
values as much as is feasible, perhaps appropriately punting the
determination to agency experts, who can engage in whatever research and
public participation is necessary to evaluate what is feasible under the
circumstances. The decision doesn’t provide very much guidance about
what “feasible” actually means.
Still, the command does include a cognizable, if modest, substantive
component. The court affirmatively requires that the resource be
protected—at least as much as is feasible—and not just studied. In this
respect, the California public trust doctrine is not equivalent to the
information-forcing, substantively agnostic perspective that has come to be
associated with NEPA. Although it may be weak in comparison to the
509

See supra notes 427–444 (discussing the environmental critique of the public trust

doctrine).
510 See, e.g., Veronica Rocha, Central California Residents Rely on Bottled Water As Wells
Run Dry, L.A.. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2014, http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-central-

california-residents-wells-go-dry-20140826-story.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2015).
511 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370(h) (2012).
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statutory commands of other environmental protection laws, there is an
identifiable, substantive commitment in the California trust to achieving as
much environmental protection as possible.
Would the Water Board have satisfied the court’s command, then, had it
considered the issues and simply decided to renew Los Angeles’s rights to
divert as before? So long as it produced a solid enough record of the
evidence to withstand the arbitrary and capricious standard of judicial
review, a sympathetic court might have affirmed the agency against a
challenge in court. On the other hand, we now know that this absolutely
should not have satisfied the command to protect as much as is feasible,
because more really was feasible. At least with the benefit of hindsight, we
have seen that much more protection was possible, once Los Angeles
undertook serious water conservation measures. So it will all come down to
what kind of record the agency and plaintiffs produce, how hard a look the
overseeing court takes, and perhaps how good everyone is at predicting the
future at the moment of decision.
The requirement to protect at some level thus deviates from NEPA’s
purely procedural requirement, but it still remains unclear exactly what kind
of substantive obligation is left. In keeping with California legal tradition,
perhaps the trust obligation comes closer to the California Environmental
Quality Act’s (CEQA)512 command—which disallows approval of an
unmitigated environmentally harmful project only if the agency formally
explains the overriding public considerations that outweigh the project’s
significant impacts.513 Either way, much hinges on judicial and administrative
discretion—but this is a doctrine that stakes its entire methodology on
judicial discretion to oversee legislative and executive decision making. If
we can’t trust the court to do that, then what’s the point of the doctrine?
Yet if the doctrine really does create substantive obligations, why has it
performed so little since the Mono Lake case?514 I suppose it is possible that
everything is already perfect in California, but having lived there for a
number of years, I suspect that it is not. Nevertheless, consider how much
more the doctrine has done since then abroad, where its substantive
component has shown undeniable force in various countries in Asia, Africa,
and the Americas.515 In these international contexts, the trust sweeps with
even greater aspiration, to the delight of its proponents, and the concern of
its critics.

512

CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21081 (West 2007).

513

Id.
514 See Owen, supra note 374, at 1122–23 (demonstrating how little actual change this
doctrine has wrought in California since Mono Lake).
515 See generally Michael C. Blumm & Rachel D. Guthrie, Internationalizing the Public Trust
Doctrine: Natural Law and Constitutional and Statutory Approaches to Fulfilling the Saxion
Vision, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 741 (2012) (discussing various countries’ approaches to the public
trust doctrine).

15_TOJCI.RYAN.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

THE MONO LAKE STORY

5/14/2015 2:53 PM

637

D. How Does the Public Trust Doctrine Intersect with the Separation of
Powers?
Following naturally from these concerns, the public trust doctrine asks
us to consider the rightful roles of all the different legal actors in
accomplishing this complex decision making. What is the appropriate role of
the legislature? The courts? Administrative agencies? The citizens? Who
should get to make the tough calls? Is the court an appropriate check on
legislative action, or is it a feckless tyrant who will undo democratic
processes? How much judicial discretion are we willing to accept? And how
much power should the court have over the other branches? Should it only
be able to undo bad decisions, or should it be able to affirmatively assess
natural resource damages, as Professor Wood proposes?
It’s old legal hat by now that most policy making is appropriately
legislative, because the legislature is the designated apparatus of
government for hammering out public consensus among competing
considerations. That said, it is new legal hat that administrative agencies are
increasingly involved in the process, often by legislative invitation in broadly
framed requests for implementation, and often for good reason.516 Legislators
can’t be experts about all the thorny details in every narrow subject of legal
concern, but agency bureaucrats are subject matter experts by design. The
court helps adjudicate civil, criminal, and constitutional disputes by
interpreting the laws and the past judicial precedent making sense of them.
The citizens oversee the entire mechanism by participating in the political
process as voters, jurors, letter-writers, public commenters, NGO lobbyists,
and occasionally as plaintiffs.
The public trust doctrine engages everyone in their usual role. The
legislative and executive branches coordinate in policy making and
implementation until a citizen objects, filing a public trust claim. The court
considers the claim in light of the available doctrine to decide whether the
sovereign has abdicated a trust responsibility. If it concludes that the trust
has been violated, the court simply informs the parties that the challenged
government activity was ultra vires—beyond its authorized powers—and the
sovereign actor revisits the decision. As a matter of public trust theory, the
court doesn’t invalidate political action; the court simply interprets whether
the applicable doctrine allowed or prevented the challenged action from
having legal force. Which makes the judicial role seem less tyrannical—
although critics may legitimately worry about the expansion of judicial
power under the doctrine through unchecked judicial interpretation. Then
again, isn’t that the normal operating process of the common law?
The separation of powers concern is certainly more muted when the
doctrine is based on a constitutional or statutory source, because then the
court is simply interpreting a legislative command. There is less room for
judicial improvisation, and less room for criticism of judicial selfaggrandizement. But even when the court is interpreting the common law
516 See, e.g., Owen, supra note 374 (discussing the preeminent role of administrative
agencies in implementing trust-sensitive governance).
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public trust doctrine, itself articulated by other judges, separation of powers
concerns should not derail the doctrine.
Just as Marbury v. Madison517 had to invent judicial review of
congressional acts to protect the constitutional order,518 so the public trust
doctrine was necessary to protect sovereign regulation of critical public
commons from capture by private interests. And as noted above, what we
casually refer to as the “common law” public trust doctrine may itself be a
quasi-constitutional doctrine—or at least an inherent limit on sovereignty
that should be recognized constitutionally, even if it is not expressly created
by the constitution.519 (After all, the Constitution nowhere mentions the
words “equal footing,” and yet we uncontroversially consider that a
constitutional doctrine.)520 The Supreme Court does not presently favor this
view,521 but as does the common law, constitutional interpretation
sometimes changes with time.
If the premise of the doctrine is that some commons resources must
remain in public ownership, then the public has to be able to check political
activity that falls prey to political patronage or other shortsighted impulses
to expropriate trust values. Throwing the bums out is an insufficient
corrective if the bums have already conveyed away an irreplaceable public
trust resource—like Chicago Harbor, Mono Lake, or atmospheric integrity.
But within the constitutional order, the only other avenue available to
aggrieved citizens is to invoke judicial review, and have their day in court.
For this reason, the judicial role in public trust cases is not antidemocratic—
it is a democratic corrective. It is the citizen’s last stand, the last opportunity
to be heard within the political process.
That the doctrine should evolve through the usual processes of the
common law is necessary for the same reason the common law has always
evolved.522 As always, times change—and with them, the circumstances. The
public interest, that fleeting moment of consensus within the political
process, changes with new circumstances. It is the same philosophical
insight that underlies hallowed legal doctrines like the Rule Against
Perpetuities and others hostile to dead-hand control. The judge evaluating
the public interest in a given trust resource must have the flexibility to
adjust. Notwithstanding, judges should be careful to exercise the restraint
customary to their offices, because there is one aspect of the public trust
doctrine that makes it special among the common law.
Questions about the judicial and legislative roles with regard to the
doctrine intersect with the ultimate question that faced the California
Supreme Court in the Mono Lake case about which doctrine should trump—
517

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).

518

Id. at 177.
See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the trust as a constitutional doctrine).
See Blumm et al., supra note 65, at 494–96 (critiquing Idaho’s legislative restriction of the

519
520

doctrine on grounds that it is an implied constitutional doctrine, like the equal footing doctrine,
that should be immune from legislative abolition).
521 PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215 (2012).
522 See generally Matthews, 471 A.2d 355, 361–63 (N.J. 1984) (discussing the evolution of the
public trust doctrine).
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the common law public trust doctrine or the statutory doctrine of prior
appropriations. It was a tricky question, because when statutes conflict with
the common law, we normally conclude that the common law has been
abrogated by the statute. The judge-made precedents of the common law are
what the legal system uses to answer questions on which the legislature
hasn’t spoken—and they are usually preempted uncontroversially when the
legislature finally gets around to saying otherwise. So when the court
determined that the public trust doctrine had not been displaced by
statutory water law, that was a significant moment—revealing what sets the
public trust doctrine apart.
The decision affirms that the public trust doctrine is special among the
common law, because it doesn’t just state a principle—it acts as a constraint
on government action, limiting what the government may or may not do. It
establishes a line beyond which the government cannot go. It acts, as
discussed previously, as a limit on sovereign power.523 With that in mind,
should the sovereign be able to free itself from that limit by destroying it
with a statute? A few states may have come to that conclusion, by abolishing
or limiting the common law public trust doctrine, as Idaho famously did by
legislative enactment.524 But most have not done so, and like California, have
honored the principle that the public trust can’t be easily abrogated. To
change the public trust in these states would require public consent, as
through constitutional amendment by referendum.525
In states with strong common law doctrines, then, judges bear a
heightened responsibility to act carefully, because what they decide cannot
easily be undone by casual legislative response. In this respect, as even the
famously libertarian Professor Richard Epstein has noted, the public trust
doctrine has a constitutional dimension.526 When the Supreme Court renders
a statutory interpretation that Congress doesn’t like, it can always amend the
statute. But when the Court determines that a congressional act violates the
Constitution, the legislature has no recourse but to accept the court’s
judgment. Judicial public trust determinations have similar force, and must
be taken equally seriously.
And yet, so they are—and the sky has not fallen. Constitutional
interpretation, while important, is not exotic; this is what we regularly ask of
our courts. By and large, they are good at it. Everyone can point to a judicial
decision she doesn’t like, but that hardly invalidates the system. Indeed, we
hold out our constitutional system of judicial review as a model for the
world. In which case, perhaps we should have more faith in the judicial
administration of the public trust doctrine.
***

523

See supra note 27 and accompanying text.

524

Idaho Code Ann. § 58-1203 (West 2012).

525

See BLUMM & WOOD, supra note 47, at 4–5 (discussing the origins and nature of the public

trust doctrine and noting the open question of “whether the public trust has constitutional force
in those instances where it has not been incorporated explicitly into a constitution”).
526 Epstein, supra note 41, at 426–28.
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Returning finally to the Mono Lake story: the epic tale continues. Water
continues to flow back into the lake, and also south to Los Angeles. Decision
1631 had directed that the lake reach its target level in 2014, and of course,
that did not happen.527 As this Article goes to press, news is breaking that Los
Angeles will have to begin curtailing exports to 4,500 acre-feet per year—an
old restriction that few had expected to see again—because the lake level on
April 1, 2015 had receded to 6,380 feet.528 But there has been less rain in
California these past ten years, and it is projected that there will be even less
in the future.
Perhaps the state’s duty of ongoing supervision will eventually require
that even the current plans for diversions must be revisited because of the
drought that has prevented the Lake’s recovery. On the other hand, the lake
has recovered substantially from the time of the litigation, and the drought is
also causing hardship for Los Angelenos that may factor in to any
reconsiderations. This is the state’s delicate balancing act—its ongoing task
to negotiate between Los Angeles’s legitimate needs for imported water and
the competing environmental, cultural, and economic reasons to keep it in
the Mono Basin. The requirement of this balancing act, displacing the force
of an erroneous decision of the past, is itself a substantial achievement.
Nothing in the California Supreme Court opinion tells us exactly what
the balance should look like, but it does tell us to think things through
carefully. Bearing in mind the rich history behind the Mono Lake litigation
and all the questions it continues to raise for us, let us be certain that we do.

527 See Mono Lake Level, supra note 393 (listing historical lake levels from 1919 to as
recently as February 1, 2015).
528 McQuilken, supra note 396 (“The lake has declined to a level at which water exports to
Los Angeles are, by the terms of the State Water Board’s rules, automatically reduced by 70%.
DWP will be limited to 4,500 acre-feet of water export, a lake-protecting restriction that no one,
until recently, thought would ever be activated again. It was a solemn, though not unexpected
outcome, given that California’s drought is entering its fourth year and the Mono Lake
watershed is officially classified as being under ‘exceptional’ drought.”)

